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Verbal communication is a complex process of negotiation towards a common aim,
maximizing each participant's information about the world. Conversations typically
involve dispute, correction, and agreement between their participants. How could a
formal theory begin to describe such phenomena? In particular, how might a mathe¬
matical theory of utterance interpretation (a "formal semantics") handle the idea that
language use systematically changes the beliefs of communicating agents?
The contributions of this thesis, in the fields of logic and formal semantics, are largely
constructive. The research is carried outwithin twomain "traditions", the research pro¬
grammes of "Belief Revision", or Theory Change, and Dynamic Semantics (and to a
lesser extent, Paraconsistent Logic). These theories are integrated, and applied in a for¬
mal model of dialogue. Thus, the objective of the thesis is to examine a marriage be¬
tween "logics" of Theory Change (which describe rational modifications to theories in
the light of new information) and systems of Dynamic Semantics (which describe an
agent's processing of incoming linguistic information). This venture involves provid¬
ing a semantics for Theory Change, extending TheoryChange systems to the first-order
case (i.e. where theories are expressed in predicate logic), and interfacing the result with
existing systems of dynamic semantics. The project is placed in the larger context of for¬
mal semantics for dialogues; a theory of changing information states in communication,
and a theory of the rational agency of communicants.
Philosophically speaking (in part I) the notions of information and communication
come under scrutiny, as do some foundational issues for a formal semantics of com¬
munication. Particular definitions of information and communication are argued for;
definitions which concentrate on transformations over epistemic states as the primary
subject matter of formal semantics. A view of model-theoretic semantics is developed,
which also concludes in the importance of an epistemic approach.
In terms of formal systems (part II), the central project is the development both of a
semantics (called "Revision Semantics") for existing (propositional) systems of theory
change (Gardenfors 1988), and an extension of rational theory change systems to the
first-order case, also with semantics. This approach results in an account of utterance
interpretationwhich allows for arbitrary change in the information state of the processor
(or agent), rather than simple information growth, or update (as in Update Semantics
for example). A variety of simple completeness results are established, linking different
Theory Change systems with revisable systems of Dynamic Semantics. The systems are
robust in their handling of apparent contradictions in dialogue.
In part III, systems allowing revision are applied in the analysis of dialogue contribu¬
tions known as "repairs" or "corrections". A treatment of constituent negation clauses
and other related phenomena is provided in terms of revisable dynamic semantics. A
model of communication is proposed, by which agents can dispute and repair informa¬
tion conveyed earlier in a dialogue (either by themselves or by another agent).
The potential for a fruitful combination of paraconsistent logics (logics which are robust
in that they do not "explode" under contradiction) with revisable information states
is also considered, so that gradual revision of inconsistencies becomes possible, along
with an account of rational agent autonomy.
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In addition, the notion of change in information is discussed with regard to the 'ob¬
jects' referred to during communication. The "dialogue referents" emerging from revis-
able dynamic systems are epistemic "partial objects" whose properties can change.
In the body of the thesis, links between theory change systems and intuitionistic log¬
ics are also considered, as well a variety of approaches to the epistemic modals.
The main contributions of the thesis are the provision of revisable systems of dy¬
namic semantics, the development of first-order theory change systems (with dynamic
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A Formal Semantics of
Communication
"The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say
that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes,
the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for
the fruit appears in its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not
merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with
one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes
them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely
do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and
this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of
the whole."
(G. W. F Hegel, [52])
1.1 The significance of change
Logicians have interpreted the world in various ways— the problem is that it changes.
The quotation given above is relevant not only as a description of the flux of information
which occurs in communication, but as a reminder that the world itself changes. New
aspects of the world, and of our information about it, continuously override the old;
not just in any arbitrary way, but so as to constitute coherent unities; 'reality' and 'the¬
ory'. The world changes in accordance with natural regularities, and our acceptance of
2
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changing information about it is likewise constrained by our standards of rationality1.
Our information about theworld comes from twomajor sources; language and observa¬
tion. Both these sources are liable to radical change and even inconsistency. Agents of¬
ten receive conflicting linguistic information, and the world throws up 'contradictions'2
via temporal change: what is the case today may not be so tomorrow.
Moreover, the power of language lies in its ability both to express and change the informa¬
tion that people have about the world; how it is, was, may be, or may become. Indeed
in some cases the language used by somebody else will actually force agents (if they are
rational) to change their beliefs and to hold new ones. The research programme known
as Dynamic Semantics assumes this notion of changing individual information states as
the basis for a theory ofmeaning (although it shall be disputed that such a theory could
give an exhaustive account of meaning).
As has been mentioned, the significance of change lies not only in the philosophy of
language. Theory Change or BeliefRevision systems have been motivated by the notions
of change in databases, legal systems, and epistemic states of (either real or artificial)
agents (see eg: William James [58]), as well as in scientific theories3. Amongst other
philosophers, Quine has pointed out the importance of the provisional nature of all the¬
ories (the "Quine-Duhem thesis" see eg: [80]). Figures in the philosophy of science (Pop¬
per, Kuhn, Lakatos) have stressed that all theories encounter (sometimes radical) revi¬
sion in the face of empirical refutation. Carl Hempel (see [54]) attempted to systematise
scientific theory change, providing part of the motivation for "belief revision" systems.
Nevertheless, in contrast to these historical precedents, the focus of this thesis is the ap¬
plication of "logics" of theory change as a central part of a dynamic semantics of di¬
alogue. An account is sought of how the processing of linguistic structures is seen to
construct and modify agent-relative theories and information states.
1These rationality constraints apply to coherence of discourse, narrative, and dialogue, as well as sci¬
entific theory change.
2In the sense that, unless new information supplants prior information, rather than simply adding to it,
contradictions ensue.
'in addition, for a discussion of the importance of change in the Philosophy of History, see [70].
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1.1.1 Origins
One way of approaching this thesis is via the argument that agent-relative theories, or
their contents (individual information states), play a crucial role in communication. By
a "theory" I mean the syntactic characterization of an agent-relative epistemic state (or
information state); the sort of thing which has previously been dubbed a "belief state,"
or "belief system". However, the "belief states" which I consider have little connection
with the usual philosophical concerns about propositional attitudes. Indeed, in order to
avoid any misleading entanglementwith the literature on the propositional attitudes, I
prefer (along with most current researchers) to do away with the label of "Belief Revi¬
sion" in favour of "Theory Change."
An integration of formal semanticswith an account of communication is long overdue4,
and certainly, some theory-like construct is central to achieving that goal. For not only
are theories indispensible in our everyday theory of persons, but they are also the best
starting point from which to approach the semantics of dialogue and a theory of com¬
munication in general. Moreover, some philosophers argue that an approach centered
around (what I have called) theories is the best starting point for a scientific analysis of
cognition in general (see eg: Dennett [24]). In addition, most research in AI and formal
semantics assumes constructs similar to agent-relative mini-theories (eg: "background
knowledge", "conceptual schemes", or "frames") as an essential foundation. In general,
then, formal treatment of such pragmatic and contextual factors is central to an account
of communication
Against this, some philosophers might urge that the notion of a "theory" is too vague
to be of any special interest whatever. Such comments are correct insofar as they point
out the lack of precision in the commonsense notion of "belief systems", but also fail to
recognise that such "theories" can be refined and formalized to a useful extent. In part,
this thesis embodies an attempt to further that project.
In particular, I take operations of theory change (TC) or "belief revision" (transformations
over theories) to be of central importance in an adequate explanation of communicative
linguistic behaviour. Indeed, communication is explicated as a series of (potentially)
theory-changing speech-actions, as a process of iterated "belief revision".
4For example, see [44]
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Crucially, the stance taken here on the central importance of the notion of a theory (or
"information state") does not imply any ontological commitment to those theories above
the level of that of theoretical entities 5. Theories do not exist like houses and trees, but
are syntactic classifications of epistemic states. It is in this sense that I go on to advocate
semantics as a branch of mathematical epistemology.
Ontologically speaking, I construe a theory essentially as a rational agent's epistemic
approximation of a state-of-affairs, (or a "set-up", or situation6). Structures distinctly
like theories are central to an account of linguistic understanding, and are to be elimi¬
nated only at that expense.
1.1.2 Communication and Change
The vast majority of semantical research in the philosophical tradition concentrates on
language as a relation between propositions and the world, rather than as a tool of com¬
municants. Obviously this concern with language-world correspondences (referential
truth-conditional semantics) overlooks much of the mechanics of everyday language
use. However, worse than that, this traditional emphasis produces a somewhat blink¬
ered vision of some central theoretical points concerning language use in general. Com¬
municative behaviour relies more often on speaker-hearer correspondences, as it involves
negotiation for the purpose of co-ordinating action. Some recent formal linguistic theo¬
ries (eg: DRT [61], DPL [46]) have concentrated quite convincingly on the modelling of a
linguistic agent's interpretation of utterances. However, this hearer-centered perspec¬
tive7 also produces a philosophically misleading approach to semantics. Both the old
and new traditions in formal linguistics and philosophy of language fail, in a damag¬
ing way, to do justice to simple communicative considerations. Dialogues are often used
to resolve disagreements, repair misconceptions, and negotiate theories. Such dynamic
processes require the interpretation of utterances not only to add to the information of
dialogue participants8, but also, potentially, to change their information.
5see Quine, "On Mental Entities" p.223 in [80]
6These being notions derived from Russell, the relevant logicians, and situation semantics respectively
7Paul Dekker calls this a "recipient oriented" semantics in [21].
sAs is the case in Update Semantics and Dynamic Predicate Logic, and their progeny.
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If the explanatory scope of Dynamic Semantics is to be extended to cover commu¬
nicative contexts, so that actual dialogue contributions can be formally treated, an incor¬
poration of processes of information change is essential.
I take the task of a formal semantics of dialogues to be the construction of a mathe¬
matical theory of the interpretation and production by agents of utterances during com¬
munication. This project is to be sharply distinguished from the usual philosophical
task of semantics as uncovering the meanings of utterances. This "agent oriented" ap¬
proach is an epistemological, rather than metaphysical, venture.
Outline of the body of the thesis
Firstly, the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:
I define some basic terms and make distinctions. Then the assumptions underlying the
thesis are laid bare and given some initial argument. The exploration revolves around a
discussion of the issue ofmathematical modelling issues in semantics. The precise area
of application that concerns me here is the mathematical modelling of linguistic com¬
munication in terms of changing "information states." The main worrieswill be:
(1) How could a mathematical theory explain communicative phenomena?
and, (2) What notion of "information state" is needed in a formal semantics of commu¬
nication?
The concern of the first chapter is to establish and argue for the philosophical un¬
derpinnings of the approach, which I am only able to hint at later on. In particular I
focus here on the notions of information and communication, and foundational prob¬
lems with the venture of formal semantics in general.
Having established some basic foundations in the first two chapters (part I), the the¬
sis becomes increasingly formal in part II, until the applications and discussion of part
III. Once the groundwork of part I is established, the following chapters concentrate on
formal problems in Theory Change, Dynamic Semantics, and dialogue modelling, and
logical tools with which to solve them. It is to this end that the theory change and dy¬
namic semantical systems introduced in chapter 2 are combined.
One clear point which motivates the shift towards first-order theories (in chapter
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5) is that information exchange in communication cannot, in general, be described at a
coarse propositional level. In particular, a restriction to the propositional calculus fails
to account for the "grain" of correction exploited by constituent negation clauses, and
anaphor resolution. Analysis of constituent negation clauses (in chapter 7) reveals that
a predicate calculus style of formalization is required to account for the fine-grained in-
crementality of the interpretation of corrections. This point counts againstmanyAI type
belief models, which take propositions as the unit of change (eg: AGM belief revision).
Of course, themore fine-grained systems still have to satisfy the propositional-level con¬
straints (AGM rationality postulates).
Initially (in chapters 3 to 7), the performance of an ideal and gullible rational agent
in communication is investigated. Later the issue of agent autonomy is explored (Chap¬
ter 8), introducing more sceptical agents. An autonomous rational agent is one who will
revise their current information if the result of that revision coheres better with their
previously established theory, and generally forms a more informative9 system. Thus a
form of limited agent autonomy (limited only by their rationality) is preserved, relative
to each individual's operational theory.
In addition, the claim that some notion of partial or abstract, arbitrary or conceptual
object is essential in an informational account of language understanding is explored
in Chapter 6. I explore the idea that such objects, or "dialogue referents" can change in
various ways.
The central concepts of the thesis are now considered.
1.2 Definitions and Distinctions
Some basic notions for the ensuing enquiry are defined below. Many of these definitions
will be given a formal characterization in the main body of the thesis.
A theory is the syntactic form of an agent's epistemic approximation of some portion
of reality. A theory is a partial description of the world as perceived by an agent.
By agent I mean an idealized rational information processor, with the capacity for
9A way of measuring the relative merits of competing theories shall be explored.
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perception and action, including linguistic action.
By information conveyed by an utterance I mean the change in the content of an
agent's theory induced by their interpretation of that utterance.
By communication between agents I mean information exchange for the purpose of
changing the contents of theories belonging to those agents.
By exchange of information I mean the construction and revision of agent-relative
theories (rather than the actual transfer of "pieces of information" from one agent to
another.)
An agent's interpretation of an utterance is taken to be its construction of an epis-
temic approximation (a partial theory) to the state-of-affairs supposedly described by
that utterance, relative to the agent's background beliefs and context set by prior dia¬
logue.
Notice some consequences of the above definitions. Information states, as I define
them, are partial, cannot be separated from interpretation, and are thus agent relative.
This definition contrasts with some current approaches (eg: Barwise [10]) to informa¬
tion, as shall shortly be explored. Informational factors are to be distinguished from log¬
ical ones. The class of logical possibilities is much wider than the class of informational
options, for information must obey rational epistemic constraints aswell as logical ones.
(See the "multiple extensions problem" later in this chapter.)
The notions of rationality and logicality are therefore understood to be distinct. Ra¬
tional options are always a subset of the logical options, but not vice versa.
• The communicative effect10 of an utterance is the actual change that it induces in the
epistemic state of its hearer.
• An utterance is informative (or has communicative effect) only in the case that it
changes (either expands or contracts) the range of epistemic possibilities of the hearer.
(A consequence of this is that non-eliminative statements are genuinely informa¬
tive.)
10Dynamic Semanticists usually take this to be the meaning of an utterance
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• To understand an utterance, upon hearing it, is to recognize the change it would
make for your epistemic state (beliefs) if you were to incorporate it as sound in¬
formation. This is a hearer's interpretation. Thus hearers can understand utterances
which they don't actually believe.
1.2.1 Methodology and Empirical goals of the thesis
The overall explanatory aim of the thesis is to draw out the principles and structures
underlying the notion of changing information states as they are manipulated in com¬
munication. The empirical work to be achieved is the extension of the data coverage
of systems of Dynamic Semantics (see chapter 7). Currently, there are many dialogue
contributions11 which cannot be formally analysed because they have to do with the
correction, repair, and recovery strategies of the participants. These dialogues involve
contraction of established information, and, more often than not, revision of contradic¬
tory information. Most commonly, such dialogue contributions are manifested as con¬
stituent negation clauses. For example:
Example 1 (van Leusen 1994)
A: They gave Tim a blue kite.
B: No, they gave Tim a YELLOW kite.
The semantics developed here, it is hoped, will advance the formal treatment of such
utterances and other dialogue contributions in dynamic semantics (again, see chapter
7).
Furthermore, the systems developedwill go someway to explaining themanner inwhich
communicants manage to agree on referents, and share information about "objects". As
with all scientific endeavours, some degree of predictive power is expected of the model
developed. Predictionswill take the form of rationality constraints upon options for the
next utterance in a dialogue.
"See, for example, corrections in the the Map Task [15] dialogues.
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The data to be covered will be drawn from the linguistics literature on corrections
and repairs in discourse and dialogue (van Leusen [99], Carletta, Caley, and Isard [15],
Levelt [73]). Cases will also be presented in the form of "talk experiments"; invented
"mini-dialogues" which illustrate certain phenomenawhich revisionsmight handle. Like
"thought experiments", "talk experiments" are supposed to uncover conceptual con¬
straints on rational language use. Their purpose is to explore possible dialogues, and
uncover dialogue strategies. In particular, the use of epistemicmodals, constituent nega¬
tion, and question forms will be significant. The data draws out the kinds of informa¬
tion structureswhich can feature in revisions, and the types of expressions used to effect
such changes.
1.3 Change in Dynamic Semantics
If the spirit of dynamic semantics (which I argue is that "communicative effect is the change
induced in the hearer's information state") is really to be taken seriously, then dynamic
systems do not only require a notion of update (simply adding a sentence and its con¬
sequences), but also ways of revising and contracting information (handling contradic¬
tions, and retracting previously established information.) The repair and recovery strate¬
gies of agents in dialogue have implications for a theory of information in communica¬
tion.
Formal semantics needs to be integrated with an account of communication in gen¬
eral. The setting for nearly all dynamic theories of semantics has been discourse, whereas
it is clear that dialogue is a basic form of language use12. A primary purpose of language
use is to change the epistemic (or, more precisely doxastic) states of other agents. Formal
semantics has commonly abstracted away from communicative issues, relegating them
to the "dustbin of pragmatics." Empirical adequacy demands, however, that commu¬
nication be seen as the correct setting for semantic theories in general (otherwise many
dialogue contributions cannot be analysed.) Indeed, onemight regard discourse as a re¬
stricted case of dialogue. The upshot for formal semantics is that individualistic consid¬
erations become more important; different individuals have different semantic options,
12See eg: [44]
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and the agent-relativity of information states becomes a driving force behind commu¬
nicative language use.
In contrast to the stance sketched above, the more philosophical notions of "Mean¬
ing", "Truth", and "Reference" are commonly understood to transcend the epistemic
limitations of agents. These notions are, therefore, peripheral in the account of commu¬
nication sought here. However, they still play an important role at the boundary of that
account. Meaning, truth, and reference, as they relate to theworld, perform the function
of being the regulative ideals of information exchange in communication. The account
of informational factors in dialogue sought here is to rely upon (a formalization of) the
epistemic states of agents, and largely eschews the discussion ofmeaning and truth. In¬
formation is understood to be an essentially epistemic notion (contra Channel Theory,
Situation Theory), which is a facet of an agent's interpretation of communicative signals
and perceptions, as opposed to an independent substance inherent in reality. Indeed, I
offer a definition of information for formal semantics, in terms of change.
Definition 1 A signal "carries information" if it has the capacity to change an agent's commit¬
ment to a set ofepistemic possibilities.
This definition does not restrict information to being true, and relieves it of any meta¬
physical burden. It also classifies signals which might have previously been thought of
as absurdities as informative. Utterances which contradict the hearer's information (re¬
sulting in changing it, rather than monotonically increasing it), are informative. Infor¬
mation so defined is amenable to formal treatment, and is quite adequate for the pur¬
poses of formal semantics.
Note that (epistemic) possibilities are connected to the world. They are ways that the
world might be, so that information is about the world, but not in it.
Defining communication; the primacy of semantics
Communication is construed as an attempt by agents to converge on a shared (or mu¬
tually acceptable) theory about the world. In other words, communication is modelled
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as iterated theory change between agents. An advantage of this approach is that it (at
least) allows a putative theory of communication, and is amenable to formal treatment
and analysis. The notions of theory building and revision become central to an account
of communication. Theories are syntactic structures, their contents are semantical (in¬
formation states). Information processing is handled syntactically while the content of
an information state or theory is given by way of model-theoretic semantics (see eg:
Wansing [106]). For practical purposes, the computational tractability of theory change
systems (symbol processing accounts) supercedes that of a corresponding intensional
semantics (which operates over sets of possibilities). In that case, one might ask, why
bother with the semantics at all? Some have argued that if a semantics is merely an al¬
ternative characterization of syntactic results (ie: is a "merely" formal semantics), then
it ought to be dispensed with. What is the point, some might ask, of looking at theory
change through semantical goggles? There are at least 4 replies to this critique:
(1) Semantics provides a notion of content.
(2) Syntactical systems are based on semantical intuition in the first place. Seman¬
tical notions like truth and consistency preservation provide constraints on admissi¬
ble processing algorithms. Without semantical ideas as a foundation and guide, there
would be no constraints on admissible syntactic systems.
(3) A semantics allows the exploration of correctness and completeness for a formal
system. Semantics functions so as to define a notion of correctness for information pro¬
cessing accounts.
(4) Semantical exploration, intuition, and insight, can lead to the invention of new
processing algorithms.
These considerations (as well as the desired "marriage" with Dynamic Semantics)
motivate the provision of a semantics for Theory Change (in the next chapter), and a
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primarily semantical model of communication (as opposed to a symbol processing ac¬
count). Of course, the first-order theory change systems of chapter 5 provide a symbol
processing approach to the phenomena modelled by their corresponding systems of dy¬
namic semantics. It shall also be demonstrated that the semantics for theory change
is not "merely" formal, but preserves intuitions about the changing commitments of
agents to "inhabit" various "realms" of possibility.
1.4 Communication and Information
The methodology of this thesis is the application of logic in order to reveal features of
information structures relevant to natural language interpretation in communication.
This venture requires a clear understanding both ofwhat counts as communication, and
what an explanation in terms of "information states" actually is (or should be). Such
an understanding requires a rigorous conception of information, in both its syntactic
and semantical guises, as well as criteria which establish what is to count as success¬
ful communication. I have already given basic definitions of these concepts as I think
they should be employed. They are now analysed in some detail. Aspects of both these
foundational conceptions are noticeably lacking in current theories of formal seman¬
tics, which employ a variety of notions of "information state" and are explicitly hearer-
centered.
1.4.1 Communication
The first issue which must be addressed is; What is to count as successful communica¬
tion?
The proposal embodied in the following chapters is that successful communication be¬
tween two agents should be defined as their increasing convergence upon a shared theory
about the world.
This proposal begs the following questions:
(1) What notion of theory is needed to support an account of communication?
(2) What notion of sharing is needed for communication?
(3) What notion of convergence can ensure that communication is so often successful?
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To answer these in brief: a theory is taken to be a syntactic structure, simply a set
of sentences of some formal language. The content of the theory is a semantical object;
the set of possibilities which support that theory (the set of possibilities to which an
agentwho espouses that theory is committed). A theory becomes shared in a very weak
sense; only in that the agents find it mutually acceptable. This agreement on a "shared"
theory can be establisehed through dialogue, when the contents of each agent's theories
are changed so as to be isomorphic. This establishing of a shared theory structure be¬
tween individuals is taken to be the starting point for a "structural realism" about the
entities referred to during communication. One cannot require that shared theories are
syntactically identical, for this would be an impossibly strong requirement, but agents
can hope to establish a strong structural correlation between their respective theories.
This structural similarity amounts to "dialogue referents" or theoretical objects playing
the same role in each agent's theory. Of course, there is much to be said about what the
notion of "the same role" amounts to, especially under change. I shall return to this is¬
sue later in the thesis.
As for convergence criteria, theories ought to approach each other's version of the
world as much as possible, as well as seeking consistency and truth. Ultimately, the
quest for consistency and its preservation drives theory change processes, and the no¬
tion of truth is the regulative ideal to which all good theories aspire. In this regard, it is
also crucial to acknowledge that (without physical confirmation) no agent can be certain
that they have communicated successfully, whilst admitting that in practice they man¬
age it all the time, and that agents can detect and repair communication failure. Indeed,
the notions of falsification and subsequent repair of theories are central to an account of
communication as iterated belief revision.
Communicative failures are grounded out through action. With only language to go on,
agents can never have knowledge that a communicative utterance has been successful
("the problem of communication"). Action is unambiguous in a way that words cannot
be. Actual physical copresence (or deixis)13 is often needed to verify shared reference,
whereas mere "linguistic coprescence" is always open to possible falsification and sub-
13see Clark and Marshall [18]
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sequent revision. If one takes for granted that communicants can, in the last resort, ac¬
tually leave aside the resources of the spokenword and finally just point to relevant ob¬
jects14, then there comes a point where action in the physical world eventually grounds
out reference and predication.
This point applies to the issue of the degree of sharing which a theory of communica¬
tion needs to allow its agents. An adequate account of communication needs at least
to admit that agents share (a part of) the world, or more explicitly, an environment that
they perceive similarly.
1.4.2 The problem of communication
Important issues can only be addressed here once some criteria are in place for what
counts as sharing reference and communicating successfully about the same thing. A
first attemptmight be to say that, as a default assumption, people assume that they share
referents. However, it is clear that communication often brings agents to realise that
they have in fact failed to share referents (eg: talking at cross purposes, and so on), and
they are then able to remedy the mistake. The fact that this type of problem actually
arises needs to be accounted for by any theory of communication. There is a vital dis¬
tinction between an objective "third-party" view of a conversation, and the perspective
available to, and required by, the dialogue participants. The latter is to be the subject of
a model of communication, being the "information states" of the individual agents.
This brings about the "problem of communication"; that of a complete lack of any
guarantee that communication is occurring within the framework of a shared concep¬
tualization, or classificatory and referential scheme. An important consequence is that
"shared" theories are in fact not, as discussed above, strictly speaking available. Agents
can have approximations as to what they might assume their dialogue partner's beliefs
to be. (These nested epistemic states are built up primarily by use of questions and the
"test" epistemic modals, e.g. " John might be in", "Presumably you're on your way.",
"That must be John.")
I am concerned with an account of information "exchange", or rather, reconstruc-
14Leaving aside the Wittgensteinian objections (from [109]) that this too is a conventional linguistic act,
and that verification of physical copresence is impossible for many parts of language use .
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tion, in dialogue. Here, information is conceived of as any stimulus altering the range
of epistemic states of a cognitive agent15. These epistemic states can be about the world,
so that some information is about the world, or they can relate only to fictional objects.
In opposition to this, some researchers (eg: Dretske [27], Barwise [10]) take informa¬
tion to be essentially true. Of course, there is no real-world information in fictional state¬
ments, but I seek a wider conception of information, which is not to be restricted simply
to the analysis of factual declarative sentences. There are informative statementswhich
are about non-actual states of affairs. There are even informative statements (utterances
which change the information state of their processor) which are false.
Now, examine a brief statement of the problem of communication.
Dynamic semantics (or cognitive semantics generally) often supposes that although the
referent that each participant has in the (physical) world is the same object, theymay have
different conceptualizations of, or ways of referring to, that object in their private (men¬
tal) worlds, or epistemic states.
So one can say that agents share the same (dialogue) referent if and only if their concep¬
tualizations of it in that context are fixed and identical. The question now is: how can
agents know if their conceptualizations are the same without physically pointing to or
otherwise indicating an object? The point being that we may need to rely after all on the
physical world in order to define the identity relation even if we are interested in only
the one in conceptualizations 16.
Take an example:
Example 2 A: - "That's a good book."
B: "Yes, Donleavy is very witty."
A: "Oh! No. I meant Peake's book!"
Could one say here that A and B now definitely share the same (dialogue internal)
referent? Agent A may be talking about the book Swritten by Peake whilst agent B may
have inmind a different book T, also written by Peake. For them to resolve the dialogue
referent, they might be finally forced to point to the actual book. Perhaps even pointing
15Of course, the stimulus, or signal, is interpreted, which is the point of doing the semantics.
16These points were put to me by Tsutuomo Fujinami.
A Formal Semantics ofCommunication 17
to that bookmay be a part of a conceptualization? Therefore, some theorists are tempted
to say that dialogue partners must share the same book physically.
The question here, put forward by its critics, is whether dynamic semantics might be
possible without reference to the physical world. Ultimately of course, the answermust
be negative. I have already argued that reality acts as the ideal to which agent's epis-
temic states approximate. But the issue demands further clarification.
The problem is one of sharing reference in communication, and crucially, knowledge that
reference is shared. So, identity criteria on referents ("talking about the same thing")
seem to be decisive.
On a "cognitive" semanticist's explanation/description of events, reference relations
are not independent of humans, needing to be "grasped" correctly in communication
(the Fregean "magical" theory of reference), but are constructed and refined according
to task and context. Thus there is not just one correct reference relation, but a family
of such admissible relations. The idea is that we can explain "talking about the same
thing" simply by assuming that people share the same epistemic strategies, that is that
they assume that reference is shared, to begin with, and then refine this belief during
the discourse (using the kinds of operations which I provide in "Revision Semantics").
They do have to pay real attention towhat their perception of the real world is, of course,
so that some kind of causal/direct reference account is also a crucial part of the story.
Dynamic Semantics really is not denying that the world has a crucial role to play in ut¬
terance interpretation. The problem was that, in order to share reference, at some stage
agents are forced to actually go and point to objects in the world. However, experience
dictates that only sometimes is this necessary, even for physical objects. In addition,
this argument cannot accommodate cases where agents discuss "abstract" and "non¬
existent" objects, for example "democracy" and "the proposed Nuclear Tests". Surely
there are true statements to be made about democracy and Nuclear Tests, which are not
(and cannot be) determined by going and pointing to them.
On the issue of truth and falsity, these notions are of course considerably less central to a
dynamic account. The business ofDS revolves around the assertions that agents are pre¬
pared to make on the basis of their (partial and changing) information about the world.
From the point of view of formal semantics (rather than philosophy) "truth on the basis
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of available evidence" is more of interest than any more abstract notion. Of course the
world ("the way things really are") is the final arbiter of disputes; but evidence drawn
from the world is used to revise an agent's conceptualizations of it. Therefore, Dynamic
Semantics does not ignore the world at all, it simply gives agents' epistemic states re¬
lated to it, their "theories" concerning it, considerablymoreweight in a semantic theory.
All in all, when the focus is on communication, the epistemic states of agents are of cen¬
tral importance, and reality is peripheral.
1.5 Information
Contemporary cognitive science is keen to explain the mind as an "information process¬
ing system", and in this way commits itself both to a computational and informational
model of scientific explanation. Typically, however, explanations in the established sci¬
ences take universal laws and initial conditions causally to force the occurrence of the
event to be explained 17. In that case, what explanatory force do the notions of "infor¬
mation" and computation have? Whilst computation in the abstract is very well under¬
stood, information does not have this virtue (Information Theory18 as a branch ofmath¬
ematics deals with quantities of information in signals subject to interference, as opposed
to the content and structure required in NL interpretation.) The menagerie of different
structures masquerading as "information states" is too populated to explore fully here,
and for now it is enough to ask what a formal semantics requires of the notion. In par¬
ticular, where is information to reside on the following scale of distinctions? (In order
of increasingly "abstract" ontological status):
• Interpretation - theory change - dynamic semantics (Beliefs "in flux")
• Theories - static belief systems - doxastics (Justified Belief)
l7Hempel. C. [54] "The Deductive-Nomological model of scientific explanation".
lsAs established by Shannon and Weaver [91]
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• Knowledge - epistemics (Justified True Belief)
• Meaning - traditional semantics (Reference)
• Truth - metaphysics
From my earlier comments, it should be clear that I take "information" to reside at the
first point of the above scale. The second and third points on the scale correspond to
"static" information, or information that has been accepted (or believed) by an agent
(their "background knowledge"). The following everyday uses of the term "informa¬
tion" can help to support this view. For example;
"I got some good information from Harry today"
"There was very little information in today's news,"
and, "I'm writing to inform you ofmy change of address"
"You are not very well informed."
The basic features to be extracted here are:-
1. Information is something that agents have.
2. Agents generate information via perception and interpretation.
3. Agents use language to express and change information in narrative and communi¬
cation.
4. Agents typically gain more information than that which is explicitly communicated
by a sender. Context fills in "gaps", and inference creates more detailed information.
Information is thus underdetermined by a signal.
In order to accommodate these features, the broad approach taken in this thesis agrees
with much of the spirit of currentwork in dynamic semantics, where the epistemic state
of an agent plays a crucial role in their interpretation of linguistic expressions. However,
I argue (contrary to the literature on Dynamic Semantics) that meanings, whatever they
are, cannot be identified with transformations over epistemic states.
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1.5.1 The Informational Metaphor
The current "informational trend" in semantics, philosophy, and logic can be traced back
perhaps to Dretske's [27] "Knowledge and the Flow of Information" (1981). Since then,
most active researchers have payed more than lip-service to the movement. The prob¬
lem seems to be that information has been tied too strongly (for the purposes of seman¬
tics anyway) to truth and knowledge. Semanticists ought to be interested in information
as it relates to belief— a much weaker notion. Frege's concern with the "cognitive sig¬
nificance" of propositions (in [33]) (in particular the informativeness of identity state¬
ments) is at the root of the issues here, and ought to be taken as a starting point for a
theory of information as it relates to semantics.
Along with writers such as Asher and Landman, I take information to be truth-value
neutral, thus trivially permitting false information, as something close to propositional
content. However, for researchers such as Perry, Israel, Dretske, Fodor, Barwise, and
Seligman, if a signal carries the information that p, then p is true.
Crucially (and this counts against a Realist or Platonist conception of information),
in addition to correct information agents can have the wrong information too; that is, a
partial model of the world which reality won't suffer gladly. However, one ought not
to look to reality as the source of mis-information, but to the fallible inferential and rep¬
resentational capacities of epistemically limited agents.
There is a multitude of sub-doxastic processes going on in the brain, amongst them
the processing of speech. On this account, the sub-doxastic level of processing is where
information emerges. The more substantial and stable doxastic level, of interpretation
and production of language, is where information emerges in concrete form. Informa¬
tion, then, is not solely linguistic, and is not in the world, but emerges from the rela¬
tion between a cognitive agent and the world. It is a mistake to think of information
as "stuff" either in the head or in the world. We speak both of people "having infor¬
mation" and physical objects (newspapers, signals) "containing/ conveying informa¬
tion" but these metaphors obscure a crucial distinction. Only agents have information,
whereas certain relations between agents and objects give rise to this information. This
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distinction is illustrated by the fact that 2 individuals may extract quite different infor¬
mation from the same physical object (e.g. a text), so that objects have the potential to
inform (due to their causal relations in the world), but it is agents who choose either to
believe or disbelieve (to adopt or to reject) the information which they generate from
objects. Also, note here the crucial role of inference in determining the information con¬
veyed by a signal. Conventions of interpretation license various inferences from certain
kinds of structures.
However, it is enough for a formal semantics of communication to note that the no¬
tion of an information state as a set of possibilities has some important virtues. The first
is that it is ontologically neutral. Information states as sets of possibilities, or functions
mapping variables onto entities in amodel, are silent about themodes of existence pecu¬
liar to the variables in its domain, or entities in its range. Intuitively, however, such a no¬
tion seems a little bizarre if one persists in confusing the model for a description of actual
psychological events. It is difficult to conceive of communication as simply the mutual
exchange of sets of possibilities. Indeed, something stronger is required in a suitable
conception of information for communication. As was drawn out earlier, some stable
definition of a subject is essential for agents who believe that they are talking about the
same thing. This point places a requirement on a theory of communication to provide
an account of persistent "informational entities" as the subjects of dialogue. A notion
of "dialogue referents" is required around which disputes can revolve and be resolved.
So, although the dynamic or epistemic approach to information is to be applauded, it
needs strengtheningbyway of a solid understanding of the informational entities (pegs,
discourse markers, proto-objects etc.) which are constructed and manipulated during
communication. This is partly my objective in chapter 6.
To conclude this discussion; formal semantics does not require a realist and truth-
laden notion of information. In fact, if all information is true, as the philosophers re¬
quire, then most of the "information" dealt with in formal semantics is not information
at all.
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1.5.2 Information change: Eliminativism versus Constructivism
Another point of departure in a debate concerning a suitable notion of information for
communication concerns the conditions under whichwe are to say that information has
increased or grown. The approach of [101], [46], and [21] (amongst others) has been that
information increases at the expense of possibilities. That is, as Sherlock Holmes would
have argued, if we eliminate all possibilities except one, then that possibility, however
remote, must be the truth. To restrict a theory of information to this insight is a seri¬
ous mistake, for such an approach entirely neglects the sense of information growth in
which possibilities are constructed, and avenues for investigation opened up19. Dekker's
Eliminative Dynamic Predicate Logic20 allows a very minimal "constructive" aspect of
information growth; the introduction of new variables. I advocate a significant exten¬
sion of this approach, with an emphasis on revisions. In addition to the elimination of
possibilities a more important role must be allowed for the construction of new avenues
of possibility, or the re-investigation of previously discarded ones. This is more than just
the introduction of new discourse referents, and demands an entire theory of informa¬
tion revision.
The appropriate formalisms construe information states as combinations of sets of
variable assignments and sets of possible worlds in a first-order model-theoretic seman¬
tics. Given the above discussion, such a formal characterization might at once appear
(perhaps like most work in formal semantics) both technical and crude, but by the end
of this chapter it should be clear that such an approach is useful in important respects,
especially in comparisonwith the stances taken by other theories. In particular, a meta¬
physical conception of information as having agent independent existence (eg: the in-
fons ofSituation Semantics [10]) should be avoided, while on the other hand, a construal
of information in terms of an agent's mental representations (in any strong sense of "rep¬
resentation") must be dismissed. While the discussion above has, I hope, sketched the
horns of this dilemma, the following discussion points to an acceptable escape route.
19If Holmes has never even heard of Dr. Moriarty, he cannot eliminate him from his enquiries.
20This is somewhat of a misnomer, as the next chapter reveals.
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1.6 Mathematical Models in Formal Semantics
Semantics as part of a "Cognitive Science" is often caught precariously between the con¬
cerns of logic and philosophy on the one hand, and the demands of an empirical psycho¬
logical account of linguistic behaviour on the other. Psychological evidence repeatedly
supports the claim that humans do not behave logically, while at the same time cog¬
nitive science seeks logic-based information processing mechanisms behind reasoning
and linguistic activity. In order to avoid this seeming conflict, informational and logical
factors must be distinguished. I provide just such a distinction in the following chap¬
ter, using the Multiple Extensions Problem (from the literature on Theory Change) to
motivate rationality constraints on change as informational constraints on interpreta¬
tion. I eschew descriptive psychological considerations largely in favour of the norma¬
tive ideal of an ideal rational agent. The main body of the thesis, then, employs math¬
ematical modelling as its primary methodology. But how can a mathematical model of
interpretation, a "formal semantics", be seen as scientifically explanatory?
In part, the following is a sketch of the explanatory framework of a Formal Seman¬
tics which properly pays its dues to communication. The sketch builds on the same
foundations as most currentwork; the model-theory of language presented in Wittgen¬
stein's Tractatus [108]. However, it modifies them in a way that takes seriously epis-
temic states21 emerging from communicative language use, as the subject matter of a
scientific semantics.
Wittgenstein's conception in the Tractatus was (in part) to provide a mathematical
model of language, along the lines of the mathematics of mechanics. For instance, as
Hertz wrote of puzzles about the "nature" of force in mechanics:
"Why is it that people never in this way ask what is the nature of gold, or what
is the nature of velocity? Is the nature of gold better known to us than that of
force? Can we by our conceptions, by our words, completely represent the na¬
ture of any thing? Certainly not. I fancy the difference must lie in this. With
the terms "velocity" and "gold" we connect a large number of relations to other
terms; and between all these relations we find no contradictions which offend
us. We are therefore satisfied and ask no further questions. But we have ac¬
cumulated around the terms "force" and "electricity" more relations than can
21A terminological problem here is that, strictly speaking, these states are not epistemic (since knowledge
carries the presumption of truth), but doxastic.
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be completely reconciled amongst themselves. We have an obscure feeling of
this and want to have things cleared up. Our confused wish finds expression
in the confused questions as to the nature of force and electricity. But the an¬
swer whichwe want is not really an answer to this question. It is not by finding
out more and fresh relations and connections that it can be answered; but by
removing the contradictions existing between those already known, and thus
perhaps by reducing their number. When these painful contradictions are re¬
moved, the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but
our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions."
(Hertz, [55], quoted in [59])
The mathematical models in mechanics are completely determined by their formal
properties, and as such their limits of applicability are specified, as it were, from inside
the system itself. The parallel idea of explaining from within a mathematical system the
limits of a language thus eschewed cultural/psychological origins of linguistic "con¬
cepts", concentrating instead on the formal structure of relations between propositions.
Just as spurious questions concerning the reality of "lines of force" in mechanics were to
be dissolved by regarding them as relations in a model which is practically applicable,
so confusions surrounding linguistic items could be bypassed through consideration
of the formal function of their corresponding model-theoretic counterparts. The logi¬
cal formalisms of Frege and Russell were then to be used to construct a mathematically
precisemodelling tool formally capable of showing how internal structures of linguistic
expressions represent corresponding structures of objects in the world, and their modes
of combination into facts.
This was then, broadly, the "picture theory" of language, the intention of which was to
elucidate the workings of a language by way of modelling the structure of its terms as
they are used. The theory was to provide an understanding of the nature of language
fromwithin a mathematically rigorous system, therefore avoiding the circularity of stat¬
ing explicitly a theory about language. Crucially, properties of a language are to be un¬
derstood via a mathematical model, the structure of which demonstrates, rather than
states, the nature of that language. Terms are to be understood by way of their func¬
tions in models.
But how does a model "show" us structure, and what is its relation to the language
in question, and to the world? Methodological issues concerning the interpretation of
model structures become central to the Tractarian position, and indeed the enterprise of
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formal semantics as a whole. Wittgenstein, of course, held that the language-world con¬
nection could not be stated in themodel-theory, only "shown" by it. Thus the Tractatus
left the language-world connection to itself, as something ineffable, leaving only mod¬
els as a kind ofmetaphor for language. Logical relations hold only within a symbolism,
so that formal models can never be anchored (as a matter of logic) to theworld that they
describe, but only by convention.
A model exhibits its structure purely by virtue of the formally specified relations hold¬
ing over its elements. This allows theorists to see, say, "lines of force" not as entities in
themodel, but simply as instances of a certain kind of relation over those entities. "Lines
of force" then become amathematical, functional, or structural property ofmodel-theoretic
entities, and similarly for the logical connectives of a language. The model, by its for¬
mal structure, is supposed to show relations between entities, so that beyond describing
configurations of entities, the model can assert nothing about them. But now a number
of other questions arise.
(1) The manner in which the model is to forge a connection to objects in the world (how
the model-theoretic entities relate to the physical ones. i.e. The ontological status of en¬
tities and relations in the model)
(2) How the terms of the language in question are to be interpreted in the mathematical
formalism of the model-theory.
The model-world connection (1) employs the, notoriously difficult, notion of "rep¬
resentation", along with a correspondence theory of truth. AsWittgenstein used it, the
notion of representation had a distinctly constructive aspect, so that agents consciously
build up logical structures which represent the world. "Representations," then, are not
re-runs of sensory experiences, but something quite different. The notion, from [61],
of a Discourse Representation Structure (via the "construction algorithm") appears to
have precisely this feature. On the other hand many interpretations ofWittgenstein in¬
vite a decidedly pictorial mental image or snapshot conception of "representation." The
partial models of Situation Semantics seem to follow this line more closely. In any case,
models are to be judged true or false depending on their accordance with reality. If the
structure of entities in the model ismirrored by a corresponding configuration of objects
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in the world then the model is declared true. This correspondence theory of truth thus
demands an isomorphism between language and the world, and the concern is then
how such a strong connection between model and world is to be guaranteed. Not only
must there be a method which connects model-theoretic entities with their real-world
counterparts, but there is also to be a connection between mathematical relations over
the symbols in the model and relations between the real objects. To establish the truth
of a certain model one is to determine whether or not the real world objects stand in
the modelled relations to each other. How then does this stance claim to avoid such is¬
sues as the reality of lines of force? If they are relations in a model and nothing more,
then so be it, but once one imposes a correspondence test for model-theoretic truth, one
is forced to look for such relations in the world, thus putting the initial question once
more. At this point, it seems that a route away from this isomorphism test for truth is
needed if the Tractarian picture is to be salvaged. To this end, I suggest the adoption
of a "structural realism" regarding formal semantics. The issue revolves around the in¬
terpretation of model-theoretic relations. As argued above, the requirement that they
point through the model to relations in the world begs precisely the question that the
Tractarian model-theory of language set out to avoid.
What can, and should, be argued here, is that relations constructed in the model-theory
of language are not interpreted as being in the world itself, but in the categorisations and
explanations which agents construct in order to deal with perceived correspondences
in the world (ie: relations are in an agent's information). Thus, models should be inter¬
preted asmodels of epistemic or doxastic structures, rather than parts of the world. This
argument certainly needs some elaboration. A shift in interpretation of the relations in
a model, and their truth conditions, is required here. Recall that the intention behind
Wittgenstein's notion of representationwas that models are built by agents as they inter¬
pret language. Propositions show certain relations between named objects. Once these
stated relations are regarded as statements about an agent's perceptions and interpre¬
tations of the world, rather than as directly corresponding to reality, the models which
agents construct are not directly related to the world, but of the epistemic situations pre¬
sented to them by other agents and their own senses. Thus a relation of "force" com¬
municated by one individual to another vis a vis two objects is, first and foremost, a de-
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scription of the first individual's epistemic state, concerning their perceived correspon¬
dences and regularities in the world. Thus, once theoristsmove into the communicative
stance on language use (rather than the classical world-language centered position) they
freemodel-theoretic relations from themetaphysical burden placed upon them by a cor¬
respondence theory of truth. But what theory of truth remains? Linguistic acts partly
serve to articulate an agent's epistemic "possibility space", based on their perception of
correlations. What is it then to judge a statement as true? Presumably, agents label a
statement "true" if the logical-epistemic space that it prescribes for the objects that they
take it to refer to are compatible with their own. Judgements of truth, truth on the basis of
available evidence, rather than apprehension of pure metaphysical truth, are central to
language seen primarily as a vehicle for communication about perceived regularities.
The epistemic analysis of truth is more important to formal semantics than the tradi¬
tional metaphysical stance. The truth conditions (or rather, judgement acceptance con¬
ditions) for a proposition now become a matter of compatibility between models built
up by interpreting the proposition and the world-model of the interpreter. This is the
semantical version of what has been called "Belief Revision". This revised Tractarian
position regards the important part of language as laying models against other models
for comparison, rather than, as Wittgenstein had it, a model "laid against reality like a
measure." 22 In their own ways, both DRT and Situation Semantics fall into this Tractar¬
ian trap (DRT via embedding conditions and Situation Theory via a realist approach to
relations). The methodological lesson should be that entities and relations in a model
need distinguishing in an important ontological sense. Whilst the entities in a model
correspond to informational approximations to individuated objects in the world, the
relations stated between them are a feature of the communicant's judgements, beliefs,
and perceptual capabilities. Thus entities have a (slightly) stronger ontological position
than do relations. An approach, such as Situation Semantics, which fails to appreciate
this distinction entirely (by regarding the world as composed of relations and objects)
does not do justice to language use as observed in communication.
The final question here concerns the language-model connection. Aswith theworld-
model isomorphism, we are entitled to ask what guarantee we have regarding the math-
22Tractatus 2.1512
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ematical model's applicability to our actual descriptive language and practice. Mon¬
tague Semantics and DRT provide explicit translation rules from syntactic structures to
model structures. In DRT, the assembly of DRSs even seems to appease the construc-
tivist aspect ofWittgenstein's "representations." Ideally, what is sought is an incremen¬
tal procedure which takes each word in a linguistic expression to construct or modify
a logical model of the entities and relations between them posited by that expression.
The functional view of "meaning" adopted in modern-day information-based seman¬
tics takes this view of sentence and discourse processing, but approaches are divided
on the issues of representation and compositionality. Given the discussion above, the
"epistemic" approach taken in Dynamic Semantics is clearly to be advocated.
1.6.1 An epistemic/doxastic semantics
Semantics, as part of a cognitive science, is presumably an explanatory venture, afford¬
ing the theorist some degree of predictive power regarding the utterances of agents (in a
given context). Cognitive science is often described as the study of the mind as an infor¬
mation processing system. If this is to be taken at all seriously, paradigms are required
which really do attempt to give explanatory information processing accounts which are
noticeably lacking in the semantics of dialogue. I have attempted to argue that concen¬
tration on dynamics and epistemics, or more precisely, doxastics, is the most promising
way to approach these issues.
Other approaches, such as Channel Theory, are forays in mathematical metaphysics,
because there information and its flow are considered to be agent-independent parts
of reality. Instead, the project of formal semantics is a mathematical epistemology, be¬
cause information is generated by cognitive agents. I have said earlier that information
is any signal which (potentially) expands or contracts an agent's set of epistemic possi¬
bilities (their "commitment slate"). Meanings, by way of contrast, are tied to reference
and truth. So "Meanings just ain't in the head, and information just ain't in the world."
This has the further consequence that all the modalities in which are of interest in a se¬
mantics of communication are simply the epistemic modalities.
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A note on the modals
The standard position currently adopted in formal semantics is the acceptance of the
Kripkean distinction between metaphysical and epistemic necessity. Instead, I should
like to follow Quine in his statement:
"Humewas right, I hold, in discrediting metaphysical necessity. .. .Sub specie aeternitatis
there is no necessity and no contingency; all truth is on a par."
(Quine, [81], p.140)
The real question here is whether or not the Kripkean distinction is of any use in
an account of communication as iterated theory change, or state revision. A standard
example in dynamic semantics of a "metaphysical modal" might be along the lines of,
"He survived. He might have died."
The dynamic account of the meaning of "might", derived from Veltman [100], can¬
not handle such a discourse, leading to the adoption of the epistemic/metaphysical modal
distinction. Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman [47] also claim that information states
can be enhanced with a set of "metaphysically possible worlds" for such metaphysical
modals to range over.
However, unless these "metaphysical possibilities" are still relative to an agent's epis¬
temic state23 this account does not square at all with the position I take throughout the
thesis; that information states are epistemic objects, and that utterances express the epis¬
temic state of a speaker and request hearers to revise their own theories. My claim is
that utterances such as "He survived. He might have died," are still epistemic claims
by a speaker, albeit of a non-eliminative nature. When I speak of "counterfactual" or
"counterdoxastic" modals I shall in fact be referring to those modals whose operation
is not eliminative on epistemic/doxastic states, but "constructive".
1.7 A Revision Semantics for communication
Given the above discussion, it seems clear that the integration of Theory Change sys¬
tems with Dynamic Semantics is a viable project, which is both technically and theoret-
23In which case they are hardly metaphysical.
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ically interesting. If one revises the dynamic account ofmeaning, adopts a structural re¬
alism concerning individuals in model-theoretic semantics, recognises the importance
of change in communication, and accepts the doxastic conception of information and
the primacy of semantics, then one is led to the project which the rest of the thesis at¬
tempts to carry out.
From the perspective of Artificial Intelligence research, the dynamic semanticist's no¬
tion of an update is useful inmodelling the change in a knowledge-base due to a change
in the world that it describes. On the other hand, dynamic semantics requires agents
which can processes conflicting information about the world.
Updates in communication are triggered by simple assertionswhich do not conflictwith
an agent's current information, whereas revisions are the result of processing and incor¬
porating fresh and possibly inconsistent information.
In some of the literature in the field of Dynamic Semantics there is an explicit recogni¬
tion that the notion of an update alone is not sufficient for a full semantical theory, and
that some notion of "belief revision" will have to be worked out. But there, so far, is
where the issue has been left.
"If the speaker attempts to exchange the information that <f>, and the hearer has in¬
formation to the contrary, then the exchange is simply taken to come to a halt. For
the exchange to proceed in such a situation, a higher order discussion may be re¬
quired ... as well as some method of belief revision. Since ... belief revision fall[s]
beyond the scope of the present undertaking, we just have to settle for expelling
the occurrence of inconsistency of information."
(Paul Dekker, [21], pages 211-2.)
An integration of revisions and updates is therefore to be desired both for the AI and
Formal Semantics communities. As far as dynamic semantics is concerned, the issue is
that while updates are always concerned with information growth, a dual notion of re¬
vision, or repair of information is required. Theory change deals with rational agents
which are required to dispense with certain current information in order to accommo¬
date new information. This process can even occur just hypothetically, during a dia¬
logue, where an agent "suspends disbelief" for the sake of argument. Such revisions
have not yet been taken seriously enough in the formal semantics of dialogue, but there
is a large and technically impressive "belief revision" literature which, although neither
semantically nor linguistically oriented, is available for integration into such a new ac-
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count.
1.7.1 Conclusion
The chapter raises foundational questions for the current "informational" vogue in for¬
mal semantics, and cognitive science in general, and similar issues for a theory of com¬
munication in that vein. In particular, an important problem for any theory of com¬
munication was raised (the issue of "common ground" or "shared" information states),
whilst a rigorous conception of "information" as an explanatory device in formal se¬
mantics was developed. A formal definition of communication was also provided. Def¬
initions of information and communication (in terms of doxastic states and their trans¬
formations) were given, and argued to be suitable for a formal semantics regarded as a
scientific, as opposed to a purely philosophical, venture. I argued for a revision of the
dynamic account ofmeaning, and a "structural realism" about model-theoretic seman¬
tics. I argued that the integration of (ultimately First-Order) Theory Change methods
with systems of Dynamic Semantics could lead to an empirically adequate semantics of
dialogues, and a putative theory of communication.
The remainder of the thesis carries out some of the formalwork that this chapter has,
in part, motivated.
Chapter 2
Formal Preliminaries in Dynamic
Semantics and Theory Change
2.1 Outline
My intention in this chapter is to give at once a brief introduction to technicalities in
the fields of Dynamic Semantics and recent work in Theory Change (or "Belief Revi¬
sion"), and to develop some issues arising from their application in a putative theory of
communication. The most important concepts of the thesis (information and change)
are formalized. In addition, along with the recognition that information is often incom¬
plete and inconsistent, criteria for any satisfactory 'informational logic' are developed,
and some non-classical logical ideas thatwill be useful in the applications of later chap¬
ters are discussed.
2.2 Information in communication
Specific conceptions of information and communication were argued for in the preced¬
ing chapter. Given that discussion, now simply note that the ideas about 'information
growth' which are currently employed in Dynamic Semantics (DS) are unsatisfactory,
insofar as they fail to properly capturemany kinds of informative statementsmade dur¬
ing communicative dialogues (these linguistic constructions are properly explored in
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chapter 6). Specifically, an account for repair during communication breakdown is of¬
fered, and systems of Revision Semantics (RS), which deal with corrections in dialogue,
are developed. A particular concern is the extension of the coverage of formal semanti¬
cal theories to an analysis of dialogue rather than discourse. The techniques of Revision
Semantics enable the analysis of dialogue contributions for which discourse-based the¬
ories can offer no explanation. It is in this setting, then, that a Revision Semantics is seen
to be central to an account of information states in communication.
2.2.1 What is information growth?
Researchers in formal semantics have embarked upon an account of the information
gained and lost by an agent through the interpretation of utterances. Acquired infor¬
mation is not just the explicit surface content of an utterance, but is also given in the
inferences licensed by believing that utterance1. Thus the information gained through
utterance interpretation is highly context-sensitive; being relative to the inferential ca¬
pacities of the agent (its "background knowledge"), and to the information provided in
the foregoing dialogue or discourse. Earlier it was argued that formerly, philosophers
have been confused about a theoretically useful notion of information (making it overly
objective) either because they fail to properly take into account the element of subjectiv¬
ity required in linguistic interpretation, or because they are concerned with a different
problem altogether. Information has been tied to truth by philosophers taking a 'God's
eye' view of the content of discourse. I define information content via change in epis-
temic state for an agent. Important consequences of this are:
(1) that an utterance can be informative for an agent even if it is false, and
(2) that utterance interpretation can be informative without elimination of possibilities
for an agent.
Ever since Kripke's semantics for Intuitionistic Logic [66] there have been increas¬
ingly more elaborate attempts to capture formally the intuitive idea of increasing infor¬
mation. The technical device for capturing information states is most commonly an un-
!cf: Montague's goal of capturing all valid entailments.
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structured collection (set) of possibilities. Every time information is gained it precludes
some of these possibilities. Information produces (provisional) commitmentwhere there
once was ambivalence.
The eliminative stance on knowledge growth exploits the idea that information grows via
the elimination of possiblities. These sets of possibilities grow smaller under informa¬
tion growth, ultimately until only one possibility under consideration ("the real world")
is left. Information growth thus proceeds by a "Sherlock Holmes" method of elimina¬
tion of possible models.
Intuitionistic logics describe the process of gaining information (in this case mathe¬
matical knowledge) as movement outward along the branches of a tree-like structure
(a partially ordered set of points), where each branch point is associated with a cer¬
tain amount of established (and thence irrefutable) information. Points further along
branches "hold" more information than lower points in the partial order. Gaining in¬
formation is thus a process of travelling ever outward along (infinitely long?) branches
of this "tree of knowledge."
In Relevant Logics the idea is very similar to the intuitionistic case. Points in the frame
semantics for relevant logics are referred to as "information states, theories, or possible
situations "2 which have the same natural ordering as intuitionistic frames.
In the following chapters it is shown how the intuitionistic (and therefore also the rele¬
vant) way of thinking about information states leads to an overly naive approach to in¬
formation change; in particular the approaches fail to address the Multiple Extensions
Problem for information loss. Of course, such 'logics' were never intended to tackle phe¬
nomena which require non-monotonicity.
In addition, there is an alternative which needs to be explored here, for it is closer
to intuitions about the information carried in statements in dialogue: the constructive
stance. The intuitions behind Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp 1981 [61]) seem
to be similar. Each utterance interpretation is taken to construct an entity or relation in
2see Greg Restall in his review of Entailment vol. 2
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one model, until a detailed "picture" of some situation is achieved3.
However, it is worth asking whether these two conceptions of information growth
are really in conflict, as they are commonly thought to be, and indeed, whether these
are the only ways in which information can be said to grow. One view might be that
the eliminative and constructive construals of information growth are really just two
sides of the same coin. Eliminative considerations become paramount when we con¬
sider information semantically, while a syntactic focus (as in AGM belief revision and
DRT) results in the constructive view. But such a view would be to mistake the force of
the argument for non-eliminativity as information growth. For our purposes it is infor¬
mation change rather than growth which should be the focus of a theory of communica¬
tion. In particular there is an important sense in which a dialogue partner's insistence
that he in fact knows nothing about X actually results in a form of information growth on
the hearer's part; in at least two possible ways. Firstly, the hearer's information about
the speaker grows; he knows that she is ignorant about X. Secondly the hearer may be
informed just in terms of the subject matter of X; he may never have heard anything at
all about X before.
2.2.2 Information: Syntax and Semantics
I shall write about "theories" (syntactical objects; sets of sentences) as a way of express¬
ing doxastic states and "information states" (semantical objects; sets of models and as¬
signments) as an alternative name for the things so expressed (contents of theories). In
harmony with this syntax/semantics or processing/content distinction4 I explore ra¬
tional systems of Theory Change and of Dynamic Semantics. Theory change (TC) systems
deal with constraints upon themodifications that theories should go through in the light
of new, and potentially conflicting, information about the world. Systems of Dynamic
Semantics (DS) attempt to describe the meanings of expressions in Natural Languages
as changes in the information states of their users.
3Jaap van der Does clearly has this in mind in his "Dynamics of Sophisticated Laziness" [95]. Also,
Wittgenstein's notion of "representations" in [108] is distinctly constructive.
4See Wansing [106] for more on this point.
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Theory Change systems, since they deal with finitely describable structures (closed
sets of sentences), are computationally much easier to deal with than the infinities of
"possibilities" dealtwith inDynamic Semantics. Despite this computational advantage
however, it is the semantics that is primary in this account, in the sense that it provides
the intuitions from which different Theory Change systems develop. A central goal of
the thesis is DYANA's5 first objective;
"to determine those aspects of the structure of information states which are relevant to
Natural Language interpretation."
In the following chapters the structure of such information states is explored with
special reference to dialogue. Specific attention is given to cases where utterance inter¬
pretations conflict either with the hearer's current beliefs, or with information previ¬
ously conveyed by the speaker. In such cases, information states must undergo repair
and correction.
2.3 Properties of a Dynamic Semantics
Common to all systems ofDynamic Semantics (Discourse Representation Theory6, Up¬
date Semantics7, Dynamic Predicate Logic8 and their progeny) is the following philo¬
sophical claim, which serves to unite these otherwise often disparate approaches;
"Themeaning of a sentence is the change that it induces in its hearer's information state."
The philosophical considerations of the preceding chapter demand some modifica¬
tion of this slogan, but for now it serves to introduce the cornerstones of the dynamic
approach: that agents 'have' information states (sets of possibilities s G S, where S is the
powerset of the set of all possibilities) and that these states change under utterance inter-
5The ESPRIT basic research project 6852
6DRT, Kamp [61]
7US, Veltman, [101]
8DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhof,[46]
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pretation. Information states are generally taken to be sets ofpossibilities9 which an agent
has under consideration at any point in the interpretation of a dialogue or discourse.
Following Veltman, the basic mode of change in an information state is the update, writ¬
ten [.] , which is to correspond to the addition of information to a state. Write s [</>] to
denote the state resulting from the update of s by a formula <j>.
One objective of this thesis is to provide truly dynamic systems, in the sense that the
usual notion of update does not capture the notion of change in information state suf¬
ficiently for the purposes of an empirically accurate formal semantics of Natural Lan¬
guages. Writers such as Dekker10 , Asher and Veltman acknowledge that such an ac¬
count is required, but do not tackle the issue in their published works. To remedy this
deficiency a new "downdate" operator ]. [ is supplied, the function ofwhich is to remove
specific information from a state. I shall describe as a Revision Semantics any dynamic
system which accommodates loss of information ("downdates"), as well as its growth
under updating, and the consistency-preserving update operation of revision.
The following properties of dynamic systems are useful in classifying the different
approaches11. Here, they are surveyed with reference to a Revision Semantics.
1. ELIMINATIVITY is the property of a dynamic semantics whereby interpretation can
only eliminate possibilities. The result of interpreting a formula in a state s is always
a subset of s.
[</>]] is eliminative iff s [0] C s
Interpretation thus guarantees update of information in the sense that possibilities
have been narrowed down. Purely eliminative updates are monotonic, in that they
reflect the dynamics of simple addition of information. Obviously with revisions in
mind, a strictly eliminative semantics is undesirable, for some expressions retract pre-
9Possible worlds, situations, possible variable assignments, possible 'individuals', or combinations of
these, depending on the particular system.
10See for example [21] page 157.
"For a full account here, I refer the reader to [46], and [21].
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viously established information, and actually open up epistemic possibilities. Thus,
while retainingmany of the eliminative operations familiar from Update Semantics, a
dynamic semantics with revisions will also employ some non-eliminative processes.
2. DISTRIBUTEVITY is the property whereby (when computing the update of a state s
with a formula (f>), only properties of individual elements in s are relevant, and not
global properties of the state as a whole.
m is distributive iff s [0] = Uig«{»} 14>1 •
Update semantics is non-distributive because its epistemicmodal "might" tests global
properties of an information state ('maybe p' tests the entire state s for non-absurdity
under update by p, which need not hold of singleton subsets of s to be successful12).
Retaining this account of the epistemic modals also would require non-distributivity
for a Revision Semantics 13.
3. Non-commutative conjunction;
(f) A tp ^ ip A (j)
This property of conjunction is due in particular to the dynamic treatment of the epis¬
temic modals, specifically the modal "might" (or "maybe"), denoted O. So that: "It
might be John. It's Mary." does not have the same meaning as "It's Mary. Itmight be
John." The latter is nonsensical. Formally then; Op A ->p -y> A Op
Note that a text such as :
"It's John. It might have been Mary."
is not absurd. Past tensed modals are often argued to be 'metaphysical', rather than
epistemic, since they reflect theway the world may or may not have been, rather than
properties of an agent's epistemic state. However, this Kripkean distinction between
epistemic and metaphysical modalities, ought not to be imported into formal seman¬
tics (see eg:[47]). Counterfactual modals still express epistemic properties, and no set
of 'metaphysically possible worlds' is needed in order to treat such expressions. A
Revision Semantics allows a treatment of such counterfactual modals as testing en¬
tailments of a state under revision.
12See [21] p. 155 for a full account of the non-distributivity of US.
13See Jan van Eijck and G. Cepparello [97], who argue that non-distributivity is the essence of a good
analysis of "maybe."
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4. Non-eliminative modals
One requirement common to all systems is that interpretation of epistemic modals
should never actually diminish the set of possibilities under consideration. Note that,
in an eliminative semantics, this requirement means that interpretation of modals is
entirely uninformative, because under update by modals information states either re¬
main static or become absurd. A Revision Semantics ought not to tamper with this
property of US.
5. Dynamic entailment.
The treatment of anaphora in first-order dynamic semantics is exemplified by the fol¬
lowing theorem of DPL:
"A man was mad." "So, he was mad."
3xMx 1= Mx
Syntactically free variables (standing for pronouns) are semantically bound.
Of the above properties, the following are adopted as desiderata for a Revision Seman¬
tics: non-commutative conjunction, dynamic entailment, and the non-eliminativity of
the modals. Distributivity would restrict a treatment ofmodals, and eliminativity would
make a treatment of contraction and revision impossible (see the impossibility theorem
of chapter 3).
2.4 Two dynamic traditions: DS and TC
There follows a brief history of the development of the research programme ofDynamic
Semantics. Then the next section is devoted to a similar exposition regarding dynamics
over syntactic structures; research in Theory Change or "Belief Revision."
DRT, US, DPL, and EDPL
The seminal insights of the dynamic approach to semantics were provided by Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT) [61] and IreneHeim's "File Change Semantics" (FCS) [53],
which introduced "updating" in its earliest form and the idea of discourse referents or "in¬
definite objects" [63] which enabled a treatment ofpronominal anaphora. These projects
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formulated something close to the current dynamic account of meaning. Kamp's DRT
[61] made explicit use of the notion of "mental representation"; insofar as the Discourse
Representation Structures generated in DRT were taken to be mental structures repre¬
senting the content of utterances via an indispensible level of "discourse representa¬
tion". The theory made empirical progress in its treatment of the classic 'donkey' sen¬
tences (noted by Geach14), but required a level of discourse representation to account
for anaphoric relationships.
The next major development in the dynamic tradition was Veltman's Update Se¬
mantics (US, [101]), which deals with information growth via elimination of the possible
worlds constituting information states, and provides a novel treatment of the epistemic
modal operator "might". Update Semantics is a propositional dynamic system, which
does not accommodate DRT's account of anaphora. US is also non-representational,
in the sense that its information structures are about the world, rather than an indis¬
pensible level of mental entities (DRT's "discourse referents"). Indeed, at this point it
is important to distinguish the two varieties of information employed in the dynamic
tradition. Whilst US interpretation has to do with an agent learning about the world,
other systems (eg: DPL) focus only on information about possible anaphoric relation¬
ships within a discourse. Call the former discourse external information, and the latter
discourse internal information.
Groenendijk and Stokhof's Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL 1991)[46], in which in¬
formation states were considered to be sets of variable assignments to be employed in
the treatment of intersentential anaphora, neglects the issue of discourse external infor¬
mation. DPL accounted for the same data as Kamp's DRT, but was couched in "non-
representational" terms; it demonstrated how anaphoric relations could be treated with¬
out a separate level of discourse representation. However, an argument in the preceding
chapter concluded that the debate over the representational commitments of various se¬
mantical theories has often confused a technical issue for a more substantive philosoph¬
ical one.
14eg: "If a farmer owns a donkey he beats it."
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Both US and DPL contain a non-commutative conjunction. Both possess a deduction
theorem. However, DPL is non-eliminative, whilst US is non-distributive. Both allow a
notion of updating information in discourse, but while US interpretation is concerned
with updating information about the external world, DPL interpretation focuses on the
passing along of possible variable assignments for use in the interpretation of subse¬
quent anaphoric expressions. DPL also failed to be faithful to its ancestors (Heim's [53]
and Kamp's [61]) by losing the idea of a genuine domain of discourse referents15.
Paul Dekker (in "Transsentential Meditations") [21] set about integrating these two
formal approaches to discourse interpretation, in the system dubbed "Eliminative Dy¬
namic Predicate Logic" (EDPL), whichwas to remove DPL's non-eliminativity, and adapt
its logic to that underlying US (thus modelling both discourse-internal and discourse-
external information update). Information in EDPL is about the possible values of grow¬
ing sets of variables, and is encoded by way of partial variable assignments, so that
there are two kinds of dynamics within information states, and so two kinds of update.
An EDPL information state is a domain of variables together with sets of variable as¬
signments to them, so information is gained either by the reduction of partiality (further
specifying possible variable assignments), or by extension of the domain of those partial
variable assignments (finding new objects introduced in the discourse.) And so EDPL
was born. However, its notion of update, as Dekker (quoted below) explicitlymentions,
involves only the addition of information in discourse, and not its revision in dialogue.
"The system does not allow a speaker to convey information which conflicts with
information the hearer has. In order to solve such disagreement, some kind of belief
revision seems to be required and revision falls beyond the scope of the present
undertaking." ([21] p. 210)
In addition to this omission, it is difficult to square the motivations behind Dekker's
eliminativity property with the fact that the introduction of new discourse referents in
EDPL in fact opens up new epistemic possibilities for an agent. In other words, EDPL
is not, strictly speaking, eliminative. For interpretation of existential statements can ex¬
tend an information state.
Later on in the thesis a revisable DPL-like system is provided; one where DPL informa-
15See Dekker in [22] on the "dumping" of subjects.
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tion states can be revised. Later still (also in chapter 5), systems which deal both with
changing discourse internal and external information are supplied.
The Changing Theory of Theory Change
As mentioned earlier, philosophical insights concerning an account of theory change
have come from many areas: Pragmatics (William James [58]), Philosophy of Science
(Hempel [54]), and Philosophy of Law (Makinson). Belief Revision has also been used
in an account of human communication (Galliers [39]), and is part of a large movement
in "non-monotonic logics".
Formal work in Theory Change started out as "Belief Revision" research, with the
following general question. How ought an agent to rationally change its belief system
while accommodating new (possibly contradictory) information? In any answer to this
question themain delicacy to be dealtwith is theMultiple Extensions Problem (MEP)16.
For a simple instance of the MEP consider the following theory:
T = {p -> q,p,q}.
Imagine that an agent needs to remove q from this theory (perhaps because the original
evidence for q is now in doubt). The agent cannot simply remove q from T, for under
logical closure it returns (via Modus Ponens). So either one of p and p —> q must also
be removed. But how is a rational agent to choose which of these sentences to dispense
with? Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM)[1] developed a series of formal
answers to this problem in the case of propositional logic. Various assumptions of the
AGM approach have been disputed, and led to the investigation of different types of
changes (eg: Fuhrmann [35]) over different structures (eg: Ryan [88]). In the psycho¬
logical literature, work has been carried out on the actual behaviour of individuals un¬
dergoing belief change (Elio and Pelletier [28], Harman [51]). In Artificial Intelligence,
TC has been part of a whole movement. Systems of non-monotonic inference, defea¬
sible inference, truth maintenance, and default reasoning , each closely related to TC,
have been of much interest to researchers in AI.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to recognise that TC systems have, un-
16First noted by Rescher in 1964, [82]
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til now, only been supplied for classically closed and consistent theories in propositional
logic. In chapter 5, ideas from the theory of "multiple contraction" (Fuhrmann [35]) are
employed in an account of first-order theory change, and elsewhere, ideas from para-
consistent logic (see Restall and Slaney, [84]) are used to relax the assumption of consis¬
tency. Taken together, thesemoves enable an account of autonomous theory change; that
is, where agents choose (rationally) whether or not to accept new information, rather
than automatically accommodating it (as the AGM approach describes.)
2.4.1 Integrating the Accounts
This remainder of the thesis is an attempt to marry the insights of formal Belief Revi¬
sion/Theory Change systemswith the dynamic semantics of US, DPL, and Modal DPL,
and explore the outcome. Theoretically interesting results concern the extension of the
AGM approach to theories defined over more complex languages than propositional
logic and the invention of a semantical approach to theory change, leading to a vari¬
ety of completeness results. Such systems are useful for a number of reasons, the most
pressing one being the development of an account of information exchange in a formal
theory ofcommunication.
One of the main issues to be dealt with will be how contradictions ought to be handled
in a robust information preserving predicate logic. Obviously, insights from paracon-
sistent logics will be useful in this regard.
The systems developed will address anaphor binding revision and information state re¬
visions for theories expressed in both propositional and first-order logics. There follows
a preview of the problems that such an account will treat.
2.5 Problems for standard dynamic semantics
In this section a few specific problems for standard dynamic semantics (by which Imean
non-revisable DS) are pointed out. The addition of revisions to standard DS offers a
treatment of these problems. If DS is to extend its data coverage (increase its empirical
adequacy), then these issues need to be addressed.
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Data coverage: 'dirty dialogues'
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In general, a class of problems emerge from the fact that the data coverage of standard
systems is restricted to a set of "clean" dialogues. "Clean" dialogues are those which do
not involve conflict, correction, or repair on the part of either speaker or hearer. Repairs
happen when a speaker wishes to retract ormodify information gained by interpreting
a preceding utterance. In fact, the vastmajority of real dialogues contain such contribu¬
tions, which include constituent negation clauses such as:
"No, I meant the house not the lake."
Evidence for this claim can be gleaned from even a cursory glance at any real dialogue
corpus; for example theMap Task corpus [2] at Edinburgh's Human Communication Re¬
search Centre17. Chapter 7 treats these phenomena in some detail; for the moment they
are mentioned in respect of the empirical adequacy of standard systems.
The Implosion problem
Information states in standard systems of DS are implosive under contradiction (theories,
on the other hand, explode under inconsistency.) All information is lost when an incon¬
sistency arises.
s \Px A -iP:rJ = 0
All information built up by the preceding dialogue is lost once an inconsistency arises
with regard to any variable or proposition in that dialogue. The problem also occurs for
contradictions in Update Semantics. This shortcoming violates any rational idea of in¬
formational economy, for agents should at least be able to retain information that is not
"connected" to the contradiction. In addition to avoiding implosion, it is desirable that
a semantics of dialogue cover cases of resolution of contradiction. Agents commonly
use dialogue to enter into disputes, and resolve them.
17See [15] for self-repair data
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The "downdate problem" for pronouns
The "downdate problem" in DPL (and its extensions) ariseswhen all information about
possible anaphor bindings is lost once an anaphor is resolved. If this resolution is later to
be changed, say because of a further dialogue contribution, then the analysis collapses.
DS requires a more robust notion of subjects from which information can be recovered.
Example 3 "The man with red hair was carrying a boy up the stairs. He was whistling."
Our instinctive binding of the pronoun "he" to "man" standardly means (ie: in the
treatments offered in standard DS) that this assumption cannot later be revised in order
to recover a whistling boy.
First-order theory change systems,with dynamic semantics, (which I develop in chapter
5) remedy this problem.
2.6 Review of the AGM results
The central problem dealtwith in the AGM literature (see eg: [1], [42], [40], [41]) is that of
how to consistently add new sentences (which might conflictwith a current theory) to a
deductively closed set of sentences (or "theory"). Rather than truth preservation during
inference, which is the aim of the deductive rules of classical logic, TheoryChange takes
consistency preservation under change as its ultimate goal. Such systems work on two
levels, with two 'logics'. The theory-internal logic provides a notion of deductive closure
for the theories which evolve byway of rational theory change; the theory-external 'logic'
governing rational change. The base (theory-internal) logic assumed in AGM theory
change is Classical Propositional Logic (CPL), so that "theories" are taken to contain
all the sentences that classical logic dictates as derivable from the explicitly stated sen¬
tences of the theory. The adoption of CPL produces a number of, perhaps unwelcome,
consequences, aswell as a number of interesting questions, depending on the particular
application to be made of AGM theory change results. In particular, classically closed
theories are infinite, consistent, and they contain irrelevancies (the relevant logician's
"Paradoxes of Relevance"). I later explore criteria that an "Informational Logic" ought
to meet, and argue that, for the purposes of Dynamic Semantics, CPL is not the correct
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base logic to employ. Still later I show that AGM results can indeed be preserved under
the adoption of a variety of non-classical logics (cf: Restall and Slaney [84].)
Growth of knowledge is understood in the AGM tradition as a syntactic operation of
repeated set union and logical closure; the prime directive being that of maintaining
consistency under change. Where new information conflicts with that already present
in the current theory a process of revision must take place (on pain of theory explosion).
Note that there is no question of whether or not new information should be accepted;
the question is rather how to achieve thiswhilst at all costs preserving consistency. Later
I shall develop a systemwhich allows agents rationally to judgewhether or not to accept
new information. Call this property Rational Autonomy. The ideas developed here
have obvious application in the (Formal) Philosophy of Science, but I argue that they
are crucial too for formal linguistics, as tools for the fixing of reference and agreement
between dialogue participants in general.
We speak of sets of sentences T or K as belief states, belief systems, or theories defined
over some formal language C. There are three basic operations over these sets in AGM
theory change; Expansion, Contraction, and Revision. The functions correspond to (con¬
sistency 'blind') information growth, information loss (where the matter of consistency
preservation scarcely arises), and consistency preserving information growth respec¬
tively.
Returning now to the Multiple Extensions Problem (MEP), the initial questionwas how
to determine a suitable contracted theory from a set of subtheories. The force of the
MEP was that logic alone does not provide us with any criteria by which to make such
a choice. This problem illustrates the divide between logical and non-logical (informa¬
tional) factors in theory change. The distinction between logic and information is a cru¬
cial one, which demands extra-logical criteria to be applied to the problems of theory
change. It is precisely the business of rational theory change systems to supply such
criteria.
We now briefly review each of the AGM operations in turn.
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2.6.1 Expansion
A new proposition <f>, which does not contradict any sentence in the existing theory T,
is added to T, and the resulting set of sentences is closed under logical consequence.
Expansion is denoted T + <\>, and defined as follows:
Where I- is the deducibility relation of the logic under consideration (classical prepo¬
sitional logic in the AGM case), and similarly, CI denotes closure under logical consequence:-
T + <f> = {ip \ T I) {<p} \~ ip}
or equivalently:
T + d = CZ(T U{0})
Expansion, then, is a straightforward matter. The situation is not so simple for revi¬
sion and contraction, because here there is no unique way to specify what should hap¬
pen as a matter of logic18. Rather, revision and contraction operations must satisfy cer¬
tain set of rationality postulates, which are important extra-logical, or informational,
criteria.
The notion of expansion in theory change captures the notion of a (non-anaphoric)
update in Dynamic Semantics precisely. To anticipate later chapters somewhat, in gen¬
eral;
T + <j> corresponds to st [</>]
where st is the information state which is the content of theory T and [.] is an elimi-
native update function, taking states to (increasingly specified) states.
2.6.2 Revision
A new proposition 0 (which may be inconsistent with the current theory K) is added,
and some sentences from K are removed in order tomaintain consistency. Thus revision
is a consistency-preserving update. Revision of K by <f> is denoted K-i-p.
lsBy the Multiple Extensions Problem
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K± denotes the inconsistent (or overdefined) theory, which is just the set of all sentences
of the logical language (denoted C) in which the theory is expressed. Thus K± = C.
On the other hand, 0 denotes the empty theory, which contains no sentences save the
theorems of C.
(K+l) For any sentence 0 and any belief set K, K+0 is a belief set (Closure)
(K+2) 0 e K+<f> (Success)
(K-i-3) K-i-0 C K + <fi (Inclusion)
(K-j-4) If -i0 £ K, then K + <f> C K+0 (Vacuity)
(K-j-5) K+0 = Kl iff h -i0
(K-j-6) If ip 0, then K+0 = K+ip (Congruence)
(K-i-7) K-i-(0 A 0) C (K+(f>)+ip (Composition I)
(K-i-8) If -i0 ^ K+4> then (K+<p)+ip C K-j-(0 A 0) (Composition II)
The effect of (K-i-5) is to ensure that K-i-0 is consistent unless 0 is a contradiction.
The 6th postulate ensures that content, rather than surface syntactic form, determines
revision. The notion of identity of content is captured here by identity of truth-conditions.
The effect of postulates 7 and 8 taken together is thatT+(pAg) is equivalent to (T+p)+q
so long as q does not contradict the sentences in T+p.
2.6.3 Contraction
Contraction is the most important of the AGM operations. Expansion does not present
any real challenges, since itmerely employs logical closure, and it turns out that revision
is definable in terms of contraction and expansion.
A sentence 0 is to be removed from a theory T, or belief system K. The main problem
to be solved is that some other sentences from K may have to be removed in order that
the resulting system does not contain 0 under closure. Working within CPL, attention
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is focussed on the retraction of contingent sentences. Contradictions are never in (non-
absurd) K in the first place and so never need to be removed19, and removal of a logical
theorem, or tautology, is plainly absurd. Contraction of K by <p is denoted K—cp.
(K—1) For any sentence cp and any belief set K, K—cp is a belief set (Closure)
(K—2) K-<p c K (Inclusion)
(K—3) If cp g K then K—cp — K (Vacuity)
(K-4) If 1/ cp then cp g K—(p (Success)
(K—5) If <p € K, then, K c (.K—<p) + <p (Recovery)
(K—6) If ip *->■ cp, then K—</> = K—ip (Congruence)
(K—7) K—cp n K—ip c K—(<p a tp) (Composition I)
(K—8) If ip 0 K—(ip a cp) then K—(ip a cp) c K—cp (Composition II)
2.6.4 Identities
The following AGM results demonstrate that revision and contraction functions are in-
terdefinable.
If a contraction function satisfies (K— 1) to (K—4) and (K—6), then a revision function ob¬
tained via the Levi identity satisfies (K-j-1) to (K-i-6).
Levi identity: K-i-<p = (K--.^) + <p.
If a revision function satisfies (K-i-1) to (K-i-6), then a contraction function obtained
via the Harper identity satisfies (K-l) to (K—6).
Harper identity: K-<p = K n (K-i—«p)
19I shall later argue that this really goes against the spirit of theory change, and advocate a paraconsistent
approach.
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Note that these crucial results allow (in the propositional case) a reduction of the
problem of specifying revision operations to the (simpler) one of producing a suitable
contraction function.
An interesting question arises in the first-order case: can similar identities be found
in the first-order case (where theories are sets of sentences of predicate logic)? First-
order postulates for revision and contraction involve constraints on names, identities,
and the quantifiers, which have the potential to block a first-order Levi-identity. This
question is postponed until chapter 5.
2.7 Constructing Contractions
The AGM literature provides several contraction functions which meet the constraints
imposed by the rationality postulates.
Each of these methods relies on the idea of choosing some appropriate subset of the con¬
tracted theory, which fails to imply the offending sentence. Thus, define T i pas the
set of all maximal subsets of theory T which fail to imply p. Following Fuhrmann [35],
this setwill sometimes be called the set of remainders of T.
Again, the force of the MEP is that there are in general many suitable remainders
from the point of view of pure logic. AGM research explores a variety ofways of select¬
ing appropriate elements from the set of remainders, as an illustrative example I exam¬
ine "partial meet contraction."
Partial meet contraction relies on the assumption that there is simply some way of
choosing the best elements ofT _L p, via a selection function a. So, a chooses a set of pre¬
ferred remainders of T. Then define T—p as the set of sentences which such preferred
remainders (maximal subtheories) of T have in common. So that:
T—p = f]a(T Dp)
It turns out that the rationality postulates for contraction are obeyed by partial meet
contractions, and that any contraction satisfying the postulates is a partial meet contrac-
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tion. So, the contractions constructed by way of the partial meet contraction function
meet the rationality criteria laid out in the postulates (see [42] for the proof.).
2.7.1 Multiple (or "General") Contraction
Fuhrmann (1994) extends the notion of Partial Meet Contraction to the case where con¬
tractions remove a set of sentences from a theory, rather than a single sentence. This
generalization of the AGM approach provides the notion of a package remainder; the
subtheories (T _L B) left over after removal of an entire set of sentences (B).
Definition 2 Package Remainders
for sets of sentences X, T, B,
X € T 15 iff
• ACT
• XIf B, and
• VY:XCYCT=>Y\-B
Fuhrmann's General Contractions
Andre Fuhrmann's "Essay on Contraction" [35] contains an elegant generalisation of
the AGM approach which will be particularly useful in the construction of systems of
First-Order theory contraction. A limitation of the AGM approach is that it considers
only the retraction of one sentence from a set of sentences. Fuhrmann (and Hansson)
relax this constraint in theirwork onmultiple contraction: the removal of sets of sentences
from belief sets.
There are two notions of contraction herewhich are ofparticular interest: Choice Con¬
traction (denoted 3 : the removal of at least one of a set of sentences from a theory, and
Package Contraction (denoted V: the removal of an entire set of sentences from a theory.)
Chapter 5 produces evidence that such contractions occur in everyday linguistic prac¬
tice.
Formal Preliminaries in Dynamic Semantics and Theory Change 52
General contraction is a generalisation of the AGM approach, incorporating the results
covered above (Choice and Package contractions coincide when the set to be removed
is a singleton). Fuhrmann proposes the following sets of rationality postulates:
Where, for sets of sentences A and B, A\- B iff B n Cn{A) ^ 0
("b" is "Scott consequence": some of B are amongst the consequences of A.)
Package Contraction
(PCI) B =a C =>- AVJ3 = AVC (Congruence)
(PC2) AVB h B^F B (Success)
(PC3) AVB C A (Inclusion)
(PC4) a € A \ AV5 => 3A' such that AVB Q A' C A and A! \f B and A',a h B
(Relevance)
Choice Contraction
(CC1) Cn(B) = Cn(C) => A3B = A3G (Congruence)
(CC2) A3B |h B =>|P B (Success)
(CC3) A3B C A (Inclusion)
(CC4) a £ A \ A3B => 3A' such that A3i? C A'C A and A! \f- B and A', a |b B
(Relevance)
Where, for sets of sentences A and B, A |b B iff B C Cn(A)
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("|F" is "Bolzano consequence": all of B are contained in the consequences of A.)
The Relevance postulates replace AGM Recovery, which also makes AGM Vacuity
redundant. The major omission here is Closure, which Fuhrmann omits because Gen¬
eral Contractions are not restricted to theories (logically closed sets of sentences). How¬
ever, this virtue need not worry us, for Inclusion and Relevance together imply that
whenever a theory is given as input, theories are returned20.
2.7.2 Constructing General Contractions
The partial-meet contraction method of AGM needs to be altered only slightly in order
to cover package contraction. I refer the interested reader to Fuhrmann [35], where full
details and proofs are to be found.
Recall that B is now (potentially) a set of sentences. Then define partial meet package
contraction via the above generalisation of AGM's "maximal subtheories"; package re¬
mainders:
AVB = f| ot(A -L B)
The contractions so defined meet all of PCI - PC4.
Choice contractions are characterized in a similar fashion, employing the notion of
choice remainder: the set of all maximal subsets of A that do not contain set B is written
A IB. The difference between choice and package contractions can easily be traced back
to their employment of Bolzano and Scott consequence respectively.
Definition 3 Choice Remainders
X e ALB iff
• X C A
20See page 51 of Fuhrmann's "Essay on Contraction"
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• XIjf-B, and
• VY : X CY C A=>Y \\~ B
Then put A3B = H a(A/B)
Such functions satisfy CCl-4.
2.7.3 Structuring theories
Rational theory revisions are not (and cannot) be made on logical grounds alone. There
are many cases where pure logic cannot dictate the revision that takes place, for logic
does not pronounce upon the pedigree of facts. There are various ways of giving struc¬
ture to theories, which allows revision to be computed in a less arbitrary way than by
using selection functions.
Advocates of "epistemic entrenchment" have a particular way of prioritizing or pro¬
ducing a hierarchy of beliefs. For constructive propositional belief revision, postulate
a relation < on sentences reflecting their degree of epistemic warrant, ordered via the
consequence relation. Then, define contraction of sentence <j> from knowledge base K as
follows.
9 € K—(f> iff 9 6 K and <f> < 9 or \~ cf>
An obvious problem with this approach is that, while it avoids the initial 'arbitrari¬
ness' of the use of the selection function in choosing suitable theory remainders, itmerely
pushes the problem of selection into the theory itself. Theories are now structured sets
of sentences, but how is it determined where sentences fit in that structure? The selec¬
tion of entrenchment position of a sentence in a theory is just as arbitrary as use of the
selection function. Mark Ryan faces this same problem in his study [88] of "Ordered
Theory Presentations"; the problem of selection of remainders is replaced by the prob¬
lem of choosing an ordering on sentences in a theory.
What is needed, I suggest, is a more principled way of selecting appropriate remain-
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ders, which does not rely on some previously imposed ordering. Theories must carry
their structure with them, especially if, as Ryan observes, they are to undergo iterated
revision. The model of dialogue proposed here sees communication as a process of iter¬
ated change.
The IQmeasures ("InformationQuality", presented in chapter 8) for first-order systems,
are intended as (the beginnings of) a principled way of replacing epistemic entrench¬
ment hierarchies and informationally guiding autonomous rational revisions.
2.8 Modelling Theory Change
The systems and results presented above for theory change are entirely syntactical; they
concentrate on the particular form in which a theory is expressed, and as such they pro¬
vide perfectly good algorithms for theory change. So why might one need to go about
modelling theory change? Modelling allows important notions such as content and com¬
pleteness to be formalized and verified (I said more in defence of semantics in the pre¬
ceding chapter). A semantics provides a standard of correctness againstwhich methods
of information processing (the syntactic manipulations) can be compared.
Semantically speaking, amodelling for a theory gives us a notion of the content underly¬
ing a particular set of sentences. Contents of theories will be thought of as sets of "pos¬
sible worlds"21; the more informative a theory is, the fewer "worlds" it admits as possi¬
ble. A complete theory prescribes just one possible world as the real one. (The obvious
link here is with the concept of a total information state in Dynamic Semantics.) Once a
semantics for contraction or revision is in place there is a basis for checking soundness
and completeness of various systems of theory change.
There are a number of ways in which one might go about modelling theory change,
but surprisingly little work has been done on the subject. Gardenfors (1986) gives a
modelling for theory extension in terms of the semantics of intuitionistic logic. How¬
ever, Grove's "Spheres" [48] have been the only direct attempt to provide a modelling
for theory revision. As Fuhrmann [35] points out, Grove's Spheres are closely related
to Lewis' [74] semantics for counterfactuals. My semantics for revision, developed in
21 In the first-order case, sets of variable assignments are also involved.
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chapter 3, is given using the concept of "supermodels", and is directly applicable to the
dynamic semantics of natural language. I now review each modelling strategy in turn.
2.8.1 Intuitionistic Semantics for extension
In "Knowledge in Flux"22 [42], and a number of earlier papers, Peter Gardenfors proves
that propositional theory extension is complete with respect to the semantics of propo-
sitional intuitionistic logic. This is a result which I extend to the first-order case in chap¬
ter 5. The semantics of Intuitionisitic Logic (IL) is based on the idea that models encode
growing states of knowledge. Once a proposition is held to be true in IL it remains true
(Persistence). Thus the connection with theory extension is intuitively obvious (to an¬
ticipate once more):
Theorem 1 T + ph a iff st\p\ \=il on
Alpha is in a theory under extension by a proposition p if and only if it is supported
by the intuitionistic model of the theory updated by that proposition.
2.8.2 Grove's Spheres
Grove's modelling [48] is directed specifically towards AGM theory revision. Groves
spheres also make clear the link between systems of theory change and the semantics of
counterfactuals. Systems of nested spheres {£p : P C W) are families of subsets of W
(the set of all possible worlds), centered upon a particular subset P C W, correspond¬
ing to a proposition P.
Write [a] = {w &W \ w \= a] for the content of a proposition a.
Similarly, let [T] = {w £ W \ Va e T,w \= a} be the content of a theory T. In addition
p£P ["] is the set of smallest spheres in £p which non-emptily intersect [P]. Systems of
nested spheres satisfy four conditions:
• (SI) Minimality: P is the smallest sphere in £p
"Pages 138 -142
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• (S2) Maximality: W is the largest sphere in Sp
• (S3) Finite Nesting: Vet, VEp, if [a] ^ 0 then g^p[a} ^ 023
• (S4) Connectedness: if P, Q € Ep then P C Q or Q C P
(S3) and (S4) ensure that for every consistent a and every family of spheres, there is al¬
ways a unique smallest sphere which non-emptily intersects [cr].
Lewis's 1973 semantics [74] for counterfactual conditionals differs only in the respect
that there spheres are centered on single worlds (total information states), rather than
sets of worlds (propositions.)
AlthoughGrove states his semantics for revision, it can easily be use to generate con¬
tractions too. To find T—p consider the set A of the closest worlds24 to [T] at which
is true. T—p is just the set of propositions true in all of the worlds [K] U A.
2.8.3 "Supermodels"
The modelling which I develop in the next chapter is specifically tailored to interface
with the systems of dynamic semantics presented above, although it is obviously for¬
mally equivalent to contractions based onGrove's spheres. Supermodel semantics could
be described as "spheres for dynamic logicians", although their focus is on contraction
rather than revision, and I give them in terms of models, rather than possible worlds
(though this is not really a distinction of any substance.) Models are eliminated under
update (semantical theory extension), and sets of "supermodels" are constructed dur¬
ing "downdating" - the semantical analogue of theory contraction. The result is a family
of dynamic systems which are dynamic in two directions; information growth (model
elimination) and information loss (supermodel construction).
23Rules out infinite chains of inclusion; like Lewis's limit assumption in the semantics for counterfactu-
als.
24Some work must be done to ensure that there is such a set.
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2.9 Logics of Information
A Formal Semantics of communication relies, it is argued, upon the coordination of in¬
formation states belonging to communicating agents. The question quickly arises, then,
as to the particular logical principles governing deducibility over information states (the
"inner logic" of information states). The base logic under which theories are to be closed
ought, then, to be an "informational logic." Here, some basic constraints to be met by
any adequate logic based on the notion of information states25 are surveyed. An "infor¬
mational logic" is one in which the deducibility relation is thought of as inference based
on the available information. Various other names have been given to such logics ("ev¬
idential inference", "logics of inquiry", and doxastic and epistemic logics in general.)
The intuition to be captured here is that T b <fr corresponds to the evidence T making
the inference 4> available. This informational perspective forces us to reject certain of
the standard rules of classical logic. In the work to be developed in the main body of
the thesis, classical logic is retained as the base logic. I return to non-classical themes at
the close of the thesis.
1. Paraconsistency
The first quibble with classical logic regards its approach to inconsistency. Inconsis¬
tent input is common, especially in dialogue, so Dynamic Semantics needs a logic
which treats contradiction robustly. Theory change systems work so as to preserve
consistency, so that contradictions would never be met by the underlying inner logic
of the theories themselves. However, such an idealization is too strong for a proper
treatment of the data. Thus "Ex falsum sequitur quodlibet" (EFSQ), the classical law
".Lb 4>", is informationally invalid. Having contradictory information does not li¬
cense an agent to infer just anything. I require theories to be non-explosive under con¬
tradiction, and information states to be non-implosive. AGM theory workswith a clas¬
sical base logic and avoids explosion byway of the revision function. I explore a com¬
bination of AGM theory with paraconsistency in chapter 8, the point being to allow
contradictions to be explicitly dealt with, rather than ruled out of the picture alto¬
gether.
25Compare with Wansing's "Logics of Information Structures"[106], Andreas Schoter's [89].
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2. Partiality
The classical law of excluded middle, hpV ->p, is invalid from the informational per¬
spective. For information states, or theories, must be able to be incomplete; agents can
be agnostic about certain propositions. However, this can be modelled without the
use of a partial base logic. Theories are partial in that they fail to contain information
about certain propositions. Model this partiality via sets of possible models orworlds.
Within each theory (ie: in terms of the internal logic of the theory) it is true that b pV->p
is the case, but this does not commit a theory to holding either p or its negation (dis¬
junctions are not witnessing, one might say). Partiality is accommodated by way of
the external logic of theories, rather than their internal deductive systems. In this re¬
spect, AGM systems are partial, and Update Semantics is similarly partial.
3. Relevance
The crucial insight of relevant logic [3] is that entailments hold between formulae in
information states if and only if there is an "informational" link from antecedent to the
consequent (as opposed to a mere connection of truth-values). One might say that "A
(informationally) implies B" only if the content of A makes the content of B available.
Thus the usual 'paradoxes' of relevance (eg: A —> (B —> A)) ought to be ruled out
in the logic underlying communication. Both AGM theory and systems of Dynamic
Semantics are "irrelevant." I return to the issue of conditionals in a later chapter.
4. Non-monotonicity
Non-monotonicity is otherwise known as defeasibility, revisability, or non-persistence,
this is really a meta-logical requirement. Normal "monotonic" systems accumulate
inferences and information. Theory extension is monotonic, for example. However,
the notion of change requires that previous information states may be overridden by
the reception of new information. Prior commitments may have to be lost via the ac¬
quisition of new information. This is the whole point ofAGM theory change, and one
which is widely accepted in the AI and logic communities. "Truths" (other than the
logical laws) in an information state may later be discovered to be "false" or just of
undecided status, and vice versa. The eliminativity of interpretation in standard dy¬
namic systems makes then monotonic. The next chapter explores how DS informa-
Formal Preliminaries in Dynamic Semantics and Theory Change 60
tion change can be made non-monotonic, using a modelling of AGM theory change.
5. Constructive negation
Logics of information processing ought to give equal weight to both positive and neg¬
ative information. Negative information is classically taken to be supported by lack
of negative information. Thus if a state fails to support p, it (classically speaking) sup¬
ports ->p. However, negative information ought to have an independent status to that
of positive information. The point is that one cannot infer ->p just from the fact that
there is no positive information about p.
Base Contraction versus Paraconsistency
Closure of theories under classical consequence might, given the above discussion, be
too problematic a requirement in many applications of theory change. For one thing,
it leads to the familiar problem of logical omniscience, if theories are taken to be infor¬
mation states of an agent. A related issue is that classically closed theories are infinitely
large sets, which hardly fits inwith a view of agents as finite. A pressing problem is the
fact that classically closed theories "explode to absurdity" under inconsistency. The the¬
ory of "base contraction" wasmotivated by some of these considerations. The basic idea
behind "base contraction" is that contractions occur only over open sets of sentences; the
"theory base". The theory base is later closed, after contraction, in order to generate the
full theory.
However, the approach taken in base contraction, wedded as it is to classical logic, over¬
looks an alternative route away from these problems. As Restall and Slaney [84] point
out, a "theory" that does not make use of logical closure is hardly a theory at all. For
this reason, and the supporting fact that AGM results can be preserved under (some)
modifications of the base logic (or logic internal to theories), I prefer to explore ways of
changing the logic underlying theory change in order to escape some of the problems
of classically closed theories (again see chapter 8).
I turn to the formal specification of an informational base logic for a dynamic seman¬
tics of communication in a later chapter. The following chapter provides a semantics for
theory contraction, in the propositional case, which interfaces with systems of dynamic
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semantics.




A Dynamic Semantics of Theory
Change
Theory change systems (AGM et al.) have, as yet (and in the literature as a whole), only
been stated at the propositional level. They take theories to be sets of sentences (syntac¬
tic structures) closed under classical propositional consequence. Systems of dynamic
semantics, on the other hand, assume that information states are semantical structures,
often offirst-order complexity.
One of the lessons of the first chapter was that "downdates" of information states
need to be taken seriously if dynamic systems are to fulfil their empirical aims. Cur¬
rently, dynamic systems deal only with information growth in the sense of decreasing
partiality, but dynamic semantics needs to process changing information both from a
changing world and from differently informed linguistic agents. Information exchange
in communication is to be modelled by way of theory construction, contraction, and
revision, within the frameworks provided by two allied perspectives; dynamic syntax
(theory change or "belief revision"), and dynamic semantics. As explained in the pre¬
ceding chapter, the syntactic characterization of theory change derives from the AGM
literature on "Belief Revision". Dynamic semantics, on the other hand, demands sys¬
tems which see theory change as affecting semantic structures, or "information states".
Some well-explored AGM syntactical theory contraction algorithms are used to con¬
struct new systems of propositional dozvndate semantics. That such research is desirable,
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note Hans Rott's request [86] for;
"... the invention of a semantics for belief contraction."
The resulting "downdate semantics" forms the core of new extensions of current dy¬
namic semantical systems which are capable of processing changing information.
3.1 Introductory Remarks
The discussion of chapter 1 resulted in the assertion that communication can be mod¬
elled as agents' convergence upon a mutually acceptable theory about the world. This
account involves the construction and revision of agent-relative theories, rather than a
common or shared "information state". Theories here ought not to be construed solely
as sets of sentences to which individuals assent under ideal conditions, for the content
of a theory is also of crucial importance when one considers how it should be changed1.
Thus the syntactic operations of theory change go hand in hand with an account of
the semantical objects and processes to which they relate. The content of a theory will
be given in terms of structures of possibilities admitting of transformations which mir¬
ror syntactical theory expansion, contraction, and revision. The syntactical operations
determine how information in a theory is processed, while the semantics describes the in¬
formation structures which are being transformed. Furthermore, the operations of the¬
ory contraction and revision are taken to be an integral part of the dynamics of a serious
Dynamic Semantics of dialogues. Such a semantics not only needs to posit information
structures which are revisable, but ought to provide an account of how the appropriate
revisions are to be carried out.
The general problem for a genuine Downdate Semantics is that, whereas in the case of
theory extension or semantic update a unique extension or update can be determined
on logical grounds alone, for contracting theories and semantic downdates there is (in
general) no purely logical way of determining the required contraction or downdate2.
Ahis is even tacitly acknowledged in the AGM case, where the congruence postulates attempt to ensure
that propositions with the same 'content' have the same dynamic effect.
2Jaspars [60] seems not to acknowledge this important point. The multiple extensions problem shows
that constraints provided by logical considerations are not strong enough to provide a computable con-
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Thus extra-logical, or informational, factors must be brought to bear on the problem.
While there exist syntactical systems developed in the AGM literature (Alchourron, Gardenfors,
& Makinson, [1]), these are only stated at the propositional level. Thus, going on to con¬
sider the dynamics of first-order theories (in chapter 5), not even the syntactical work is
in place yet.
3.2 Related research
Gardenfors ([40]) proved the completeness of AGM theory extension with respect to In-
tuitionistic Logic (IL). This was relatively unsurprising given the Kripke semantics for
IL in terms of growing states of knowledge, and the very similar motivations behind
the AGM expansion postulates. An interesting extension of IL is Nelson's logic of con-
structible falsity [77], the systemN. Here negative information is taken to have a seman¬
tic status on a par with that of positive information, whereas IL formulates negation as
intensional. Pearce and Rautenberg [78] showed that an extension of AGM theory ex¬
pansion where falsity or rejection is seen as an independent concept is complete with
respect to N.
Note, however, that these results apply only to monotonic systems; those where in¬
formation grows and persists. Constructive negation represents the rejection of infor¬
mation rather than its retraction or revision, so that the above completeness results de¬
scribe only the semantics of theory growth. This begs the question of a set of complete¬
ness results for a semantics of theory contraction and revision with respect to the AGM
postulates. These I supply in this chapter.
Jaspars' "ud"
An obvious way to start a semantics of theory contraction would be to put the Kripke
semantics for IL as it were "in reverse," so that retraction of a proposition is seen as a
relation in the opposite direction to the usual information extension order for Kripke
traction algorithm. See Rescher [82], Gardenfors [42], Fagin, Ullman, & Vardi [29], Galliers [38]
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models. Jaspars [60] takes this approach in the Kripke semantics for N ("Nelson mod¬
els"), introducing "up- and down- dates" as modal operators.
A system dubbed "ud" for derivations in an up-and-downdate formulation of the
semantics of N is given in Jaspars [60]. "ud" is sound with respect to an up-down lan¬
guage overNelson models (p. 97), completeness is also shown (p. 163). The system sees
updates and downdates as actions denoted by modal operators, approach results in the
following (where ].[ is a 'downdate' function):
"}p[q" means that q always results from the retraction of p from some information state
s in model M.
Thus: "retraction of p means q" (where < is a partial order on .5'):
(1) M, s 1=]p[q & Vs' < s : M, s' N p =>• M, s' (= q Thus, if p is not supported but q is,
at all points lower in the information growth order than s, then s supports the assertion
that "retraction of p means q." This seems a rather strangeway of thinking about down-
dating. Removal of p from a theory does not "mean" anything much; it certainly does
not entail anything (in the sense of 'support'), unless one wants to remove p's conse¬
quences as well, so that removing pmight "mean" forcing the removal of q. This would
be to stretch the idea of entailment too far though, for the action of theory contraction
should not be thought of as supporting any evidence at all; but quite the opposite. What
Jaspars has defined is the idea that "q is in the residue of s after contraction by p." This
notion can easily be defined in the systems of the preceding chapter, both syntactically
(q € T—p) and semantically (st] P IN q), but it is not the focus of the research presented
here.
AGM theory change is constructed so as to tackle the multiple extensions problem (MEP);
the fact that there is (generally) no unique logical way of contracting a theory. The ap¬
proach embodied in "ud" singles out just one theory contraction approach, and a fairly
naive one at that. In this way, the prescription that information contraction is under¬
stood by way of (1) ignores the MEP. The prescription is that the correct way of con¬
tracting a theory is given by the semantical insights afforded by Nelson models. But
this is surely too restrictive a view.
In this chapter a range of semantical approaches complete with respect to AGM con¬
traction methods is developed, so that a generic system for semantical theory change
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is available, as opposed to a single prescriptive system. One of the great merits of the
AGM tradition is its broad approach to theory change within a treatment of the im¬
portant logical problem posed by the MEP. Any semantical approach to theory change
needs to respect this logical point. Whilst, computationally speaking, unique revision
and contraction functions are desirable, the burden of uniqueness cannot be placed on
the logical language underlying the contraction process, but on the nature and structure
of the particular information states that a revision system processes. Jaspars' approach
makes the burden of choice of contraction amatter of logic rather than of informational,
or rational, considerations.
Removing information in Dynamic Semantics
The issue of downdating in dynamic semantics has been acknowledged by researchers
in the field (Dekker [21], Asher [6], Vermeulen [104], Jaspars [60]), but few have been
tempted to start tackling it. Dekker ([21], p. 205) introduces the "common ground" as
the "strongest common downdate" of two information states (all the information that
the two states agree upon, via set intersection.) However, this is not the kind of down-
date that I shall be concerned with. I explore a function on information states of two
arguments; the state to be downdated and the expression whose semantical contribu¬
tion is to be removed from it.
Vermeulen [104] adds to dynamic predicate logic expressions of the form x3 which are
interpreted as instructions to forget the value of a variable x. Whilst, later, I shall be con¬
cerned with this kind of downdate in first-order systems one should also be careful not
to "jump the gun" in quite this way. Forgetting the values of variables is not the be all
and end all of downdating, for there are many other syntactic units by which to down-
date in dialogue (see chapter 7), epecially involving dialogue-external information. Be¬
fore issues in the dynamics of anaphora and modality are addressed, the propositional
work must be firmly in place.
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This chapter explores logical and informationally rational ways of changing consistent
and deductively closed partial theories3. Propositional systems are the focus of interest
for the moment. Recall some standard syntactical definitions for logical theories:
A theory T is a set of sentences of some language C. Here, theories are taken to be par¬
tial descriptions of theworld4, since generally therewill be propositions p such that neither
p € T nor g T. A theory T is complete if V(/> € £, either <f> G T or -i0 g T.
Theory T is deductively closed when T is the set {<p £ C \ T \- p), where h is a deducibility
relation over C. We take b to be the deducibility relation of classical propositional logic5.
Write 67/(T) to mean the deductive closure of T. Write T± for the inconsistent theory, so
that IT = C. Write for the theory deducible from the empty premise set (i.e. the set
of tautologies.) Theory T is consistent if T^ C.
Following AGM notation, T _L p is the set of all maximal subtheories of T which fail
to imply proposition p under deductive closure (or, to follow Fuhrmann [35], the set of
"remainders" of T after p). This set is non-empty as long as p is not a logical truth. We
also define a similar notion, the set of all theories (implicitly defined over a certain vo¬
cabulary) which fail to imply p:
Definition 4 T - p = {T' \T' \f p}
Semantically speaking, sets of sentences making up a theory are underwritten by
information structures, or sets ofmodels (or "possibilities") for the language. A propo¬
sitional model is a set of valuations (assignments of truth-values) to the propositional
letters in C, and can also be thought of selecting a subset of AtomC, the set of atomic
propositions, as those facts which hold in a certain possible world. Think of each indi¬
vidual model as a "possibility" or total description of how the world might be. A set
3I explore these issues in relation to paraconsistent theories in later chapters.
4Certainly the theories manipulated in linguistic communication concern only a limited subject matter.
5Although I shall later be concerned with non-classical systems.
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ofmodels is a set of such possibilities (considered disjunctively); a partial description of
how things might be. As a theory gets larger (more complete), its correspondingmodel-
set gets smaller, as more possibilities are eliminated. This is the general strategy of an
eliminative semantics.
Write Mod(C) for the set of all models of the language £ (NB: not the model of the ab¬
surd theory.) This set corresponds to the empty theory, where all possibilities are avail¬
able. Mod(jC) supports no sentences, but will accept update by any non-contradictory
sentence. In terms of Dynamic Semantics, the notation6 is that Mod(C) = S, and then
individual states are the s C S.
With each partial theory T there is an associated set ofmodelsMr Q Mod(C)7 Here, take
the turnstile "\=" to be the entailment relation of the semantics of classical propositional
logic. (Entailment is defined as preservation of truth over the turnstile).
Definition 5 Mj = {m G Mod(C) | V</> G T, m |= </>}
The absurd theory, T± = £, has no models, so that = 0.
Correspondingly, each set of models has an associated theory8;
Definition 6 Th(M) = {p G C | Vm G M, m \= p}
In the case of propositional languages there is a 1-1 correspondence between single
models and complete theories; T is complete iff 3m G Mod(C) such that T — Th(m.).
Thus a single model is the semantical correlate of a complete theory; a state of total in¬
formation. (Of course, things become somewhat more complex in a first-order logic.)
To sum up here then, the syntax (theories) and semantics (models), link up in the
following way:
'There is a potential confusion to be avoided here. Often, in systems of dynamic semantics, information
states are written ass 6 S where S is the powerset of the set of all possibilities (which I have called 5 here.)
7We shall later generalize this definition to cover sets of theories.
8This definition will also be generalized to cover sets of sets of theories.
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Tg corresponds to Mod(C) = S, and
£ = Tj_ corresponds to 0
Say that a set of models M supports p iff Vm G M, m \= p
Say that a set of models M rejects p iff Vm G M, m (= ->p
Say that a set ofmodelsM is agnostic about p iffM neither supports nor rejects p. M ^ p,
or M fails to support p, iff M either rejects, or is agnostic about, p.
3.3.1 Non-standard definitions
Definition 7 M T pis the set of all sets of models which fail to support p. A model-set N G
M ± p fails to support p iff 3m G N such that m ft p.
Thus, M ±p={N\N\Ap}
It is from this set that specific minimal elementsmust be chosen for propositional down-
dates. Note that (of course) some sets of models in M _L p, further than being agnostic
on p, may actually reject p. That is , there are Q G M ± p such that Q \= ~^p
Now extend the function Th, taking sets of models to theories, to a function return¬
ing a set of theories from sets of sets of models, thus:
Definition 8 WhereM is a set of sets ofmodels
Th(M) = {Th(M) \ M G M}
Mt can also be extended so that it takes sets of theories, denoted T, into sets of sets of
models;
Definition 9 Mq- = {Mt \ T G T)
This allows the following theorem:
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Theorem 2 1. Th(M _L p) = T — p
2. Mr-p — M -L p
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So to elaborate, the set of theories associated with the set of sets of models failing to
support p are those theories failing to imply p. The (set of sets of) models of the set of
theories which fail to imply p are the sets of models which fail to support p.
Proof: first part
Th(M ± p) = Th{N | N y= p} = {Th(N) | N ft p} = {T \ T' \f p} = T - p
Second part;
Mt-p — {Mj'i | T' € T - p) = {Mt* | T1 1/ p} = {Mt* | Mx1 ^ p} = M _L p
Example 4 (Where the notation for models is hopefully obvious, ie: for example "101" stands
for "a true, b false, c true".)
Take C = {a,b,c}
T — a = {0, {6},{c},{6,c}}
M T a = {N \ N \£ a}
Then Th(M 1 a) = {Th(N) \ N ^ a} = T/i({000,010,001, Oll}{0, {b}, {c}, {b, c}} =
T -a
3.3.2 Partial Worlds versus sets of total worlds
In the formalism presented above, sets of total worlds (or models) have been used to
model the content of incomplete theories. Agnosticismwith respect to p is modelled by
a set ofworlds, some of which support p, and some ofwhich reject p. Why not, though,
dispensewith total worlds, and employ instead partial worlds in order to model partial
theories, (as is advocated in Situation Semantics for example?) There are (at least) five
reasons for sticking with total worlds;
• (1) preservation of classical results,
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Figure 3.1: Theories versus States
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• (2) interfacing with Update Semantics,
• (3) maintaning a clear distinction between theories and models,
• (4) maintaining eliminativity, and
• (5) formal equivalence between partial models and sets of total models.
Veltman's Update Semantics [101], which is one of the systems to be modified, is pre¬
sented in terms of shrinking sets total models. There is just one partial model of an
incomplete theory, so models will have to be extended (made less partial) rather than
eliminated under theory extension. Conversely, partial models will have to be "shrunk"
(made more partial) under theory contraction, and overwritten under theory revision.
All these operations could be defined in partialmodel theorywithoutmuch trouble, but,
once this is carried out, the distinction between theories and their models seems to be
largely lost. Thus the whole motivation behind a semantical approach is undermined
by the use of partial models. For these reasons I shall operate on sets of total 'worlds',
rather than one increasingly (and decreasingly) specified partial world. Besides, any¬
thing that can be expressed using a partial model can just as well be expressed using a
set of total models; the approaches are formally equivalent in this sense, though their
processing attributes will obviously differ.
3.4 Theory Extension and Model Elimination
Syntactically speaking, information growth is handled byway of adding new sentences
to the theory, and performing deductive closure. Thus, for propositional logic, as before;
T+ p = C7 (Tu {p}), where T+p is the extension of a theory T by a proposition p. This leads
to the following simple result; that propositional theory extension is functional9.
Lemma 11. VT,p, 3T' such that T' = T + p
2. ifT is closed and T + p = T" then T' is closed.
3. ifT + p = T' andT + p = T" then T' = T"
9see van Eijck [96] for the full details.
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Theory Expansion State Update
Figure 3.2: Expansion and Update
Semantically, the update process is described by model-elimination, so that, in gen¬
eral;
Definition 10 (Update)
M \p\ = {i € M | i |= p} where M is set of models m G M, and [.J is the update function.
As each new proposition is interpreted in the context set up by models resulting from
the processing of the foregoing propositions, the set of possible models for the theory
becomes smaller and smaller. Eventually a state of total information (only one possible
model) of the world remains.
The upshot is that, using model-elimination, a family of systems of Update Semantics
can be produced, mirroring different theory expansion systems10.
3.5 Theory Contraction and "Downdating"
Van Eijck's approach [96] to modelling systems of theory extension is now extended to
theory change systems along the lines of Gardenfors [42]. The rationality postulates for
propositional belief revision form a set of syntactic constraints on expanding and con¬
tracting sets of propositions. These constraints can be met by a variety of (syntactically
10see van Eijck [96] for the results here.
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defined) contraction functions11, which serve to preserve certain appropriate subsets of
sentences from the original theory after the removal of some particular sentence. For
example,
Definition 11 Maxichoice Contraction
when <f> is not a theorem ofC , the contraction T—<f> can be defined as y(T J_ f), where T_L <f is
the set of all maximal subsets ofT which fail to imply f, and 7 is a selection function choosing
an element of this set. Thus, since T ± p = {T1 C T \ T' \f p}, we have T—<p = 7 (T _L f)
I associate a downdate semantics with this function, and prove that it is complete with re¬
spect to Maxichoice Contraction.
Note that whereas Cl(T U {p}) (theory extension) forms a unique theory T + p,T _L p,
which is a collection of suitable theories, has no such virtue. This is the source of much
difficulty (indeed, thewholeAGM system is a response to this problem). Theway ahead
now is to shift the syntactic rationality postulates for revision and contraction of theo¬
ries into a semantical setting. Some useful insights for theory change systems emerge
by way of the semantical perspective on belief revision. In addition, the provision of
genuine downdates and revisions for semantic structuresmotivates a new family of sys¬
tems of dynamic semantics12.
Ultimately the project involves finding new rationality constraints for revision at the
predicate calculus level as well as for modal systems. Given a list of rationality postu¬
lates the task is then to find corresponding dynamic systems which meet them in terms
of semantic operations of model elimination and model creation. This is the task of
chapter 5.
3.5.1 Desiderata for a genuine "downdate semantics"
First of all, some definitions:
11
eg: partial meet, full meet, maxichoice, transitively relational partial meet contraction.
12This is the subject of the next chapter.
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Definition 12 Implosive functions
A function f is implosive on a set M iff f(M) = 0
Definition 13 Eliminative functions
A function f is eliminative on a set M iff f(M) C M
Now impose the following basic restrictions on a downdate function for any system
of downdate semantics. Where J . [ is a downdate function, f.] an update function, M
is a set of models, and p any proposition.
Definition 14 Desiderata:
(for any proposition p which is not a theorem ofC)
1. M\ p \\f= p (Success)
2. MJ p ||= q iff M \= q (Non-eliminative downdates)13
There ought not to be information growth after downdating.
3. Mj p M [-ip] (Integrity)
The requirement is for genuine downdates. In general, downdate by p update by negp.
4. MJ p If: 0 (No Implosions)
Downdating ought not, in general, to result in absurdity.
5. Mj p 5 (No Explosions)
Downdating ought, in general, not to result in the loss ofall information.
These considerations bring about the following result.
Theorem 3 Impossibility Result
There are no eliminative and non-implosive downdate functions (for semantics with classical
entailment).
Proof:
Assume that there is such a downdate function. Take a set ofmodels M such that M |=
13In fact I prove that there is no eliminative non-implosive downdate semantics (next theorem).
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p, so V7V C M, N f= p . The eliminative downdate M\ p [ is non-empty (non-implosive).
Thus (by success) 3m e M] p [ such that m Y1 P- But sinceMj p [C M (by eliminativity),
it is the case thatVm G M\p{,m |= p, so thatm \= p and m ^ p. So, unless the semantics
is paraconsistent, there is a reductio.
In a classical semantics, without an account of theory change, the contraction of a
theory with respect to a proposition p is tantamount to extension by ->p. (Denial that
p is assertion that not p.) Van Eijck's [96] second system for the extension of preposi¬
tional theories works in just this way; he is able to provide a translation of that system
into Veltman's Update Logic.
3.6 Theory change as a model of dialogue
Theory change systems are not just important for the philosophy of science, artificial in¬
telligence (robotics), and computer science (databases); they are important as a model
of linguistic communication too. A conversation can be seen as a co-operative attempt
between agents (using "belief revisions") to agree upon acceptable theories about the
world as it is, was, or may be. Theories are best thought of as an agent's epistemic ap¬
proximations to reality. They make no representational claims.
I claim that people change their personal theories all the time during conversation; in¬
deed that this evolution of information structures is the motivation behind communica¬
tive behaviour. Communication is not the only way that information structures get al¬
tered, perception of a changing world also brings about information change. Thus an
empirically adequate dynamic semantics should account for information change (rather
than monotonic update) due to both a changing environment and (potentially conflict¬
ing) input from (less than perfect) communicating agents.
I give an analysis of some relevant dialogue contributions in chapter 7. For themoment,
in order to sketch the ideas here, consider a few "talk experiments":
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Example 5 John: "The opera starts at 8pm, I think you said."
Jackie: "Mmmm, did I? No, I can't remember what time it is on at."
Jackie's contribution in this dialogue is not a case of standard negation. She is not ac¬
tually denying that the opera begins at 8 o' clock, but neither is she willing to affirm her
earlier claim that it does. Rather, this example requires John to contract a proposition p
(to the effect that the opera starts at 8pm) from his "mini-theory" about the immediate
future. Theory contraction is thus applicable to a "logic of forgetting."
Example 6 John has arranged to meet Jackie in the theatre later on.
Jackie: "I'm not going out tonight."
This example requires John to revise his theory about the coming evening (which sup¬
ports a proposition p to the effect that Jackie is going out tonight), by --p. This task may
reduce him to tears, but not to logical absurdity.
Example 7 John: "You can catch the lpm train tomorrow."
Jackie: "Good. I was worried that there might be a strike."
John: "Ah. You're right. Now that you mention it - maybe you can't catch that train."
This example is more complex, as it involves epistemic modality. John has made an
assertion, and later wants to take it back, due to a modal expression uttered by Jackie.
The modal has the effect of changing John's previous commitment.
Example 8 John and Jackie have been discussing who might have stolen their amnesiac-of-the-
year trophy.
John: "I still think the suspect has to be someone with access to our front door keys; there is no
sign of a forced entry"
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Jackie: "Whoever did it was very quiet."
John: "Oh! Forget about this 'suspect'. I remember now. I hid it - it's under the bed."
Here John is instructing Jackie to "remove" an individual ("the suspect") from her cur¬
rent theory, because he doesn't exist. The downdate here is by a discourse referent or
variable (eg: see the earlier discussion of Vermeulen [104]). This type of contraction can
only be adequately formalized in a first-order system. First-order contractions and re¬
visions are the subject of chapter 5.
The above epistemic/linguistic examples illustrate two important points. Firstly,
the update/downdate distinction in partial semantics allows us to capture the distinc¬
tion between strong and weak denial in everyday dialogue. Weak denial can be mod¬
elled by way of theory contraction, leaving the epistemic status of a proposition inde¬
terminate. Strong denial is modelled by updating a theory with a negation (this may
necessitate a revision).
The second point to notice is that some of these examples would be much better han¬
dled in first-order logic, for we often need a robust notion of "dialogue referent" if cer¬
tain epistemic problems are to be resolved. After contraction, for instance in the opera
example, John is not just going to forget about the status of p; he still has the discourse
referent the opera to worry about. Similarly in the second example John needs to know
of Jackie (a "subject") just what its plans for the evening are.
This motivates the movement of the thesis, towards a first-order syntax and semantics
for theory change (chapter 5), and a paraconsistent treatment of contradictions (chapter
8), where a robust and revisable notion of subject can be provided (see chapter 6). Such
systems also allow dynamic anaphor binding, so that contraction and revision over sets
of variable assignment functions can also be formalised.
3.7 Updating and AGM theory extension
Unlike the variety of systems explored by van Eijck [96], which provide clauses for the¬
ory extensionswith respect to each of the logical connectives (including one for O), be¬
lief revision in the AGM tradition sees theory expansion as a very simple matter of adding
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the new sentence (regardless of its logical form) and closing under consequence. I stick
to a simple version of theory extension and make use of established results in the AGM
framework.
AGM Propositional Theory Extension (AGMTE)
Recall the standard definition of theory extension:
Definition 15 AGM Theory Extension
T + p = {q | T U {p} h q) = Cl(T U {p})
From this one can make explicit the following clauses:-
T + (p A q) = (T + p) + q
T + (pV q) = (T + p) C (T + q)
Note that in the case of negation I do not14 stipulate that
T + ->p = T1 such that T' + p = C.
This would be identical to the intuitionistic account of negation, where ->p is defined
as p —Rather, we simply add ->p and close under consequence, as usual. In other
words, we treat update by positive and negative information in the same way. Note
that the AGM extension clause still leaves the way open for genuine downdating, where
a downdate is not seen simply as updating with a negation (as is a feature in van Ei-
jck's syntactic correlates of Update Semantics). This openness is an essential virtue of
the AGM system, leaving the way open for contractions and revisions. In this way the
choice of an update semantics or theory extension system has implications for the fur¬
ther development of a downdate system.
The result is that the above definition allows the development of a very simple Update
Semantics.
14as opposed to van Eijck's systems
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AGM Update Semantics (AGMUS)
The following is not quite an update semantics in the style of Veltman, for it lacks an
account of epistemic modality (one can very easily be supplied). I consider modal ex¬
tensions of the AGM systems in detail in the following chapter.
Definition 16 AGM Update Semantics
For all propositions p e C there is an eliminative update on sets ofmodels M
M [pj = {m € M | m |= p}
And note the following derived clauses:
M [p A q] = M [p] {qj
M\p\J q\ = M |p| UM[q]
The connection between AGMTE and AGMUS is given by the following;
Theorem 4 (Completeness)
For all propositions p;
1. Th(M) + p = Th(M [p] )
2. T + p = T' iff Mt Ip] = Mt>
This just states formally that AGM theory extension is accomplished semantically by
model (or world) elimination.
Proof: for the first item by induction on complexity of p15.
Base step:
Th(M) + p = Cl(Th(M) U {p}) = Cl(Th({m eM\m\= p})) = Th(M [p] ).
Then by Induction Hypothesis
Th(M) + p = Th(M |p! ), and , Th(M [p] ) + q = Th(M |p] (qj ).
From this the rest of the induction is trivial.
Proof of the second part follows from the first. Since T and t" are deductively closed;
15See van Eijck [96] for a similar proof .
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T + p = T' iff Th(MT) + p = Th(MT')
and so from the first part of the theorem
Th(MT) + p = Th(MT [p] )
so that by Lemma 1 (third clause),
Th(Mr [p] ) = Th(MT'), and it follows that
Mt IpJ = Mx'
3.7.1 Downdate Semantics rationality postulates
Here I list a series of constraints on the expanding sets of models which model theory
contractions. I adopt these postulates in addition to the desiderata on a genuine down-
date semantics presented earlier in the chapter. The constraints can be thought of as
rationality postulates for downdating information states. These are basically semanti¬
cal versions of the familiar AGM posulates. We label them DS 1-8, and RS 1-8. Only
propositional constraints are listed here. Recall that |. [ is the downdate function on in¬
formation states Mx C Mod(C) (or alternatively s € 5), and ][. ][ is the revision function
on information states
Rationality Postulates for Downdating
(DS1) For any sentence 4 and any set of models Mr, Mx\ 4 [ exists (Closure)
(DS2) Mr C Mt\ 4 I (Containment / Non-eliminativity)
(DS3) If Mt Y1 4 then Mt} 4 [= Mt (Vacuity)
(DS4) If ^ 4 then Mt1 4 4 (Success)16
(DS5) If Mt |= 4 then Mt Q (MtJ 4> [) |</>J (Recovery)
(DS6) If ip <f>, then MtJ <f> [= Mt} if I (Congruence)
(DS7) Mt} 4* [nMt} [2 Mt} 4 A if [ (Composition I)
(DS8) IfMt} if A 4 4 then MTJ if A 4 [D MT\ if [ (Composition II)
16The downdated sentence is not entailed by the resulting information state, unless it is a theorem.
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Rationality Postulates for Revision Semantics
(RSI) For any sentence f and any "information state" Mr, Mr][ <t> ][ exists (Closure)
(RS2) Mr I 4> ][(= 4> (Success)
(RS3) Mt 1^1 Q Mt\ (j> f(Containment)
(RS4) If £ T, then Mr [0] 2 Mt\ </>][• 17(Vacuity)
(RS5) Mt}[ <t> ][= 0 iff 1= -k/>. (Implosion)18
(RS6) If ip <t>, then Mt][ <p ][= Mt\ if ][ (Congruence)
(RS7) Mt\ <t> A^][C (Mt][ 4, ][)][ ^ ][
(RS8) If Mr][ <f> ][¥= 4> then (Mt][ $ ][)][ tp ][C MT][ 4> A ip ][
3.8 Systems of Theory Contraction and Downdate Semantics
Here I prove connections between various AGM methods for theory contractions and
new systems of downdate semantics. The new downdate semantics given will be very
simple, analogously to the AGM update system. All propositions participate in the same
downdate procedure.
The following notion is useful in the construction ofminimal downdates or maximal con¬
tractions, which are desirable for reasons of informational economy.
Definition 17 (Maximal subtheory of T which fails to imply p)19
T' € T T p, (T' is a maximal subtheory failing to imply p) iff
1 T, ^ T
17Revision is update when ->4> $.T
18Mt][ 4> ][ is consistent unless <f> is logically impossible. In paraconsistent systems we do not make this
requirement. Instead a coherence measure which respects informativeness of the theory as a whole is to
be used in judging whether or not to revise, and there can be non-trival information states containing con¬
tradictions.
19Or Remainder of T after p
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2. p 0 Cl(T')
3. for any T" such that T' C T" C T,p e C7(T").
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Note that T Jl p C T — p
This definition allows a theory contraction algorithm which makes use of a choice
function20.
Definition 18 Maxichoice Theory Contraction (MTC)
When p is not a logical truth, choose one of the maximal subtheories failing to imply p. Use a
choice function j, and define contraction thus:
T-p = 7 (T _L p)
ifhp then T—p — T
Maxichoice contraction satisfies the AGM postulates for theory contraction.
In order to give the semantics of maxichoice contraction a semantical parallel of maximal
subtheories is required.
3.8.1 Supermodel Semantics
Here I define a possible-worlds style downdate semantics and prove that it is the se¬
mantical correlate of the AGM maxichoice contraction function. In order to achieve this,
I introduce some new formal notions.
Definition 19 Ignorant Supermodels
Notation; Mt> & Mt±p
Mt1 is a minimal supermodel set ofMr whichfails to support p (or simply "a supermodel set of
Mt ignorant ofp") iff.
20There are plenty of things wrong with this function (see Gardenfors et al. [1], and Ryan [88])-1 merely
use it as a simple starting point
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1. Mx Q Mr* (supermodels)
2. Mx' ^ p (ignorance)
3. for any Mxn such that Mx C Mx" C Mx', Mxn (== p (minimality)
Thus the set ofminimal supermodel sets ofT ignoring p,written Mx±_P, is the minimally
larger set ofmodels (thanMx) which support asmuch ofT as they canwithout also sup¬
porting p. Note that Mx±p C M ± p and that Mxj_p never actually rejects p. Of course,
for each T and p there are, in general, many minimal supermodel sets. The problem for
a downdate semantics is now which one of these to choose. A simple illustration may
prove useful at this point-
Example 9 Take C = {p, q, r} and T = {p, q}.
Then Mx is the set consisting of the two models m and m' where Val(p, m) = Val(q, m) =
Val(p,m') = Val(q,m') = 1, and Val(r, m) = 0 but Val(r,m') = 1.
This theory supports/contains p and q, but is agnostic as to the status of r. Now suppose q is
to be contracted from the theory (and this is not to say that q is false, remember.) Syntactically
the theory simply reduces to T' = {p}, but semantically things are more fine-grained. There are
two minimal supermodel sets which ignore q. One is the set Mx< — {m, m', m"} where p, q,
and r take the values 1, 0, 0 respectively in m" (and m and m! remain as above). The other is
identical but for a model m'" replacing m" which is identical to m" but for r taking the value 1.
Thus T' = T—p has two minimal supermodel sets ignoring q. Just one of them ought to be
selected as the downdate Mx J q |- But how?
The answer provided by minichoice contraction is simply to choose one of the minimal
supermodel sets which make up Mx±p by using a selection function 6 (in the same way
as Maxichoice Theory contraction uses a selection function 7 to choose a maximal sub¬
set of T _L p). Once constraints are put on 6 such that it matches the work done in the
syntax by 7, there is a tight connection between Maxichoice Theory Contraction, and
Minichoice Downdate Semantics. This is the idea behind minichoice downdates
Definition 20 Minichoice Downdate Semantics (MDS)
Mx\ P [= S(Mt±p)
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where 6 is a selection function on sets ofsets ofmodelsMr (returning a set ofmodels), mirroring
7, the selection fn on sets of theories, such that:
ift' = 7(7") where T is a set of theories, and t' is a theory, then
Th(6(Mr)) — Th(Mti) — j(T)
In other words, 6 chooses just that set ofmodels which support the maximal sub-theory
selected by 7.
Maxichoice theory contraction and MDS can be connected in the following way:
Theorem 5 (Completeness of MTC with respect to MDS)
1. Th(M)-p = Th(M\p{)
and,
2. T—p = T' iff Mt\ p |= Mr'
Proof: First part,
Th(M)Tp = y(Th(M) _L p) = 7{T' C Th(M) \ T' \f p} = ThS{N | N V and M C
N} = Th6(MT±p) = Th(Mr\ V [)•
Second part;
since T and T' are deductively closed21 T—p — T' iff Th(Mr)—p = Th(Mr')
Then by part one,
Th(MT)Lp = Th(MT\ p I)
Therefore,by lemma 1.3, Th(Mr') = Th(Mr\ p [)
and, Th(MTi) = Th(MT\ p [)
Thus, Mt> = (Mr1 p [), as required.
Claim: MDS satisfies both the rationality postulates for downdating and the desider¬
ata on downdate semantics.
21
Proposals for revisions over non-closed theories (due to limited inferential competence of the agent),
as in the literature on "belief bases", would have to be furnished with a different proof here.
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Justification: By definition, MDS is non-eliminative, non-implosive, successful, non-
explosive, and has integrity. Therefore MDS satisfies the desiderata. Also, since MDS
is the semantical analogue of MTC, and MTC satifies the AGM postulates, then MDS
satisfies the semantical versions of those postulates.
However, MDS does not supply a perfect downdating system.
Problem:
The set of models remaining after a minichoice downdate is sometimes too small. MDS
can remove the partiality of an information state22, producing complete theories and
unwanted information growth after downdate.
Alternatively, then, define a downdate to be the supermodel set which is the union
of all the minimal supermodel sets (in the above example this is just the supermodel set
{to, to', to", to'"}), and this produces a full join downdate semantics.
3.8.2 Full Join Downdate Semantics (FJDS)
So, in order to escape the problem with MDS, define downdate to be the union of all the
supermodel sets which fail to support p.
Definition 21 (FJDS)
V [= U(Mt±p)
Problem: Although FJDS escapesMDS's problemwith unwarranted information growth,
the system in fact goes too far the other way, producing the largest possible downdates
(in fact they are often too large) and thus supporting the smallest remaining theories (in
fact they are often too small). In general, information which ought rationally to be con¬
served may be lost.
Claim: FJDS satisfies the rationality postulates and desiderata.
The obvious syntactic connection here is with full meet theory contraction (FMTC),
where T—p = f|(T _L p).
22This is simply a reflection of the problemswith maxichoice contraction (see the AGM literature) in the
semantics. The problem is that p 6 T => p V <7 6 T—p or p V ->q 6 T—p
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With ]. [ given by FJDS as above, we have (unsurprisingly) the following completeness
result:
Theorem 6 (Completeness ofFMTC with respect to FJDS)
1. Th{M)-p = Th(M\p\)
2. T-p = T' iff Mr] p [= MT>
Proof:
First part; Th(M)—p = f\(Th(M) lp) = OR' Q Th(M) \ T'\f p} = Th{J{N \ N ^
p and M C N} = Th \J(MT±p) = Th{MT\ p I).
Second part; as for previous theorem.
To get a more detailed idea ofwhat's actually going on here, consider the following
very simple example.
Example 10 Take C = {p, q} and T-{p —* q,p} (this is a complete theory, which contains q
under closure.)
Then Mt is the set consisting solely of the model m where Val(p,m)=Val(q,m)= 1. This theory
supports/contains both p and q. Now consider the full-meet contraction of q from the theory.
Maximal subtheories of T failing to imply q are {p —* <7} and , {p}. Their meet is 0, the null
theory (so that FMTC would be too extreme).
Semantically, minimal supermodel sets ofMt = {m} are M, containing m and the model m'
where Val(p)=l, Val(q) -0, and the modelset M', which is made up ofm and the models m" where
Val(p)=Val(q)=0 and m'", where Val(p)=0, Val(q)=l. Their join (the FJDS downdate) is the su-
permodelset mj q |= {m,m',m",m"'} = Mod(C).
Thus, an FJDS downdate here results in the empty information state.
3.8.3 Partial Join Downdate Semantics (PJDS)
Combining the two approaches above results in partial join downdates: the union of
a selected set of appropriate minimal supermodel sets. This avoids the problems with
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downdates being either too large or too small.
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Definition 22 Mr J p [= U P(Mt_lp)
Where (3 is a selection function choosing some non-empty subset of
The result is a compromise between the small information states left after contraction
by MDS and the large information states produced by Full Join downdates.
Claim: satisfies the postulates and desiderata. Proof: by extension of the MDS case.
As above, there is the expected connection between PJDS and partial meet theory
contraction (PMTC), where
T-p = fl o(T _L p)23 and a selects a set of maximal elements of T J_ p, as long as we
connect the a and (3 selection functions24 in the correct way.
While (3 selects a subset from a set of sets ofmodels, a selects a subset of set of theories.
(By the earlier definition 5 and subsequent theorem, such functions are perfectly well
defined and behaved.)
To elaborate, (3(Mtj_p) = N C Mt_lp
and, a(T _L p) = TClip
Then connect the selection function in the following way: Th(P(Mr_lp)) = cx(T _L p)
From the results already established it is easily seen that the same connection holds be¬
tween PJDS and PMTC, thus;
Theorem 7 (Completeness ofPMTC with respect to TJDS)
Th(M)—p = Th(M] p [)
T-p = T iff Mt\ p 1= Mt,
Proof: trivial since partial join downdates are merely the functional combination of
minichoice and full join downdates.
23This function is computationally very costly.
24Extended versions of the 7 and 6 functions.
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Partial Meet Contraction








Figure 3.3: Contraction and Downdate
3.8.4 Defining Revision
As in the syntax, the following identity can be employed to reduce the problem of find¬
ing a suitable semantical revision function to that of finding a downdate function:
where J . [ is a function satisfying DS1-8 and we define ][. ][ via the identity:
then ][. ][ so defined satisfies RS1-8.
Proof: by analogue with the AGM case (the Levi identity).
3.8.5 Reprise and critique
So far so good. Given a few simple definitions, in the propositional case, systems of
downdate semantics have been found which mirror those syntactic contraction func¬
tions explored in the AGM literature. It might be interesting to find a propositional
downdate semantics connected to theory contractions constructed by Epistemic Entrench¬
ment relations, and various other algorithms (but that is beyond the scope of this work).
As far as expressive power goes, the insights gained from the propositional downdate
semantics given above are to be extended to first-order dynamic systems.
However, where the modelling of theory revision in communication is at stake we
sl v 1= 4 ->p [ |p]
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must recognise that the particular systems presented in this chapter at once fail to con¬
front an important issue in theory revision, and do not go far enough in expressive power.
The real issue in theory revision is obscured by the use of selection functions and hierar¬
chical theories (as in Epistemic Entrenchment systems), for it is precisely the selection
of an appropriate theory (or determination of the hierarchical position of a sentence in a
theory) that is at issue in theory revision. Selection functions simply do too much work.
Information structures ought to carry with them the properties which allow their con¬
tractions and revisions to be determined, rather than have them imposed externally and
arbitrarily25.
3.8.6 A "merely" formal semantics?
A formal semantics ought not to be just another technical system for the classification of
strings of symbols. Methodologically speaking, part of the point of giving a semantics
is to clarify intuitions underlying symbol processing. If a formal semantics is uninter-
pretable in any coherent and intutive way, then it faces the danger of being "merely"
formal26 So, is "supermodel semantics" merely formal? Of course, I shall try to show
that the supermodel semantics of theory change is intuitive and coherent.
Think of a setof possibilities (or information state), as an agent's "commitment slate"
— the "sphere" of possibilities which they implicitly claim to inhabit if they espouse a
certain theory. Note that there is no necessity to think of these possibilities as possi¬
ble worlds (although they are normally construed in this way); they could just as easily
be sets of possible individuals, for example (see the discussion of chapter 6). An agent
who is willing to assert a certain theory commits itself to inhabiting a possiblity some¬
where within the range of possibilia which are not excluded by that theory. Thus, when
I claim that "Masja and Tanya are in the kitchen", I commit myself to inhabiting some
set of possibilities, all of which have in common that Masja and Tanya are in the kitchen.
An agent which espouses no theory has S, the whole universe of possibilia, at its dis¬
posal. An agent who espouses a complete theory claims only to inhabit one possibility,
25cf. Ryan [88], the iteration problem
26The semantics of relevant logics have often had to face this criticism, for example.
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which is their version of actuality. The more usual case concerns partial theories and
agents who claim to inhabit one of some set of possiblities (they know not which). A
supermodel semantics for contraction and revision just describes how this set of pos¬
sibilities expands and changes under theory contraction and revision. Once I am told
that "Masja is not in the kitchen" I change my commitments, to some set of possibilities
which only have in common that Tanya is in the kitchen and Masja is not. If an elimi-
native semantics for theory extension (eg: Update Semantics) is merely formal, then so
is revision semantics. If a semantics in terms of "possibilities" is merely formal, then so
is revision semantics. However, a general defence of "possible world" semantics (and
one would not want to defend all such approaches) is somewhat beyond the scope of
this chapter!
3.9 Application: Revisable Dynamic semantics
Despite their drawbacks, the semantical systems presented above can be used as the
core of dynamic semantical systems for retraction and revision of information in dia¬
logue. The bearing of this fruit is the subject of the following chapter.
To anticipate a little, each dialogue contribution is taken to change the individual
information states of the agents which hear it. In the following chapters, I concentrate
on the minimal case of a two-agent dialogue, although the approach is easily gener-
alizable to cover multi-agent dialogues. If an assertive contribution does not conflict
with its hearer's current information state, then that state is simply updated, via model-
elimination, using AGMUS27. The interesting work involves cases where either (1) the
contribution is not an assertion, but a retraction (triggered by a constituent negation
clause, see chapter 7), or (2) where the contribution is an assertion which conflicts with
the hearer's information state.
Case (1) involves downdating, and case (2) involves revision of information states. It
will be shown that Downdate semantics (DS) can be added to any existing Update sys¬
tem as a modular addition, preserving all the results of the chosen system. In general,
27These operations are defined in proper detail at the close of chapter 7.
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revisions will be seen as downdate by the negation of the offending sentence followed
by update with the new information. This is much in the spirit of the Levi identity. The
resulting Revision Semantics has a weak "retraction" negation and provides some new
insights into the workings of epistemic modals.
3.10 Conclusion
The main contributions of this chapter have been:
• A review of related research.
• The basic link between theory change and dynamic semantics is forged, explored, and
clarified.
• "Downdate Semantics" is defined in general, and desiderata on downdate systems
are developed.
• Some motivation is provided for the later application of "Downdate Semantics" in a
semantics of dialogue.
• A semantics for theory contraction and revision algorithms is produced.
The completeness results provided here, although simple, give an account of the
transformations over information structures underlying AGM theory change. This se¬
mantical perspective provides insights for the development of theory change systems,
and shows that there are clear semantical ideas underlying 'belief revision' systems.
Conversely, the theory change perspective dramatically widens the explanatory scope
of dynamic systems, and motivates the further exploration of a number of new seman¬
tical systems.
Finally I draw a conclusion of a methodological nature on the nature of information
states in communication. A central problem is that information states (if they are ad¬
equately to meet their explanatory goals) must have an internal structure which allows
their (rational) contractions and revisions to be determined ("from the inside"). They
must carry with them (rather than have imposed upon them) information which allows
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rational information change to be computed. The provision of such structures is be¬
yond the scope of this work, where I shall be content (although not completely happy)
to use selection functions. A semantical version of Ryan's "Ordered Theory Presenta¬
tions" [88], where theories carry enough structure to avoid the use of selection functions,
might be a good place to start.
Chapter 4
Revision Semantics
AGM - inspired "downdates" open up new possibilities in dynamic semantics.
This chapter explores these new possibilities. It falls into two main sections. In the first
part the central aim is to develop, compare, and contrast two approaches in modelling
dynamic information structures; "downdating" and paraconsistency, which deal with
two problems in standard systems of Dynamic Semantics. This investigation leads to
the consideration of growing sets of models (the "supermodels" of the preceding chap¬
ter) in a "Revision Semantics". The focus of the final part of the chapter concerns notions
of constructivity relevant to the semantics of communication.
The chapter covers the development of a number of systems of dynamic semantics,
and insights into the workings of new epistemic modals. Two problems are raised with
regard to the information processing accounts of standard systems of Dynamic Seman¬
tics (DS); the "implosion" and "chivalry" problems. In response, two classes of func¬
tions over information states are investigated; the chivalrous and robust functions. The
investigation leads to two novel approaches in dynamic systems. The first system (Re¬
vision Semantics or 'RS'), based on the 'Downdate Semantics' of the preceding chapter
offers revisable information states and a weak 'retraction' negation. The other approach
(leading to the Paraconsistent Update Semantics or 'PUS' of chapter 8) is robust under in¬
consistent input and exhibits a strong negation. These approaches allow distinctions
between assertion, denial, and weak denial (retraction) in DS. A consistency preserv-
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ing update operation (revision) is also made available in RS, in order to accommodate
changing information, from other agents and a changing world. Formal properties of
RS are explored in comparisonwith existing systems of Dynamic Semantics. In chapter
8, which concludes the thesis, the approaches are combined so that both problems find
a solution in one system (Paraconsistent Revision Semantics.)
In consequence, new insights into the nature of DS information states are offered. In
particular a novel treatment of (constituent) negation and epistemic modality is offered.
The system also generates a potential logic for (counterfactual) conditionals, and a way
of treating "counterfactual" modals.
Consideration of the dynamic account of epistemic modality leads to the final part
of the chapter, where various ideas behind a constructive account of epistemicmodality
are presented.
4.1 Two dynamic problems: implosion and chivalry
There are two problems with the account of the dynamics of information states provided
by Dynamic Semantics (DS), both of which can be traced back to the dynamic treatments
of negation and entailment. These problems need to be tackled if a dynamic semantics
is to adequately account for the dynamics of information states under inconsistent input
and the retrieval of information from states which contain absurdities. DS needs to be
able to process inconsistent input, and more generally, give an account of the dynamics
of state revision.
Firstly, inconsistencies irretrievably destroy an information state - even when that state
contains much information that has no inferential links to sentences responsible for a
contradiction. Thus in standard systems of dynamic semantics (US, DPL, EDPL, DMPL
etc.), for example, the following dialogue contribution leads to the absurd state.
Example 11 "The suspect is tall and male. Sorry, he's not tall, I meant small."
In US this becomes (something along the lines of) s \<j> A ip} \~^4> A #J = 0
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Now notice that as far as the information in this discourse is concerned, obtaining the
absurd state, denoted 0, (due to the state subtraction definition of negation in DS) poses
at least two problems. Firstly, continuing on from the above example with the question
(interpreted as a test) "Is the suspect blond?", it so happens that, according to the ab¬
surd state, he is. (Since Va, 0 (= a.) In other words, the (mis)information "the suspect
is blond" is supported by the absurd state, for the absurd state (or empty set of mod¬
els) supports all propositions1. Thus all the previous information (the suspect is male)
is swamped by entailments caused by the absurdity. Call this the "Implosion problem"
as it is caused by the implosion of information states to 0 under inconsistent input. Im¬
plosion is a result of eliminativity (see the preceding chapter). The dynamic account of
entailment is responsible for the fact that states support all propositions after implosion.
Secondly, the absurd state can not be escaped , or updated with any more information
in order to regain consistency. Once the absurd state is reached, no further dialogue
contributions can be analysed. In order to solve (or rather bypass) this problem a robust
way of updating dynamic information states is required. Dynamic Semantics, if it is to
model dialogues, needs a robust account of changing information states under incon¬
sistent input.
Definition 23 (Robustness)
Call a function f on a set of information states S implosive iff.
VsGS,/(S) = 0
A function is robust iff. it is non-implosive (f(s) ^ 0).
Dynamic interpretation of all utterances in dialogue (even contradictions) ought to be
robust.
The second problem to be addressed in the framework provided by DS concerns a
dynamic account of the recovery of a dialogue from contradiction. In eliminative DS,
once the absurd state is obtained it cannot be escaped; once a contradiction arises in a
dialogue it degenerates irretrievably to absurdity. Thus some kind of dynamic process is
required to (non-trivially) rescue a dialogue from a state which contains inconsistencies
(call this the "Chivalry problem"). "Chivalrous" functions rescue "states in distress":
:0 supports any formula a. Due to the definition of entailment in Dynamic Semantics; since 0 C 0 [a] .
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Definition 24 (Chivalry)
Call a function f on a set of information states S chivalrous iff.
3s e S such that /(0) = s
A chivalrous function is one which retrieves information from states which have suffered implo¬
sion.
Obviously, eliminative functions are not chivalrous, and chivalrous functions are non-
eliminative. See figure 4.1 for a summary of the general framework here, where the
downward arrows indicate the direction of information loss, and the upward arrows
show information gain.
That "chivalry is dead in dynamic semantics" is the following fact (of US and EDPL;
due to eliminativity of update.)
Fact 1 (Chivalry is dead in standard DS)
Where [.] is the eliminative update function on information states (of either US or EDPL) and
p is any proposition.
Vp € C, 0 [p] = 0
So there are two problems to be treated if DS is to adequately account for the processing
of inconsistent input.
(1) information states should be robust under contradiction, and
(2) absurdities (once reached) should be escapable (i.e.; some chivalrous functions are
required).
Itmight be thought that a solution to the implosion problem bypasses the issue of chivalry
altogether (for then contradictions do not lead to 0), but there are dialogue contributions
other than straight contradictions which produce the absurd state in DS. These are the
following modal tests on states, which result in absurdity (these test are expressible in
US and its offspring.)
•s hp] [Op] = 0 and,
when s p, s [Dp] = 0
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Figure 4.1: Chivalry and Implosion
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as regards modal statements. As well as this, and even more importantly perhaps, it
seems that an adequate model of dialogue will actually need to accommodate incon¬
sistencies to some degree, rather than totally forbidding them. Conflict and contradic¬
tion play a crucial and constructive role in communication (see [38], for example). Infor¬
mation change in dialogue, rather than ignoring inconsistencies, often revolves around
contradictions and their resolution. A goodmodel of dialogue ought to be able to detect
and resolve inconsistencies, rather than avoiding their occurrence. Some interesting di¬
alogues focus on resolution of inconsistencies. Unless contradictions can be accommo¬
dated and then gradually resolved2, some dialogues, like the following example, cannot
be adequately modelled.
Example 12 A: "Jack's arriving tonight."
B: "No he's not arriving tonight."
A: "But he promised."
B: "Sorry. He's arriving tomorrow— he just telephoned."
Both the chivalry and implosion problems have a promising potential solution. These
solutions make use of ideas from philosophical logic, where they are the research pro¬
grammes known as "paraconsistent logic" and "belief revision," or "theory change."
However, these ideas have not yet been explored in the context of Dynamic Semantics.
The first of these approaches advocates avoiding the absurd state (under inconsistent in¬
put) by adopting an underlying logic which robustly handles contradictions. This is the
solution offered by paraconsistent logics, which are investigated in chapter 8. Inconsisten¬
cies are localized in paraconsistent logics, so as not to infect the state as a whole. How¬
ever, I postpone the formal treatment of paraconsistent dynamic systems until chapter
8.
The second avenue, that of a dynamic semantics of theory change, leads to a downdate
operator for dynamic semantics which can, amongst its other virtues, retrieve informa¬
tion states from absurdity.
After a formal treatment of this approach, the extent to which it can solve the above
2Gradual revisions of inconsistency are treated properly in chapter 8. Of course, agents can also "agree
to disagree" and allow a paraconsistent information structure to persist.
Revision Semantics 101
problems is ascertained. In addition I determine the degree towhich revisable and para-
consistent dynamic systems compete, and finally, how they might be seen to comple¬
ment each other.
4.2 The "Downdating" Approach
Whatwould be the point of constructing a semanticswhere information can be removed
from a state? One specific answer is that such a semantics is required in order to address
the chivalry problem. More generally, the answer is that agents often retract (rather than
deny) information in conversation.
Example 13 "Did I say Kerry was here? No. I actually meant to say that Kelly's here."
(Retract p, update with q.)
Note that the speaker here is not actually denying that Kerry is present (Kerry might
still be there, so the constituent negation is not actually a denial), but merely modifying
(correcting) information previously conveyed. The speaker could coherently continue
with "Kerry might be here".
Communication between dialogue partners can be seen as their attempt to converge
upon an agreed theory about the world. This convergence requires updating and revi¬
sion of agent-relative information states, the semantical correlates of theories. Thus, if
dynamic semantics is to live up to its empirical aims, some notion of information down-
date and revision is called for (this has been recognized by [21], and [6].) As Asher men¬
tions, in the context of DRT,
"
... the acceptance of the result of interpreting a verbal message may lead to a delin¬
eated DRS K that is inconsistent [ with the hearer's current information ] .... A further
stage of belief integration would consist in a process of "revision" or "contraction" to
yield a new, consistent delineated DRS K' "
([6] in [49] p.44)
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Perhaps the most obvious case for "downdating" is the chivalry problem; once an
absurdity is reached the dialogue must be able to be "rescued" by the retraction of cer¬
tain statements3. In general, however, information is not removed only from the ab¬
surd state, but it is removed from arbitrary information states, and arbitrary information
states are revised. AGM research suggests criteria that such operations should meet in
a syntactic system. The preceding chapter developed semantical correlates of the AGM
postulates, as well as systems of downdate semantics meeting them. Such systems can
be employed in a semantics which enables an account of a weak negation. The notion
might also be termed "negation as retraction", and can be formalized in an Update Se¬
mantics with downdates. The resulting system, dubbed "Revision Semantics", allows
DS to account for the kind of dynamics of information states illustrated in the above
examples. Consider, also, the following conversation:
Example 14 In the course ofa long argument John has claimed both that he does, and does not,
want to go to a party. The dialogue has reached absurdity.
Jackie "Look, do you want to go to this party or not?"
John "OK. Forget what I said before. I'd love to go."
That standard dynamic accounts cannot handle the above example is a feature of their
eliminative account of negation. Negation as state subtraction is too strong for the pur¬
poses of information loss. To retract commitment to a proposition p is not the same
as strongly denying it. So strong state-subtraction negation in DS needs to be supple¬
mented with a weak contraction-negation, or downdate, which can (amongst its other
virtues) rescue dialogues from absurdity. Retraction of information has been studied
syntactically (in the propositional case only) in the AGM theory change literature. This
is the obvious place to start building a downdate system for DS. It is fairly easy to con¬
struct a range of downdate functions 1 • [ on information stateswhich are the semantical
correlates of the AGM theory contraction systems (this was the burden of the preceding
chapter).
3Often the sentences directly responsible for the contradiction. For example in teaching contexts, where
a student is made to realize that she has contradicted herself, and then repairs her model of the problem
domain. See eg: the work of [9] on an implementation of Theory Change which teaches (repairs miscon¬
ceptions in the formulation of) algebraic word problems.
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Chivalry regained
Notice that the initial definition of chivalry is not quite good enough. It is simple to
define a chivalrous "reset" function " f" such that s |= S, which only downdates a
state s at the expense of trivializing it. However, such an operatorwould not bring "true
chivalry" to DS.
Definition 25 (True Chivalry)
Call afunction/on a set of information states S truly chivalrous iff. fis chivalrous and /(0) =
s + S
Definition 26 (Downdate)
Information state s' is a downdate of state s iff s C s'.
Definition 27 (Partial Join Downdate)
Information state s1 is a partial join downdate ofstate siffs' = [j /3(s _L p)for some proposition
V-
Fact 2 (Partial Join Downdates are Chivalrous)
J . [ is chivalrous.
( [.] is not chivalrous)
This is a trivial consequence of the definition of downdates. Downdating the absurd
state by proposition p results in some state s which fails to support p. Thus 0| p [=
s such that s ^ p ^ 0.
But what is to stop 0] p [= S ? The minimality condition on supermodels ensures that
(partial join) downdates are in fact truly chivalrous.
Example 15 Take C = {p, q)
Then 0] p [= U /?(0 J- p) = P '■ 0, q : 1 or p : 0, q : 0 depending on /34. Whatever, the result is
not S, the empty state.
4Note that the union of these modelswould not be a minimal supermodels set of, since it fails to support
either q or its negation.
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Syntax of Revision Semantics
Add a weak negation p" and a revision operator p" to update semantics (US). Add
both symbols to the syntax of US as meta-logical constants which are banned (via syn¬
tactic restrictions) from appearing inside well-formed formulae5 .
Add the downdate and revision functions ] . [: S x FORMS —* S and ][ .J: S x
FORMS —> S respectively, as defined below in the semantics.
Note that the definition of downdate in the semantics developed below relies (in the
base case) on systems of Downdate Semantics developed in the preceding chapter6.
4.2.1 Revision Semantics
A family of systems of Revision Semantics results from the combination of Update Se¬
mantics [101] with "downdates". Depending on the choice of downdate function, dif¬
ferent systems of RS result. The relative merits of different downdate systems were ex¬
plored in the preceding chapter. The system of RS presented below employs partial join
downdates. If the usual update definition of interpretation in DS is replaced by revision
as the function which interprets assertions, then contradictions are excluded from infor¬
mation states, and the implosion problem never arises.
Definition 28 REVISION SEMANTICS
Where s — s' = {i e s \ i s'} (State subtraction)7
Modelsfor Revision Semantics are of theform M = (S, V") where V(p) C Sfor each proposition
P-
For s C S :
5This frees the system from unnecessary complications over interpretation of -i — p and o | p for ex¬
ample. A treatment of such expressions can be given relatively easily, but it obscures the main point of the
system.
6These systems are complete with respect to various AGM theory contraction algorithms
7This state subtraction definition leads to an implosive negation in US.
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Update clauses Downdate Clauses
s [p] = {i e s I i G V(p)}
s [-.pj = s - s |pj
8 [~P] = Sj p [
«[t pj = sIpI
s \p A q] = s [pj [g]
8 [Op] = {i € s | s [p] #0}
•5 ppj = {i € s I s]p [= s}
ajp[= UP(s i-p)
4 -y? [= u/3(s -l -p)
sj - P [= 8 [p]
4 P A q [= sj p [Us] q [
4 Op [= {i € s | s]p [^ s}
«] DP 1= {i € s 1 s [P] = 0}
Revision clause
sI p ][= sl -1p I Hp]
Note the two base clauses in the recursion for downdates (the reason for this is that
there is no simple way to define s] -p [ in terms of an operation on p8) This presents lit¬
tle problem as long as the base logic allows negations to filter through formulae to the
right. (The usual de Morgan Laws and modal interdefinability results ensure this for
classical systems.)
A possible downdate clause for "-p" might state that to retract the retraction of p is the
same as asserting p. That is, s [ pj = s [p]. 1 consider the clauses for the modals, in
some detail, shortly.
Figure 4.2 shows how a revision operates. A state which supports not — p expands, un¬
der retraction of not - p, to a new state which includes some "worlds" where p holds.
Under update, the revised state becomes just those "worlds" in s] p | which support p
Recall the following:
Definition 29 (US Entailment)
S \=us V iff 8 Cs\p]
This is simple; a state already supports a proposition if adding that information to the
state does not increase the information in the state (by making it "smaller").
8Although one could try s] ->p [=f [p] U s, which is the union of s with all the points in S which are
non-absurd under update by p.
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s][p][=s]~p[ [p]
Figure 4.2: Revising s (= -^p by p
Revision Semantics (RS) allows a consistency preserving interpretation function for as¬
sertions, [t pj • This virtuemight lead one to consider a "robust" definition of entailment
for RS.
Definition 30 (RS Entailment)
s f=RS P iff s C s][p][
The idea being that a state supports a proposition if and only if changing the state so
as to accept that proposition doesn't actually add information to the state. Now notice
that this definition has quite similar consequences to that of US. Except that s revised
to include p is non-absurd (unless p itself is contradictory), whereas s updated by p can
result in the absurd state. Therefore, even if p is inconsistent with s, s][ p ][ exists.
Theorem 8 (US C RS)
s |=rs ptfs |=t/s P
Proof: s \=us p =*■ s C s fp] => s C sj -y? [ [p] =>• s (=«5 p
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Note also that s \fus P s V^RS P
For if, also, s is ^P, then s }[p}[ = s [p] . In the case that s \=us ~>p then s }{p}[ =
s' such that s' n s = 0- Since s % s', if s [=1/5 ->p, then s ty=ns P
This shows that using the consistency-preserving update of RS to define entailment
(rather than the implosive update of US) does not alter US entailment properties, which
is just as it should be.
4.2.2 Propositional Theory Change
It follows from the results of the preceding chapter that the system presented above (RS
with partial meet contraction) is complete with respect to an AGM (propositional) the¬
ory change system (with partial meet contraction.)
Definition 31 (Propositional Theory Change)
Expansion clauses:
T + p = Cl(T U {p})
T + ~>p = Cl(T U {-"p})
T + (p A q) = (T + p) + q
T + (pV q) = T + pDT + q
T + Op — T iff T + p
T + Op-T iff T-p = 0
T + (—p) = T-p
T + (T p) = T+p
Contraction clauses:
T-P = U a(T JL p)
T—^p = (J ot(T _L -1p)
T—(p A q) — T-p U T^q
T~(p V?) = (T-p)-q
T^Op = T iff T-p f, 0
T—Op = T iff T + p = C
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Revision Clause:
T+p = (T—>p) +p
Theorem 9 (Completeness of RS with respect to Propositional Theory Change)
Th(sT][p][) = Th(s)+p
T+p = T iff Mod(T)}[p}[= Mod(T')
Proof: by composition of the results of the preceding chapter (US clauses are complete
with respect to theory extension, and "downdates" model the theory contraction clauses.
Then compose contraction/downdate and extension/update to get the result for revi¬
sion).
4.2.3 Epistemic Modals in Revision Semantics
Downdates are interesting in their own right, not just as a treatment of the implosion
and chivalry problems, but as the principal component of a fully-fledged RS, which of¬
fers a novel treatment of the epistemic modals as well as a weak denial version of nega¬
tion and revisable information states. Now that there is a non-eliminative downdate
function on information states, it can be used to define tests against the trivialization
of an information state after downdating, just as the eliminative update offered by US
allows a test against absurdity of a state after update. In this way, the addition of the
downdate component to a dynamic semantics allows the expression of a whole new set
of constraints on information states in the semantics; constraints invoking trivialization
(rather than absurdity) of information as undesirable.
The idea that the trivial (or uninformative) information state is just as undesirable as
an absurd one could not previously be expressed in dynamic semantics. Moreover, the
following ideas can now formally be expressed, in RS:
• p is indispensible in s iff s [dp] = s (= 0 otherwise)
Contracting s by p would produce the trivial state.
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• p is disposable in s iff s] Op [= s (= 0 otherwise)
Contracting s by p would not lead to triviality.
• p is prohibited in s iff s] Dp [= s (= 0 otherwise)
Updating s by p would lead to absurdity.
• p is possible in s iff s [Op] = s (= 0 otherwise)
Updating s by p does not lead to absurdity.
All of the above operations are tests on information states. They do not change the
state itself (unless the test fails, in which case the state is reduced to 0, the absurd state),
but are used in checking meta-level properties (consistency and "informativeness") of
a state with respect to addition and retraction of propositions.
The formal definitions of these new epistemic modals are reiterated below.
Definition 32 (RS epistemic modals)
1. s [Op] = {i <E s | s [p] ^ 0}
2. s [Dp] = {i € s | sj p [= 5}
3. sj Op [= {i <E s | sj p [^ 5}
4. s] Dp [= {i G s | s [p] = 0}
Syntactic analogues of these operations are easily expressible in theory change sys¬
tems.
Comparison with the standard US modals
A potential point of conflict between RS and US is their respective accounts of "epis¬
temic necessity". The original idea, in "Data Semantics" (see [100]), was that "must p"
expresses that there is no extension of the (speaker's) current theory in which "p" turns
out to be false. Formally: s [Dp] = s iff -i3s' such that s' C s and s f= ->p. This
condition is met if and only if s \= p.
In other words, according to US, the statement "must p" acts as a test on the current
state, to the effect that the state supports proposition p. Such a construal is supposed to
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make "must p" a weak epistemic claim; agents can utter "must p" when ->p is excluded
from all possible updates9 of their current information state. Thus, the account goes,
agents can utter "must p" when they do not actually know (yet) that p. However, this
weak epistemic claim is lost in US and EDPL for example10, where the standard clause
is,
s [Dp] = {i e s | s |= p}
Such modals are better understood in communicative contexts11 (see chapter 6), as
Dekker argues in [21], where "must p" is tantamount to a question; an attempt to es¬
tablish agreement between dialogue participants. All a dialogue partner can do when
faced with "must p" is agree or disagree. However, the US clause has the effect of clas¬
sifying contingent statements as "epistemically necessary" if it so happens that they are
supported by an agent's current information. In US an agent who believes that "Masja
is in the kitchen" can consistently utter "Masja must be in the kitchen", but this does
not satisfy my intuitions. Agents sometimes utter "Must p" in contexts where removal
of p would reduce them to an empty state, not just where update by "not — p" would
lead into absurdity. The RS clause s |Dp] = {i e s | sj p |= 5} covers this context.
RS provides a stronger criterion for classifying a proposition as epistemically necessary
than does US. Not only must the proposition in question be supported by the current
state (in RS: s p =» s |Dp] = 0), but it must also be indispensible to that state, in the
sense that its removal would leave the agent "high and dry" as regards information. RS
thus classifies a subset of US's "epistemically necessary" propositions as "epistemically
indispensible".
Examples
As examples of each of the above kinds of propositions consider the philosophical sys¬
tem espoused by Descartes in his "Meditations" [25].
Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" is an example of an indispensible proposition, relative
'But obviously not revisions.
10See eg: [21] p. 202
"indeed, this is already implicit in Data Semantics.
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to the philosophical system of the "Meditations", since all other propositions follow
from it (or presuppose it in some sense). The class of indispensible propositions is usu¬
ally very small (or is even empty) for the majority of information states12. Another ex¬
ample, for some thinkers, might be the existence of God.
In contrast, very many propositions seem to be (epistemically) disposable. For ex¬
ample "Mind-body interaction occurs in the pineal gland" is a claim that can be dis¬
pensed with in Descartes' system without trivializing it. Disposable propositions are
commonly (but not exclusively) to be found at the periphery of a theory13.
Of course there are also plenty of prohibited sentences in a given information state.
Any sentence in the complement of the theory will be prohibited. Again for Descartes,
for example, take "I do not exist."
The "possible" or "permissible" sentences form a more interesting class. All the sen¬
tences which are not forbidden by a state are possible relative to that state. In complex
theories, it is not often easy to decide whether or not a sentence is forbidden or permit¬
ted. For example, could "The mind is the brain" be added to the Cartesian Meditations
without contradiction? This example requires a first-order treatment, with identity.
Note that the usual interdefinability results are still intuitively correct on this new
construal of the modals. For example, consider J-iOpJ [□->p] , which says that
not-p is indispensible iff p is not possible. Also consider, for example, | ->Op I^=>] n-y? [,
which says that not-p is prohibited iff p is not disposable.
The revision operator can also be used to express some quite sophisticated compound
tests on information states. For example, s ft Op] = s] -iOp [ [OjjJ = s iff not-p is
prohibited and p is possible.
Various other combinations of the modals shall be explored later in this chapter. Note
also that
^Disregarding the obvious case of the conjunction of all propositions supported by a state, which, triv¬
ially, is always epistemically indispensible.
13One could grade propositions in respect of the relative damage that their removal does to a theory.
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□□p = 0, DOp = 0, ODp Dp, OOp =► Op, dp p =>■ Op, p dp
4.2.4 Properties of Revision Semantics
Many of the results below hold in general (that is, for systems other than the specific
RS given above) as long as a truly chivalrous downdate function is available. The non-
eliminativity (chivalry) of downdates ensures the desired;
Fact 3 (Genuine downdate property)
si v I# s hp}
This was one of the most basic desiderata on any useful notion of downdating (see the
preceding chapter). That it holds in RS is trivial: sj p [ is a superset of s, and s [-ip] is a
subset of s.
Note also, that trivially, Vp, 5] p [= S
So losing informationwhen there isn't any around anyway changes nothing. This is just
as it should be.
As far as update properties are concerned, all the desirable features of US (as presented
in chapter 2) are also properties of RS since:
Fact 4 Revision Semantics is an extension of Update Semantics.
(This fact follows just from the fact that the update clauses of RS are just those of US.)
The next fact shows that downdating only removes the information that it is supposed
to.
Fact 5 Conservation of Information: Vq such that s |= q and p \f q, sj p [|= q
So downdating with respect to p only removes p and its consequences from the state.
Interestingly, downdates allow the removal of contradictions from the absurd state.
Fact 6 Non-implosive downdates: s] p A -ip [D s 0
So removing a contradiction is non-absurd. However, removing a logical law from a
state is absurd.
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Fact 7 Absurd / Implosive downdates: if\- p, then sj p [= 0
This shows that, even though downdating is a way of escaping the absurd state, cer¬
tain downdates (eg: attempting to remove a theorem) do lead to absurdity. Finally, as
proven above,
Fact 8 RS entailment incorporates US entailment.
4.2.5 Ups and Downs in Discourse and Dialogue
The following results explore the interaction of up-and-downdates, and explain the un-
informativeness, information loss, and absurdity of certain epistemic discourses (ab¬
surd or implosive discourses are marked by *). It is perfectly consistent for agents to
retract propositions14 which they asserted earlier, although it is not particularly coher¬
ent for an agent to assert p and then retract it (in discourse for example). The operations
provided by RS are, of course, best understood as part of a full system of information
exchange, where an agent uttering a retraction does so in order to disabuse a dialogue
partner of perceived mis-information (see chapter 6).
Call a function / on a state s absurd iff f(s) = 0. In general, updates potentially lead to
absurdity.
Call a dialogue contribution / on a state s incoherent iff f(s) = S. In general, only down-
dates may lead to incoherence.
(Different contributions will be absurd, or incoherent, for different agents15.) In a suc¬
cessful dialogue, agents need to steer a course between absurdity and incoherence.
The following results indicate that the epistemic modals interact in the ways one
would expect. It is as well to keep in mind that even though epistemic modal formu¬
lae appear between assertion and retraction brackets, they are not treated us genuine
updates, but are tests on the current state. In this sense, the notation is somewhat mis¬
leading. Intuition dictates that assertion and retraction of epistemic modals ought to
14As long as they are not logical truths.
15Although no contribution could be absurd for one agentwhilst (at the same time) being incoherent for
another.
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change the state in some circumstances. This intuition is investigated further shortly.
Another point to note in the following examples is that, where one test follows another,
we assume that the first test succeeds before evaluating the second one.
1. s [Op] ] p [D sif 3i e s, i \= p
This discourse has the potential to induce information loss.
Discourse: "Maybe p. No, I don't think that p."
Contrast with "Maybe p. In fact, p." — which can lead to information growth.
2. s] p [ [Op] A sif 3ies,i\=p, 3j G s,i |= ->p.
Again, possible information loss (due to the initial downdate).
Discourse: "I don't think that p. Maybe p"
3. s [Op] ] Op [= s as long as p is consistentwith s and p is not indispensible in s.
Discourse: "Maybe p. I can remove p."
4. s] p [ [Dp] = 0
Discourse: "*l can remove p. It must be that p."
5. s [-.p] [Dp] = 0
Discourse: ""Not p. Must be that p."
6. s [Dp] ] Op [= 0
Discourse: ""It must be that p. I can forget p."
7. s] Op [ [Dp] = 0
Discourse: "*I can forget p. It must be that p."
8. s [Dp] ] Op [= 0
Discourse: ""'Must be p. Cannot be p."
9. s [Op] ] Dp [= 0
Discourse: ""Maybe p. Cannot be p."
10. s [dp] [Op] = s if p is supported by s:
Discourse: " Must be p. Maybe p."
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11. sj Op |] Dp |= s if p prohibited in s.
Discourse: "Can forget p. Must not be that p."
12. s] Op [ [OpJ = s if p dispensible in s and consistentwith s.
Discourse: " Can forget p. Maybe p."
13. s [Op] ] Op [= s if p consistent with s, but not indispensible to s.
Discourse: " Maybe p. Can forget p."
14. s [Op] [Dp] = s if p supported by s.
Discourse: "Maybe p. Must be p."
The examples given above have been discourses (ie: uttered by one agent), but the
epistemic modals come into their own during communication. If the above examples
were dialogues, then rather than rendering absurdity, they would establish the extent to
which the participants agree on certain information. Modal expressions used in dialogue
have the effect of testing the hearer's state for certain properties. Thus (as sketched in
Dekker [21]), use of modals allows a speaker to become informed about the current in¬
formation state of the hearer.
4.2.6 A Logic for Conditionals
The idea of revision can be used to generate a logic of counterfactual conditional state¬
ments. The basic idea is that "if p then q" can be construed as a test to the effect that "q
is a consequence of the theory after revision by p." If ->p is not supported by the state,
then this conditional reduces to that of US, where s [p ► <?] = s iff s [p] (= q. How¬
ever, the interesting case ariseswhen the state itself holds that ->p, for then USmaintains
that p —+ q for all q16 Thus, where the antecedent of the US conditional is inconsistent
with the current state, US classifies the conditional as "true". However, this prescrip¬
tion does not meet with common intuition about the interpretation of conditionals in
natural language. Agents can evaluate conditionals whose antecedents are contrary to
their current information. The revision clause of RS allows a simple treatment of both
normal US conditionals, and counterfactuals too (in the case that the antecedent is not
16Since then s [p] = 0 and V<j, 0 |= q.
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contrary to the current state, the revision function reduces to update, so the conditional
is evaluated as a normal US conditional).
Consider adding to RS the following clause for a counterfactual conditional:
* b1"^ 0] = s iff SIP11= Q
Syntactically, in the theory extension system, the clause looks like this;
Thpi-> q iff q G T+p
Comparison with other approaches to counterfactuals (eg: [74], [100]) might prove
to be interesting, but it is unfortunately beyond the scope of the current work.
4.3 Paraconsistency versus Chivalry
Adoption of a paraconsistent base logic (or "internal logic") for theories increases the
complexity of dynamic information states (by invoking positive and negative classifi¬
cations of formulae). However, a paraconsistent semantics does avoid the implosion
problem altogether (by localizing inconsistencies). While a paraconsistent approach has
the virtue of avoiding implosion, and thus the chivalry problem, virtue never tested is
no virtue at all; a paraconsistent semantics simply allows contradictions to persist. Now
this feature of paraconsistent systems is not really adequate for a semantics of dialogue
as intersubjective theorymanipulation. A paraconsistent semantics still requires down-
dates in order for modal inconsistencies (failed tests) to be resolvable, and the general
point about information retraction still holds; an empirically adequate DS ought to al¬
low for repair, and retraction ofprior input. Presumably someway of reducing the num¬
ber of contradictions in a (paraconsistent) information state is required, rather than just
letting them accumulate. As well as being robust, a paraconsistent semantics needs to
at least try to maximize consistency of its information states; and for this it also requires
chivalry (again, see chapter 8).
On the other hand, RS is (truly) chivalrous and preserves (and even extends) the US
treatment of the epistemic modals. Rather than requiring a change in the whole under-
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lying logic of a DS, the downdating approach is a module which can be "plugged into"
any existing sytem of DS (the clause for [—p] is the "socket"). This means that,
Fact 9 Revision Semantics is an extension of Update Semantics.
In the sense that all results that hold for US also hold in RS (since the US account of [Op]
is preserved in RS).
Unfortunately, RS is still implosive under contradictions; licensing any inference at
all after an absurdity has been reached (it's just that, by using revision rather than up¬
date, the absurd state is a lot harder to come by). Thus, just as a paraconsistent dynamic
semantics requires chivalry, so a full Revision Semantics for dialogues ought to localize
inconsistencies.
4.4 Constructivity in Dynamic Semantics
There is a potential confusion to be avoided, between the concept of constructivity as
employed in Intuitionistic and Nelson logics, and the notion intended here. "Construc¬
tivity" in the sense of downdates and revisions of information states, refers to the con¬
struction of models (or possibilities) in a semantical system. This feature ought not to
be confused with the debate over a constructive negation, which is a feature of the para¬
consistent systems developed later (in chapter 8).
A constructive (or "possibility-creating") account of conditionals and epistemicmodal¬
ity does justice to the intuitions and philosophical motivations behind Dynamic Seman¬
tics. Such an account both complements and supersedes the eliminative approach of
recent tradition.
Meaning, for DS, is identified with the information change potential of a sentence.
Thus DS currently prescribes only utterances which serve to eliminate epistemic pos¬
sibilities as informative or, indeed, meaningful. But this is obviously inadequate, for
language is more often than not used to construct, or bring to light, new possibilities for
the consideration of other agents. We could distinguish (along with Kripke) between
the epistemic modals (those which inform about the beliefs of other agents) and modals
which inform about how the world might be (or have been) different; the "Metaphysical
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Modals." Earlier, I argued against importing this distinction into formal semantics.
Systems of dynamic semantics which rely on model elimination as their sole method
of information growth, or utterance interpretation, actually rule out such utterances as
"Maybe it's Jackie" as being properly meaningful (in the sense of being "informative").
Such statements are interpreted as tests on information states,which either succeed (with
no effect on the current information state), or fail and reduce the state to absurdity. Thus,
"Maybe it's Jackie" means, according to standard DS, either nothing at all or results
in absurdity. But this prescription is plainly wrong. Why say, "Maybe I'll see you at
the party" if the utterance is going to be either empty or incoherent? The treatment of
modals offered by DS is clearly at odds with semantical and linguistic intuition; there
are "metaphysical" modal statements17 whose content relates to how the world might
be, as well as the standard epistemic modals treated by DS. That purely eliminative ac¬
counts have sufficed until now has perhaps been due to the absence of any real alterna¬
tive to the eliminative perspective.
The problems here have much to dowith the focus on discourse rather than dialogue. In
discourses (where information accumulates), the eliminative treatment ofmodals seems
fairly well motivated, but once DS is extended to model dialogue (where information
changes and is exchanged), a purely eliminative interpretation of modals becomes un¬
tenable. Recall, however, that the Kripkean distinction between epistemic and meta¬
physical modality was brought into question (in chapter 1). As far as a semantics of
dialogue is concerned, it is important to realize that all the modals are epistemic, in
an important sense. For even those supposedly "metaphysical" modals which express
how the world might have been, only do sowith respect to an agent's information state.
When an agent states "Hemight have survived" the intention is that, as far as the agent
knows or believes, things may have turned out differently. Of course, the big differ¬
ence between this and the standard case is that the agent knows that "not p" is the case,
while stating "might have been p." The case seems very similar to the counterfactual
conditionals mentioned earlier. One might think of some occurrences of 0 as a "coun¬
terfactual modal". Treatment of such statements does not require an extra set of "meta¬
physically possible worlds", but an approach to some modals (eg: those which appear
17[47] recognizes this.
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in constituent negation clauses or apply to the past tense) as conjectures about conse¬
quences of theory change, or state revision.
This shortcoming of standard DS reveals a deeper problemwith the current dynamic
perspective. The semantics may be dynamic, but its subjectmatter is a static world. DS
assumes that once an update is accepted in a state there is no question of removing its
effect or updating with contrary information. However, a changing world throws out
changing information. An adequate DS needs to be able to deal with this fact, and the
"metaphysical" modals play an important part here for, rather than conveying informa¬
tion about an agent's information state (the job of the epistemic modals), they convey
info about how the world might be or might change, relative to an agent's information
state.
The claim here is not that there is no role for eliminativity to play in formal seman¬
tics, but that there is constructive work to be done at the same time.
4.4.1 A constructive account of epistemic modality
Update Semantics handles growing information with eliminative functions, but chival¬
rous functions in Revision Semantics can cope with changing information18. Work can
now be done against the following (current) situation in dynamic semantics:
"our approach to information change is eliminative rather than constructive. And
we don't know yet how to do better than that."
(Groenendijk, Stokhof, and Veltman, [47] p.2)
The "chivalry" of downdates allows a more radical treatment of information change
and modality in RS. Rather than preserving the test account of epistemic modals from
eliminative DS one can begin to give the kind of constructive account of information
change alluded to in the above quotation. For example, rather than seeing "might p"
as an uninformative test on a current state, it can be construed as an action, a genuine
assertion to the effect that p is possible, by using downdates.
18Not just temporally dependent changes in the environment, but changing information supplied by
fallible communicants
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LetCRS (Constructive Revision Semantics) be RS supplementedwith the following (con¬
structive) account of epistemic possibility, s |<0>pj = s] ->p [J P I
Some assertions of "maybe p" in smay now be viewed as constructing an extension of
s in which neither "p" nor "not p" are supported by the state. In a sense, this construal
of "maybe p" performs the function of "opening" the state for p. Thus a subsequent
update by either p or -<p will be permissible. In US however, if p is supported by s,
then the discourse " Not p. Maybe p." is absurd. CRS, on the other hand, construes
"Maybe p" as resetting the information in the state with regard to p, so that even with
prior knowledge that not-p "Maybe p." is non-absurd.
Such a step is not meant to supplant the treatment given in US, but to complement
it. It seems that there is a variety of ways in which "might", "maybe", and "must" are
used in dialogues. There ought to be a corresponding range of formal treatments of
these epistemic modals: some as tests, and some as actions. Use of the ("dynamic") CRS
modal, for example, might be restricted to cases where "maybe p" appears in the scope
of constituent negation or in a "counterfactual" context.
Example 16 "John's not here. No, actually, he might be here."
Whilst US classifies this example as absurd, CRS allows it to be informative. Thus, CRS
allows some epistemic modals to reflect temporal change.
This approach constitutes a new slant on "informative" statements, which previ¬
ously were taken to be simply the eliminative ones. Downdates allow chivalrous or
constructive statements to be treated as "informative" in the sense that processing them
changes the current information state. This procedure is, after all, closer to the original
philosophical slogan of DS of meaning as change in information state.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter makes the following contributions to the thesis.
1. Two problems for DS are raised.
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2. Chivalrous and Robust functions are defined.
3. Revision Semantics is presented and explored in some detail.
4. Novel ideas about negation and epistemic modalities are presented and explored.
5. The paraconsistent approach is motivated, and its relationship to systems of theory
change and dynamic semantics established.
6. A notion of constructive DS is discussed.
The construction of RS provides new (semantical) insights into the nature of the in¬
formation states required for an empirically adequate dynamic semantics. New prop¬
erties of information states (and functions on them) have become formally expressible
through the employment of the supermodel semantics of the preceding chapter. In par¬
ticular the treatment of epistemic modals in RS employs the new dynamic dimension
which downdates supply.
Downdates and paraconsistent systems have been seen to complement each other.
The approaches can be combined to produce "Paraconsistent Revision Semantics"; a ro¬
bust DS which accommodates gradual repair of localized absurdities (the main subject
of chapter 8).
In general terms, the chapter demonstrates that an empirically adequate dynamic se¬
mantics must attend to the fact that information structures conveyed in communicative
utterances are paraconsistent and obey instructions regarding the downdate and revision
of information structures as well as their update.
The problems raised here, and the systems investigated, highlight serious issues for the
structure and nature of information states in dynamic semantics. The approach com¬
mends further systems for future study.
The issue of paraconsistency shall become the focus of chapter 8, where paraconsis-
tency is considered in tandem with the rational autonomy of agents who can be sceptical
about accepting new information.
Chapter 5
First-Order Theory Change Systems
with Semantics
Cognitively relevant information processing is often argued to have at least the com¬
plexity of first-order logic (for example see Kamp [62], Asher [49]). Accordingly, pred¬
icates and variables are distinguished in the processing of information in natural lan¬
guage interpretation. In order to meet the demands of such applications systems of
theory change and dynamic semantics must operate over structures expressed in first-
order logic.
As Peter Gardenfors mentioned in discussion [43]1,
"So far, I have only beenworkingwith propositional languages. However, the epis-
temic semantics could be extended to quantificational languages as well. The main
problem would be to handle revisions of the domain of individuals."
Of course, for the purposes of dialogue modelling, it is essential that theory change
systems are extended to the first-order case.
While the work in earlier sections has been confined to the dynamics of proposi¬
tional systems, the formalism now increases in expressive power, to incorporate first-
order dynamics.
The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly it is demonstrated that that Gardenfors'
completeness result (in [42], reviewed in the second chapter) can be extended to the first-
1With Frank Veltman, Jim Delgrande, Michael Clarke, and Bob Moore. Reported in [43], page 237.
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order case. The result is that AGM-style first-order theory extension (FOTE) is complete
in relation to the semantics of the Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus (IPC). This fact leads
to a consideration of how downdates might be defined in an intuitionistic semantics.
Secondly, intuitions are given about a set of first-order rationality postulates for contrac¬
tion, covering quantifiers, names, variables, and identity. Some of the intuitions are for¬
malized. Following this, a variety of systems for first-order theory change (FOTC) are
given (some employing Fuhrmann's Package Contractions from [35], introduced in chap¬
ter 2), along with their semantics. The supermodel semantics of chapter 3 is extended
to the first-order case.
In general, the class of problems involved in a first-order revision semantics is found
to be similar to that encountered in the construction of a Quantified Modal Logic2, and
a semantics for counterfactuals3.
A hierarchy of systems is then explored, using variations on the theme of chang¬
ing dialogue-internal and external information (anaphoric and truth-conditional infor¬
mation), and changing information about identity statements. For example, a revisable
DPL is shown to be connected with a particular FOTC system. Employing the same
methodology, after examining a variety of systems, a revisable FUL (van Eijck's First-
Order Update Logic [96]) is connected with a different system of (First-Order) Theory
Change.
5.1 First-Order Extension and Intuitionistic Semantics
Firstly it is demonstrated that, before one becomes entangledwith the dynamics of anaphora,
a simple first-order theory extension (FOTE) system is complete with respect to the intu¬
itionistic predicate calculus (IPC). This should come as no great surprise when one re¬
calls Gardenfors' proof4 that Propositional Theory Extension is complete with respect
2Otherwise known as Modal Predicate Logics. See James Garson's "Quantification in Modal Logic", in
[37], for a useful review of these issues.
3Recall that Grove's sphere semantics [48] for revision is similar to Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals
[74].
4Pages 138 - 142 of [42].
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to IL. (This result was reviewed in the second chapter.) An explicitly verificationist se¬
mantics is adopted. To call a proposition 'true' is simply to have observed it to be so,
or to have been told that it is so (agents are gullible in the sense that they uncritically
adopt new information and continue to believe it come what may). Therefore, resulting
in monotonicity, it is assumed that verifications persist; that received truths remain true.
Of course, as regards theory change, non-persistent systems (where agents are gullible
in the sense that they uncritically accept new information at the expense of older infor¬
mation5) are later investigated.
Syntactically speaking, a theory T held by an agent is simply a deductively closed
set of first-order sentences which have been adopted by an agent. For the moment, as¬
sume that theories simply make reference to names (of course, theories in dialogue use
variables too, but they are more the subject of the dynamic systems which I investigate
in the body of the chapter). Such a theory grows by addition of sentences and closure
under logical consequence; as usual:
Definition 33 AGM First-Order Theory Extension (AGMFOTE)
T + cf) = CUT U {0})
Semantically, the epistemic states of an agent are modelled by way of a partially or¬
dered set T, elements ofwhich correspond to possible knowledge situations of an agent.
Lower points in the order encode less knowledge. Thus the elements t gT serve to in¬
dex theories in the order of their growth. With each point t G T we also associate a set
Const of names of individuals referred toby state t (sometimes I refer to this set of names
as the domain of the theory Tt), and a total valuation function Vt. Thus t = {Const, Ft)6.
A theory Tt is also associated with each point in T; the set of sentences verified at t. Thus
it makes little difference whether one talks of the state corresponding to Tt or the state
at t. Both are defined, for either Tt or t, as the set of points t' such that t < t'. Write the
state at t as st. The state at t is not just the characteristic function of membership of Tt,
but includes all the possible extensions of t.
5A characterization of scepticism is given in chapter 7, where agents choose whether or not to accept new
information.
6This structure is much like a DRS; it has a domain of referring expressions and conditions on them.
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Definition 34 (Atomic Valuations)
V, : ATOMc => 2 assigns truth values to atomic propositions, relative to each possible epis-
temic state t. VJ(0) = 1 when 0 has been accepted by the agent whose state it is. Thus, Vt is the
characteristic function ofTt.
Consider the following functions:
Definition 35 Th(st) = {a \ Vi £ St, Vfa) = 1}
st = Mod(Tt) ~ {t e T \ Va e Tt, Vt(a) = 1}
This means that st C T. Now it is simply the case that Th(st) = Tt. As far as the
growth of such knowledge states is concerned I assume that agents are able to verify7
more and more sentences involving more and more objects. Once a sentence is veri¬
fied it remains so (Truth Persistence), and the set of names grows with theory extension
(agents increase the set of referring expressions). Formally then, impose the following
conditions;
(1) for all atomic sentences 0, Vf' > t, Vti (0) > V)(0) (Truth Persistence)
(2) VfVf', if t < t! then Const C Const' (Vocabulary Growth)
To sum up, a sequence of growing theories (sets of sentences), T\ C T2 C ..., is
modelled by a corresponding sequence of shrinking states (sets of models), si 2 «2 3
Evaluation clauses
Recall that, in Intuitionistic Logic, ->Pa is defined as Pa —>_L. Intuitionistic Predicate
logic has the following valuation clauses for complex formulae. Define Valt : FORMSc
2 so that;
7For alternatives here, see Milne 1991, [75]
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Definition 36 Semantics of Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus8
1. Vt,Vt(l) = 0
2. for atomic f, Valt(4>) = Vt{4>)
3. Valt(<f V tp) = max{Valt(4>),Valt(ip)}
4. Valt{<j) A if) = min{Valt((f>),Valti^)}
5. Valtif -» V) = 1 Vf' > t, Valt if) < Valt>(ip)
6. ValfVxPx) = 1 iff Vt' > f,Vc G Const, Valt (Pc) = 1
7. Valt(c = d) = 1 Vt' > t, VP € PRED(C), Vf(Pc) = Vf(Pd)
The last three definitions invoke meta-conditions on the structure, which impose con¬
straints on possible extensions of the current state t.
Alternatively, write the system in terms of the sentences supported by states. Write
t \= <f> when state t supports sentence p.
t\= (f iff Cons{4>) C Const and Valt(<f>) = 1
Definition 37 Where Cons(<f>) is the set of names used in formula p.
1. t \= cpV if iff t \= (p or t \= (p
2. t\= (j> Aip iff t \= f and t (= <f>
3. t \= f —> if iff Vt' > t, t! |= -><p or t' \= tp
4. t f= VxPx iff Vt' > t, Vc G Const, t' \= Pc
5. t\=(c = d) iff Vt' > t,VP G PRED(C),t' (= Pc iff t' |= Pd
This way of putting things enables the definition of an update function on states:
Definition 38 (Update)
st [</>! = {t' G st | t < t' and t! |= <f>)
8As presented in [75]
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Thus Tt + a = Tti such that Valti(a) = 1 and t < t!
Intuitively, addition of expression a to a theory has the effect, in the semantics, of mov¬
ing up to the next node which supports a in the intuitionistic information growth tree.
Define survival in structures, St, for IPC in the following way;
Definition 39 (Structures and Survival)
St is a structure iff. St = (T, <, {Vt : t € T})
Following Milne [75], say that 0 survives in St when Vt £ T, ifValt(4>) = 1 when all names
in f are in Const9.
0 *-survives ifVST, 4> survives.
Let T be a finite set of sentences. Then T |= 0 survives in St when Vt £ T, if Vip £
T, Valt(ip) = 1 then Valff) = 1 (again, when all names in V and 0 are in Const.)
r |= 0 *- survives ifVST, T (= 0 survives.
The following result is based on Milne [75].
Fact 10 T |= f *-survives if and only ifT P/pc 4> where h/pc is the deducibility relation of
Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus.
Theorem 10 (Completeness ofFirst-Order Extension wrt Intuitionistic Information Growth)
Where + is the AGM theory extension operation for first-order theories and [.] is information
growth (update) as defined above for the semantics for IPC:
(1) Th(st M ) = Tt + <f>
(2) T1 — T + <t> iff sT' = sT [01
(Proof)
First part: by definition, Th(st [01 ) = Th{t' £ st | t < P and t' f= 0}
= Th{t' | t' |= 0 and t' |= a, Va £ Tt}
9Dropping this condition results in a free logic.
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= Cl(Tt U W) = Tt + <f>
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Second part:
T" — T + 4> iff Th(sr) + 4> = Th(sx') iff (by part 1) Th(sr [</>] ) = Th(sr') iff sr' =
[</>J
This completes the basic case. The other clauses ought not to present further prob¬
lems.
Then for theory expansion, as an easy consequence of the above:
Theorem 11 T + fFIPc a iff Th(st [</>J ) \= a *-survives.
Proof: assume that Th(st [d]) 1= a ^-survives. Then by the above fact Th(st [</>]) h/pc «
and so by the preceding theorem Tt + f P/pc a
For the converse, simply reverse the argument.
5.1.1 Intuitionistic Downdates
The above system can easily be used to define an intuitionistic notion of downdate. When
instructed to remove f one could "look back" downT to the first point twhere Valt{4>) =
0. Revision could then be described as "jumping" from branch to branch of an intuition¬
istic tree. For example, one could find a "lower" node where the contracted information
does not hold, and then ascend some branch leading off that node to a point where as
much as possible of the information prior to downdate is regained (a rather arduous
process). Thinking of each branch of T as a "stack" of information states, there is an
analogy with the work of researchers such as Zeevat [111], Vermeulen [104], and Jaspars
[60], where similar structures are employed. These approaches advocate storing an in¬
formation growth history with which agents can retrace their steps. However, such an
approach would restrict agents to considering only the theories held prior to a contrac¬
tion, thus losing all intermediate information. For an extreme example, if a is the first
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sentence in my theory10 (at point t\) and by tn I have also learnt 4>i * ■ ■ 0n, and I then
have to contract by a, the naive approach of simply retracing my steps will put me in
to, where I know nothing at all. To repeat part of the argument of chapter 3, this is simply
not rational (failing the maxim of conservation of information). Agents should be able
to conserve (most of) <j)\... <pn- (In fact they should be able to conserve all the & \/ a).
The problem here has to do with the basic monotonicity of IL, and the fact that the or¬
der of information growth is encoded in an Intuitionistic semantics. However, in AGM
research, the order in which expressions are added to a theory is irrelevant, save that
a current revision instruction overrides all preceding information. In order to escape
these limitations, AGM-style contractions are now employed.
5.2 Levels, Systems, and Rationality Postulates
Both the syntactical work on theory change for theories defined over first-order lan¬
guages, and systems for modelling such change, are taken care of a little later. The gen¬
eral approach might be thought of as constructing an "experiencable logic" based on
investigation of a changing world. That is a logic where statements can be verified, fal¬
sified, or undecided, and where such classifications are defeasible, in the sense that veri¬
fications and falsifications are not (necessarily) persistent (ie: there is non-monotonicity
of valuations). Onemight also think of such a logic as describing, not a changingworld,
but an agent's changing information about theworld, perhaps as conveyed by other, dif¬
ferently informed, agents.
In the propositional case, of course, AGM theory revision systems meet many of the
requirements on such a logic. However, thinking about predicate logical theories also
forces the development of new rationality postulates for names, the quantifiers, and
identity statements. One trivial way of producing a revision system over first-order
theories is to restrict contractions and revisions to atomic propositions, and simply con¬
tinue to use propositional AGM methods. Indeed, this is the method used in [9], where
theory change is implemented as an educational tool. However, such an approach merely
sidesteps some real issues in first-order theory change. The systemwhich I present em-
10A favourite example, due to Peter Milne, is the case of forgetting one's own name.
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bodies a similar approach. Theories are taken to be defined over a fixed domain of con¬
stants, or names. Thus, universal quantification reduces to conjunction of propositions,
and (non-anaphoric) existential quantification is construed as disjunction. Rather than
computing such contractions and revisions in a piecemeal fashion (eg: for universals, as
a series of individual contractions), the theory of general contractions is used to calculate
them all at once (eg: as contraction of a set of sentences).
Levels
First though, it pays to be explicit about the different levels atwhich the various systems
operate, and the connections between those levels. In general, three stages of formalism
are employed in theory change and revision semantics, and with two particular opera¬
tions11 . The three levels are,
(1) the observation or input language, in which the theories are expressed,
(2) the change language, in which the operations of expansion and contraction are invoked
over sets of input language sentences, and
(3) the semantics, which describes the effect that instructions in the change language have
on the contents of theories.
The object language connectives A and — (dynamic conjunction and retraction) cor¬
respond to the change language operations + and — (expansion and contraction) respec¬
tively, and the semantical functions 'up' and 'down' |.J and ] . | on information states,
respectively.
Systems
FOTC systems allow the formal expression of many different intuitions about change.
Indeed the range of possible systems is a little bewildering, given the number of pa-
Revision can be treated as a derived operation, which could be seen as the "meta-language" ana¬
logue of a consistency preserving conjunction. Such a conjunction (call it A) could be defined AAB =
(A - (~iB))AB.
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Extension Semantics restrictions Information Growth
FOTE DPL single model anaphoric information
FOTE/// DMPL exhaustive and full over Cons anaphoric & external information
FOTE/// FUL Cons exhaustive, canonical models anaphoric & external & identity
Table 5.1: Dynamic semantics vs Theory Extension
rameters available for change. This chapter navigates a particular course through the
landscape of FOTC systems, using van Eijck's pioneering work [96] on first-order the¬
ory extension systems as a guide. In order to chart this course some of van Eijck's basic
assumptions are adopted. The prospects for different FOTC systems and their seman¬
tics are explored at the close of the chapter.
To begin with, consider the propositional TC and RS systems of the preceding chapters.
There, changing partial theories were modelled by changing sets of models, or worlds.
The semantics is rather more involved in the first-order case, due to the complication
of variable assignments. In DPL, for example, information increase is modelled by way
of eliminating possible variable assignments (rather than possible worlds) relative to a
single model. If attention is restricted to one model in this way, information change rel¬
ative to the model can be described by way of growing and shrinking sets of variable
assignment functions. Where the model is fixed, there is a connection (due to van Eijck)
between DPL and an FOTE system (see table 5.1), which I extend to a connection be¬
tweenRevisable DPL (RDPL) and a FOTC system (see table 5.2). However, restriction to
one model does not allow evaluation of modal expressions, or update by "discourse ex¬
ternal" information. For that to be possible, information structures must be made up of
both sets of assignments (DPL states) and of "worlds" (US states)(see eg: Dekker [21]).
In this hybrid case, different FOTE systems are connected with DMPL and FUL (see van
Eijck [96]), and a FOTC systemwith a revisable DMPL and a "first-order revision logic"
(FRL). Again, see table 5.2.
There seems to be a "missing" system in the above progression(table 5.1): a first-
order update semantics (FUS), dealing solely with growing discourse-external informa¬
tion in the semantics of (modal) predicate logic. Such a system would define updates
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Theory Change Semantics Information Change
FOTC RMPL external information
FOTC/ RDPL anaphoric information
FOTC// RDMPL anaphoric & external information, "static" identity
FOTC// FRL anaphoric & external information, "dynamic" identity
Table 5.2: Dynamic semantics vs Theory Change: information processing
Theory Change Semantics restrictions
FOTC RMPL single assignment functions
FOTC/ RDPL single model
FOTC// RDMPL exhaustive and full over Cons, Canonical models
FOTC// FRL exhaustive over Cons, Canonical Models
Table 5.3: Dynamic semantics vs Theory Change: formal restrictions
over sets of first-order models, with a shared domain, and single input and output as¬
signment functions. FUS would be complete with respect to an FOTE system which ig¬
nores the dynamics of anaphora. In fact, FUS and its corresponding theory extension
system are the "information growth" part of the systems RMPL and FOTC given be¬
low.
Concerns over anaphora, although important in dynamic semantics, are not central to
a (first-order) logic of theory change. Thus, the first system developed disregards "dia¬
logue internal" information, instead concentrating on processing changing information
about the world.
5.2.1 Intuitions behind the Rationality Postulates
The basic motivations behind the development of first-order contraction postulates are
discussed below.
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• (Names)
The set of naming expressions of a theory (Cons(T)) grows under utterance interpre¬
tation. Thus, the set of names in a theory grows and persists, although it can be the
case that some names are found to refer to the same object, or even to be non-referring.
Even in the case of non-existence claims, the naming expression involved is not lost.
All in all then, contractions and revisions can only add to the set of names of a theory.
Names can become redundant (or "fall into disuse") through acceptance of identity
statements, but they are never lost. So, Cons(T) can only grow, even during theory
contraction.
Names are assumed to designate rigidly (they are assigned to the same individuals
across models) in any information state, considered statically. However, rigid desig¬
nation also holds for names under theory change; they always denote the same indi¬
vidual after change as they did in the preceding theory. In other words, one can revise
a theory like so: "John is not in Greece, he's in Canada", which changes the properties
associated with John, but not the actual individual referred to. This models changing
knowledge of the reference of theoretical terms (more shall be said about such cases
in chapter 6).
• (Variables and Anaphora)
Variables, in dynamic semantics, are associated with natural language's pronouns. In
theories, each variable is associated with a name from the set of names of the theory.
Under change, a variable can become associated with a different name, thus mod¬
elling change in anaphoric information (the information about which name or indi¬
vidual a pronoun stands for.) The denotation of variables is thus, as expected, non-
rigid under change.
Anaphoric change is effected either by simple sentential revision (in a revisable Dy¬
namic Predicate Logic, for example), or by revision of identity statements. As an ex¬
ample of the latter, consider, "One of them was ill. It was John. No, it was Jackie."
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• (Predicates)
Theories could be said to have growing sets of predicates (descriptive terms, percep¬
tual capacities, experimental techniques), as well as growing sets of names. The same
kinds of consideration apply to Pred(T), the set of predicates of a theory T, as apply
to Cons(T) (apart from rigid designation). Thus, even under contraction, the set of
predicates of a theorymay grow.
• (Existential Quantifiers)
Think of the contraction T—3xPx as removal of the disjunction Pa V Pb V ... V Pn
whereCons{T) = {a,b,..., n}, so that theoryT no longer implies 3xPx. This amounts
to removal of all the atoms of the disjunct, and so is clearly analogous to Fuhrmann's
notion of Package contraction12. Thus, take retraction of existential statements to have
a finite domain of application; the constants currently employed in the theory.
However, in dynamic semantics, existential quantification is taken to introduce a fresh
variable as the referent of subsequent pronouns. In this case, contraction of an exis¬
tential statement is taken to remove the variable as a candidate for anaphoric refer¬
ence. Thus there are two strategies to choose from. Where dialogue-external infor¬
mation is at stake, contraction of existential claims is interpreted as Package Contrac¬
tion. Where anaphoric (or dialogue internal) information is of interest, retraction of
an existential effectively "kills" its variable. Where both types of information are of
concern, Package Contraction can be used to interpret statements like "No, none of
them were ill," while the anaphoric "death" of a variable can be used to interpret ut¬
terances such as "No, there is no thief." The first of these utterances could continue,
"They were all hallucinating" (because the individuals referred to by "they" are still
available for reference), while the second could not be added to by "He is innocent."13
• (Universal Quantifiers)
Similarly, contraction ofVxPx is removal of the conjunction PaPPbP ... SzPn, so that
T no longer licences the inference ofVxPx. This requires the removal of at least one of
12See [35] chapter 3
13Unless "he" is interpreted as referring to some other individual.
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the atoms of the conjunct14, and is clearly analogous to Fuhrmann's notion of Choice
Contraction.
• (Identity)
Rather than statements concerning absolute or metaphysical identity, identity on the
basis ofavailable information is of central interest in the following systems. That is, iden¬
tity statements are relative to the descriptive resources (predicates) of the current the¬
ory. Recall that the focus is on theories as epistemic approximations for an agent,
so that rather than having any direct metaphysical import, theoretical terms refer, in
the first place, to "objects" in epistemic states15. Identity claims between names are
thought of as licencing the inference that the named objects share properties. Thus
identity is relative to a set of predicates, modelling a theory's descriptive capabilities
(the more predicates at our disposal, the more fine-grained our distinctions can be.)
Thus retraction of an identity statement requires that the terms involved no longer fall
under all the same predicates. However retraction of an identity statement is not to
be equivalent to the assertion of non-identity, so it is simply required that one or other
of the terms involved becomes underspecified for some property or properties16, in
comparison with the other term17 . This all means that the 'objects' that are of inter¬
est here ("dialogue referents") are partial and may change their identity relations to
other individuals. These "objects" are more properly investigated towards the close
of the thesis.
Name and Predicate Postulates
• N1 ConsiT—f) D Cons{T) (Inclusion)
• N2 if f £T then ConsfT—f) = Cons(T) (Vacuity)
14For an example along the lines of Quine-Duhem theory revision, take the casewhere a new observation
contradicts a universal claim.
15This fits in with the more philosophical considerations adduced in chapter 1, and shall be elaborated
upon later.
16Removal of a bare identity statement obviously leaves an agent in quite an epistemic predicament.
They have to make some (arbitrary) choice of contraction of a predication for one of the terms involved.
17This can be achieved by "contracting" one term in respect of a certain property.
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N1 says that the set of names does not shrink under theory contraction. This becomes
plausible when one considers the following example;
Where T = {WxPx}, with the contraction T—Pc
Then c G Cons(T—Pc)
However, removal of existential claims might seem to warrant the removal of a name
or referent. This possibility is considered later in the chapter.
N2 says that names are invariant under contraction by sentences which are already in
T.
For predicates, and for very similar reasons;
• PI Pred{T—(j)) ~D Pred(T) (Inclusion)
• P2 if (f) G T then Pred(T—(p) = Pred(T) (Vacuity)
Quantifier Postulates
Inclusions (T—\/xPx C T, T—3xPx C T), Vacuity, and Success are all covered by the
general case (ie: the AGM postulates). However, Imake the treatment explicit by noting
the following Success requirements.
• Q1 Vc G Cons(T), Pc ^ T—3xPx (Success)
• Q2 3c G Cons(T), Pc ^ T-VxPx (Success)
Q1 says that contraction by an existential quantifier amounts to removal of all names
from the denotation of the relevant predicate. (Package Contraction)
Q2 says the converse for universal quantification (Choice Contraction).
Identity Postulates
Again, Inclusion, Vacuity, Success (c = d $ T—(c = d)), and Recovery are each covered
by the general (propositional) case.
• II T—{c\ = C2) 1/ -"(ci = C2), unless -i(ci = C2) G T (Partial Identity)
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• 12 BP such that Pc\ € T—(ci = c2) and PC2 & T—(ci = C2), or Pc-i € T—{c\ =
C2) and Pci qL T—(ci = C2) (Distinguishability)
II states that contraction of an identity statement doesn't lead to the stronger claim of
non-identity (unless that claim was already part of the theory.) For example;
Example 17 "I used to think that Batman was Clark Kent, but now I'm not sure."
This statement does not commit the speaker to the claim that Batman is not Clark Kent.
12 (Distinguishability) says that retraction of identity requires that there is an avail¬
able predicate P e Pred{T) which distinguishes the constants (one of them has prop¬
erty P, but the other doesn't).
5.3 First-Order Theory Change
I demonstrated earlier that first order theory extension, disregarding anaphora, brings
about Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus. Unfortunately, the intuitionistic frameworkwas
found to be unsuitable formodelling rational theory change, due to its basic monotonic-
ity. Again, before any entanglement with anaphora, a semantics for first-order theory
change systems can be developed by adding to (modal) predicate-logical semantics so
that verifications and falsifications are now defeasible (or non-persistent).
The language under consideration at first is first-order logic without identity, but with
strong and weak (contraction) negations, denoted and " respectively (the for¬
mer is in the "theory-internal" logic, the latter is an operator in the "external logic" of
change) . Recall that theories are partial; it makes little sense to talk of contractions (or
expansions) in complete theories, for then T—p — T + -*p. If, in the semantics, atten¬
tion is restricted to assignments in a single model, then the only information that can
be gained is about variable assignments relative to that model (eg: in DPL). In order to
avoid this limitation for a basic FOTC system, I shall consider sets of models, defined
over a fixed shared domain D.
First-order theories will be given in terms of configurations. A configuration is a pair
consisting of T, a deductively closed set of first-order sentences, and a set n of naming
functions j £ n, j : Vars —> Cons(T), called a naming.
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If c G Cons(C), j(c) = c.
Write S for the set of all assignments. Write N for the set of all namings. Following van
Eijck, make the following crucial assumption, which brings about a correspondence be¬
tween a naming n and sets of assignment functions i G s (sets of which make up DPL
information states):
(NA) Naming Assumption
Vd G D(t), 3c G Cons(C) such that s(c) = d, where s is a state (set of assignment func¬
tions.)
In other words, every object in the domain of the model has a name. This makes a
naming (a set of naming functions) the syntactic counterpart of a DPL-state or set s of
variable assignments i G s, where i : Vars —* D. Thus, every variable is associated with
a name, and every namewith an individual in the domain of the model. This means that
namings and states are interchangable; mapping a variable to a constant is tantamount
to mapping it to an individual.
The naming assumption is reflected in the further requirement of constant exhaustive-
ness:
Closed TheoryT is constant exhaustive (or "exhaustive over Cons" if Vc G Cons, 0(c) G
T^yX0 G T)
This first system (i.e. FOTC) handles predicate logical theory change with regard
to discourse-external information only. FOTC defines a function from an input config¬
uration (theory and singleton naming), to an output configuration, without change in
anaphoric information, with the following assumptions (from van Eijck [96]).
(NC) Names Constant The set of names Cons(T) remains the same under extension,
contraction, and revision.
(SCD) Shared Constant Domains: domains of models are fixed under extension,
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contraction, and revision. Wheremore than one model is under consideration, all mod¬
els share the same domain D of individuals18 .
Now, simply extend the AGM partial-meet contraction function to the first order
case. This involves ensuring that T, n contracted by f fails to support </>, under the as¬
sociation n of variables with names.
Definition 40 First-Order (partial meet) contraction
For 4> a first-orderformula, where T _Ln f is the set ofall maximal subsets ofT which fail to im¬
ply (p under naming n, and a is a selection function on that set, delivering a subset ofT _Ln f>.
T, n-(f> = H ol{T _Ln </>), n
Fact 11 First -order partial meet contractions obey the first-order rationality postulates.
Proof:
Firstly, partial-meet contractions already obey all the propositional-level postulates (the
AGM postulates), so that the quantifier postulates are met.
Then, N1 and N2 are trivial due to the assumption NC.
PI and P2 can be treated similarly.
II: T-(ci = c2) = n a(T _l_ (ci = c2)) = T' such that T' V (ci = c2) T' h -.(ci = c2)
12 is trivial so long as VP € Pred(T), (a = b) G T =h Pa £ T Pb £ T
5.3.1 FOTC; syntax
This first system (FOTC) does not deal with the dynamics of anaphora, but with the
dynamics of dialogue-external information.
Where n(x | c) is the set of naming functions just like n but that x might get mapped to
c.
18As Veltman et al. [47] recognise, this assumption is problematic, since it implies that agents have prior
knowledge of the domain of discussion.
First-Order Theory Change Systems with Semantics 140
Assume that there are syntactic restrictions in force (as in the propositional case)
which ensure that — and f only ever appear on the far left of well-formed formulae
(this rules out the intricacies of — p" and so on). Unlike the propositional case, inter¬
pret extension by negative information as exclusion of positive information (this move
both makes the recursion neater and interfaces better with van Eijck's systems.) Unfor¬
tunately, contraction of negative information cannot be so neatly dealt with; as in the
propositional case, contracted negative information engages in the same partial meet
algorithm as positive information.
Extension:
T,n + Pt = Cl(T U {Pnt}),n
T,n + -i(f> = fl{T' | T' D T and 3w 6 N : T', n + (/) — C,w},n
T, n + 3xPx — T + Pc, n(x \ c), 3c € Cons{T)
T, n + MxPx = (... (T, n + Pc\) -I- ... + Pcm), Vci ... cm € Cons(T)
T, n + ((f) A ip) = (T, n + (f>) U (T, n + ip)
T,n-1—(f> = T, n—(f)
T, n+ | (f) = T, n+(f>
Contraction:
T, n—(f> = H ot{T -Ln (f)),n
T, n—10 = f| -Ln -•0), n
T, n—3xPx = TV{Pa ... Pm},n for a ... m € Cons(T)
T, n—\/xPx = T, n—Pc, 3c € Cons(T)
T, n—(0 Atfj) — (T, 71—0) U (T, n—tp)
Revision:
T, 71+0 = (T, 77—-i0) + 0
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5.3.2 A Semantics of FOTC
The basic semantical framework for the family of systems is an extension of the model-
theoretic approach of preceding chapters to (sets of) predicate logical models with (sets
of) assignment functions.
st now denotes a set of predicate logical models which supports the theory T.
Entanglement with assignment functions also complicates the interpretation func¬
tions ].[,!•[, and ][. ][. They now carrywith them (sets of) input and output assignment
functions to the state, denoted by superscript and subscript respectively, for example
.SJ (p [" is a downdate function on state s taking input state n (a set of assignment func¬
tions i : Vars U Cons —> D) and returning output state u. The general framework
here is that of Quantified Modal Logic, or Modal Predicate Logic. Updates by existen¬
tial quantifiers effect a random assignment to their variables, and in (later) dynamic sys¬
tems, those assignments are passed over sentential boundaries (interpreted as sequen¬
tial conjunctions).
Supermodel Semantics for General Contraction
The Choice and Package contractions of Fuhrmann ([35], presented in chapter 2) are to
be put to good use here (where contraction of existentially quantified statements is not
interpreted as "killing" variables), but as yet they have not been given any semantical
analysis. It turns out that the "ignorant supermodel" semantics for contraction (from
chapter 3) can be used to model general contractions, but now the supermodels have to
be modified so that they fail to support sets of sentences.
The case is quite simple for package contraction:
In the syntax (recall chapter 2), TVB = f| a(T _L B) = f) a(T _L {ai,..., am})
So that semantically, one can define, st} B [y= |J (3(s J_ B)
First-Order Theory Change Systems with Semantics 142
where the concept of supermodel sets is generalized (as follows) so as to fail to sup¬
port B, a set of sentences. It is possible to model Fuhrmann's "General Contractions"
by way of "General Ignorant Supermodels"; supermodels which fail to support whole
sets of sentences.
General Ignorant Supermodels
Generalise the definition given in chapter 3, to cover downdate by sets of sentences over
sets of models with variable assignments:
Definition 41 General Ignorant Supermodels: Mf G Mt _Ln B
For B a set offormulae of C, Mt' is a minimal supermodel set ofMr which fails to support B
under assignment n (or simply "supermodel set ofT ignoring B under n") iff.
1. Mt C Mt> (supermodels)
2. P, Vp G B (general ignorance)
3. for anyMt" such that Mt Q Mt" C Mt> , Mt" \—n P, Sp e B (minimality)
where \=n is the standard relation ofsatisfaction under assignment n.
The AGM case occurs where the set B is a singleton. Thus, the set of minimal su¬
permodel sets of T ignoring B (under assignment n), written Mr j_np/ is the set of (mini¬
mally larger than Mt) sets of models which (under n) support as much ofT as they can
without also supporting all the propositions in B.
Semantical Package Contraction
As anticipated, the above definition allows a semantical version of Fuhrmann's Package
Contraction [35]:
Definition 42 srj B [y= (J P(ST 2- B)
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The definition can be employed in the downdate semantics for existential claims:
sr] 3xPx |= st} Pa,..., Pm [v, for all a,..., m € Cons(T).
A semantical version of Choice Contraction could similarly be constructed in order to
deal directly with the contraction of universal claims.
T, n—WxPx = T3{Pa ... Pm},n for a ... n € Cons(T)
and then simply, st} VxPx |= s^] Pa [, 3a £ Cons(T).
5.3,3 Revisable Modal Predicate Logic
The semantics presented below is a version ofModal Predicate Logic (presented as an
update semantics), augmented with a new operator J . | which expands the set of pos¬
sible models supporting a partial (first-order) theory. Dub this new system RMPL (for
"RevisableModal Predicate Logic.") The system does not deal with changing anaphoric
relations, butwith changing information states (dynamics of anaphora are tackled later).
The existential quantifier still makes use of random assignment, but the assignments
are not passed on as inputs to further interpretations. The semantics of RMPL defines a
function from sets s of first-order models over a single domain D and an input assign¬
ment function n to sets of first-order models over D and an output assignment function
u.
Where s ±n cp is the set of minimal supermodels of s which fail to support <j> un¬
der assignment n, and /?, as in the propositional case, is a selection function on s _Ln 4>,
choosing just the set of sets ofmodels supporting the theories chosen by a from T J_„ <fi
in the syntax.
Models i £ s consist of a fixed domain D of individuals and an interpretation func¬
tion F assigning sets of n-tuples of elements of D as the denotations of n-place predi¬
cates. Thus i = (D, F)
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Definition 43 (RMPL Semantics)
u = n(x | d) is the assignment function just like n but for the possible mapping of x to some
deD
n = uin all cases except where existential quantification is involved.
Updates
s \P{tx ... tm)J 2 = {i E s | i \=n P(ti ... tm)}
s |-!0| ™ = {i£s\n = u and there is no r such that its [</>] "}
s [BxPxJ 2 = {i E s | i |=u Pc, 3c E Cons(T), u = n(x \ d)}
s [VzP.tJ 2 = s [Pci] "... [PcmJ 2, Vcx ... cm E Cons(T)
s [0 A Tpju = 8 [01 2 n S [V>] u
s [-01 u = SJ 0 lu
a IT 01S = «I0IS
s [-01 U = s 1 0 E
Downdates
s] P(<1... tm) [2= u /?(« -Ln P(h . ■ ■ tm))
s] ~>P(h ...tm) 12= u 0(s -Ln =P(il • • • tm))
«! 0 A 0 ["= S1 0 I"Usl 0 K
s] 3xPx [2= si Pa,..., Pm [v= s] Pa [2,.. -1 Pm [2
sJ MxPx [2= sJ Pc, |23c E Cons(T)
Revision
«I0E=«1 -0 C 101 u
An example theory contraction/state downdate
Take the following theory growth:
T = {Pa, Pb, Qa}
T + Qb = T'
T' = {Pa, Pb, Qa, Qb}
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Semantically things looks like this: st = {i G S \ i |= Pa&zPbfoQa} =
st IQbj = {i € sT | i 1= Qb} = st>
—the set of models becomes smaller so as to support Qb.
Now try the contraction: T" = T'—Pa = f| ot{T' J_ Pa) = {Pb, Qa, Qb}
Semantically:
sT„ = s^'J Pa [= \J/3(st' -L Pa) = sk Q st>,BK such that sk V1 Pa and ,sk 1=
A, VA C T" such that A ^ Pa
—the state becomes larger again, expanding to incorporate some models which fail to
support Pa.
5.3.4 Completeness of FOTC wrt RMPL
Theorem 12 (1) Th(s),n + f = Th(s [0] "), u
(2)Tin + <t> = T', u iff Mod(T') = Mod{T) [0] ™
(3) Th(s),n-<j> = Th(s]<t>lZ),u
(4) T,n-f = T\ u iff Mod(T') = Mod(T)J <j> [£
By composition, this leads to the result that
(5) Th(s),n+<p = Th(s}[ <f> ]["), u and
(6) T, n+f = T',u iff Mod(T') = Mod(T)][ f £
Proof:19
The update/expansion clauses first (items 1 and 2):
19By induction on the structure of <j>, similarly to the propositional case. Not all of the clauses are given
here.
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For n = u, Th(s),n + P(tx... tm) = {ip \ Th(s) U P{nt\... ntm) \- ip},n
= Th({i G s | i ^=n P(ti ...tm)}),n = Th{s {P(h ... fm)J £),«
For n=u,Th(s),n + ~><f> = Pl{T" I T' D Th(s) and 3w : T',n + (p = jC,w
= Th{i€s\i\4>Vu=^} = Th{s M2),«
For u = n(v \ d) for some d G D,
Th(s),n + 3xPx = {ip \ Th(s) U P(c) F ip, 3c G Cons(T),u = n(x | c)}, u
= Th({i G s | i |=u Pc},u — Th(s [3xPx] ™),u
Th(s),n + (p Aip = Th(s),n + (p U Th(s), n + ip
=(Ind hyp)Th{s [</>] £), w U Th{s [<f>] JJ), y
=(Ind hyp)=T/i({i G s \ i 1=™ </>}), w U Th({i G s \ i \=y ip}),y




T,n + cp = T',u iff Th(Mod(T)),n + p = Th(Mod(T')),u
iff by part (T)Th(Mod(T)), n + cp = Th(Mod(T) \(p\ £), u
iff Mod(T') = Mod(T) [<j>] £
Downdates, (items 3 and 4)
The following subproofs make use of the basic fact that, by definition,
Lemma: f| oc(T _L </>)) = Th(\J (3(st j_ p))
For n = u,
Th(s), n—P(t\... tm) = D a(Th(s) _Ln P{tx... tm))
= n <X({T' I T C Th(s) and V \f P(tx... tm)})
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= 0 a({T' | T' = Th{N \ N D s and N Pfa ... tm)}})
= Th(|J /3(s ±n P(ti . . . U
= Th(sjP(h...tm) K),u
For n = u,
Th(s),n—-iP(ti ...tm) = P| a(Th(s) _L -<P(nti... ntm))
= n «({T' | T' = Th{N DS|JV^n ^P{tx ... tm)}})
= Th(\J /3(s ±n ->P(tx... tm)),u
= Th(sj -i.P(ti...tm) \™),u
For n — u, and B — {Pa,, Pk) for a,..., k £ Cons{T),
Th(s), n—BxPx = Th(s),n)/_{Pa,..., Pk}
= f)a(Th(s) _L B),u
= Th(\J(3(s ±B)),u
= Th(sJ B [v),u
= Th(s] BxPx [S),«
Th{s), n—((p A ip) = Th(s),n—(p fl Th(s), n—ip
=(Ind hypJT/^J <P [£), w n Th(a] <P [£), y
=(Ind hyp) = Th{i € s \ i \AW cp},w n Th{i £ s | i fp},y




T, n—cp = T', u iff Th(Mod(T)),n-(p = Th(Mod(T')),u
iff by part (3) Th(Mod(T)), n-<p = Th(Mod(T)J <f> £), u
iff Mod{T') = Mod(T)j p K
Revision: by composition of the preceding results.
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As discussed above, in relation to Intuitionistic semantics, the semantics presented above
differs from the spirit of Jaspars [60] presentation of up-and-downdates in Kripke struc¬
tures. There Jaspars uses a "look back" definition of downdate in multi-modal logics,
where agents retrace their information growth history in order to effect a downdate (he
also only considers propositional systems). Note that the semantics that I present em¬
ploys a different conception of rational downdating; one that does not just look back to
previous information states, but instead has the capacity to bring about entirely novel
states in which the retracted information is absent. In other words, the Multiple Exten¬
sions Problem makes a semantical point too; there are a number of information states
which fail to support a given formula, and one needs (in the most rational way) to spec¬
ify which is the most appropriate downdate. Whilst Jaspars' "look-back" approach em¬
bodies the conservative maxim "only consider states that you were in before" (similarly
to the intuitionistic case), genuine AGM-inspired downdating allows for consideration
of previously unencountered states.
Using the "downdate" function that I have defined, stacks or sequences of information
states (growth histories) are not necessary in order to perform revisions; they can be
computed on individual states. This has the consequence that downdating can produce
new states rather than simply re-instating old ones.
The avoidance of stacks of states is also, ontologically speaking, more conservative.
5.4 Adding Dynamics of Anaphora
Information conveyed in linguistic communication has two important facets, as recent
developments in dialogue and discourse analysis illustrate. There is information about
theworld or how itmight be (external, truth-conditional information), and information
about the possible values of variables, or anaphor bindings. The latter is "discourse in¬
ternal" information, or a "mere" book-keeping device. The former has been the province
of US and epistemic logics in general, which are superseded by RS when it is taken into
account that both the world itself, and our beliefs about it, are dynamic. Information
about variable bindings has been the subject matter of DRT and DPL, and brings into
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semantics the notion of information about partial and abstract objects, discourse refer¬
ents, pegs, indefinite objects, (eg: Kartunnen [63], Kamp [61], Heim [53], Landman [69]).
Both of these conceptions of information (the internal and the external) are required in a
semantics adequate for the purposes of a theory of communication. What's more, for a
semantics of dialogue, the information states which they produce need to be revisable.
That revision of variable bindings actually does go on in dialogue will be shown by a
few examples (see chapter 6). An interesting problem is that of how to model arbitrary
change of information about the values of variables, so that sentence interpretation in¬
volves genuine information change. In this sense a Revision Semantics reformulation of
DPL is required, or an adaptation of the underlying logic of DPL to that of RS, in order
to accommodate repair and change of discourse internal information. The combination
will allow the modelling of information about "partial objects" which can be changed
(and later exchanged) via sentence utterance and interpretation (see chapter 6).
For DPL, information growth (or theory extension) in the context of a fixed model,
has to do with changing s, the set of possible assignments to variables. Interpretations of
atomic formulae are simply tests to the effect that the current state (set of assignments)
supports the formula in question. Since the model under consideration in DPL is static,
all that changes is the association of variables with individuals in the domain of the
model. For example; 3xPx A Qx is true with respect to fixed model m and sets of as¬
signments s iff there is an assignment i e s which maps x to some d e D such that d €
F(P) and d € F(Q).
A state of total information arises when only one possible assignment is left; each
variable is associated with just one name, and thus (via the naming assumption) with
one individual each in the domain. Syntactically speaking, in a total theory this is the
same as finding out which names the variables are associated with; settling on just one
naming function.
Example 18 Cons(T) = {a, b}
T, n = {Pa, ~>Pb}, {i € N \ i(a) = a, i(b) = b}
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T, n + BxPx = {Pa, -^Pb, }, {j G n | j(x) = a}
or, T,n + 3xPx = {£}, {j G n \ j(x) = b}
Anaphoric relations under downdate
A characteristic of DPL is that sentential close is interpreted as a dynamic conjunction,
which passes variable assignments from the first to the second conjunct (ie: across sen¬
tential boundaries.) Note that there is an interesting parallel case in retraction, or down-
date. The following example illustrates that anaphoric relations survive revision (and
therefore downdate).
Example 19 "He's old and happy. Well, he's not happy. He's my friend."
The pronoun he is still available for reference after the revision in the second sentence.
The next system explored is a variant of DPL where states (sets of variable assign¬
ments) are revisable. I later outline similar systemswhichmodel genuine theory change,
and provide an interesting treatment of changing knowledge about identities.
Agents do not often 'dump' subjects in dialogue; they can repair and recover wayward
anaphoric relations. For example:
Example 20 "A man and a hoy were running along the beach. He started to laugh. Not the
man, the hoy."
The above example cannot be dealtwith using standard negation, for then the story de¬
generates into absurdity. Rather one assignment is to be retracted, and replaced by an¬
other. This kind of consideration motivates the provision of revisable DPL states.
5.4.1 First-Order theory extension with Anaphora
Van Eijck [96] presents two different first-order theory extension systems, the first of
which is taken as the point of departure for a revisable DPL. I choose to rewrite van
Eijck's system in more familiar notation:
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Definition 44 (FOTE, first system)
151
Here I present a system of theory extension for theories consisting of sets of sentences ex¬
pressed in first-order logic with identity.
• T, n + Rt\... tm = T \J{Rnti... ntm}, n
• T,n + -i(j> = f|{r' | T' ~D T, 3w; T", n + f — C,w)
• T, n + (fi = t2) = T \J{nti = nt2}, n
• T,n + 3x = T, n(x | c), c G Cons(T)
• T, n + (f> /\f> = (T, n + f) + 20
Note that conjunctions passes namings from the first to the second conjunct, and that the
only clause which changes the naming part of a configuration concerns the existential
quantifier; assigning some constant from the theory to the relevant variable. Note also
that the negation clause of van Eijck's system is intuitionistic (it acts so as to exclude
positive information), which marries well with the state-subtraction negation of DPL.
5.4.2 Semantics of DPL
The semantics for DPL (here formulated as an update semantics, as in Dekker [21], page
150) defines a function from an input state s (a set of variable assignments) to an output
state. The states are sets of functions from the set of variable Vars to the domain D of
the (single) model, m = (D, F)
Where s[x] = {i[x/d\ \ i G s and d G D} (the state just like s except that it can assign d
to x.)
20B, u such that T,n + 4> = C,w and C, w + ip = B, u
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and,
i M = {'' | {'} [©J V 0} (all the assignments which are non-absurd under update by
<t>)
Definition 45 (DPL Semantics21)
s \Rxi... xnj = {i <E s | {i(xi)... i(xn)) e F(R)}
S \x = yj = {i e s I i(x) = i(y)}
s [-.0] = s- | m
s \4> A ipj =s {(pj [VI
s I3x<t>j = s[x] [VI
Note that DPL has total information states22; that is,
Fact 12 for all DPL formulas f,
hdpi <t> V -V
FOTE is provably complete with respect to the semantics ofDPL under the following
assumptions;
1. theories are complete,
2. the Naming Assumption; every individual is named (is in the set Cons),
3. and theories are Constant Exhaustive
A closed theory T is exhaustive over Cons if V(c)Vc G Cons implies thatWxf € T.
21The here is state subtraction; all the assignments in s but not in 1 [0]
22see Emiel Krahmer [64]
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Completeness
I state van Eijck's result below (translated into the notation used here) . Where m is a
predicate-logical model, s the input state, u the output state.
Theorem 13 (Completeness ofFOTE wrt DPL (van Eijck 1993))
m, s, u 1=dPi 0 iff Th(m), s + <f> = Th(m),u
and
T,s + <j> = T,u iff Mod(T),s,u \=dPi f
Note that, since attention is restricted to one model, the theory part of the configuration
is static in the above results, and it is only the naming, or state which changes (in fact
namings and states can be used interchangeably because of the naming assumption).
But these results aren't really about theory extension then, for theory extension involves
a change in sets of models - adding external, truth conditional information about the
world. The restriction above to complete theories (ie: where T = Th(i) and Mod(T) = i)
actually means that the result is about associating variables with names and nameswith
individuals, rather than adding sentences to a theory. DPL tracks change in discourse-
internal information. Strengthening these results to incorporate genuine theory change
(discourse-external information) involves moving away from DPL, towards "modal"
DPL, an issue which I postpone for the moment.
5.4.3 Revisable DPL
Discourse-internal information is open to revision. Consider the following (see also the
example of chapter 6):
Example 21 "A man and a hoy came in. He was tall.
No, not the boy . I meant the man."
[y] P^l l~Txl ITy\
Here discourse internal information is being repaired (or corrected, or revised). It
seems, in general, that most constituent negations are revision instructions (see chapter
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7), rather than downdates. However, note that in the above example, the hoy is not ex¬
cluded from being tall. Rather, a previously supplied constraint on the set of variable
assignments (of "the boy" to tall individuals) is being retracted. In order to deal with
this type of repair, a Revisable DPL is required.
In DPL, agents can only learn about the values of variables. Genuine update of dis¬
course external information is to be handled by diminishing sets of models. However,
loss of information in RDPL can be modelled by growing sets of assignment functions.
For example, to retract Px from a state s in RDPL, is to move to a superstate s' of s in
which variable x is not assigned to d e F(P) for all the i e s'. Thus, s _l Px is the set of
minimal superstates of s which do not (under the new set of assignments) support Px.
This requires a slight change in the supermodel semantics for contraction; where infor¬
mation is encoded as sets of variable assignments, a superstate semantics is required.
The basic idea is that s ± (pis the set of all (minimal) superstates of s which fail to sup¬
port 4>. That is, some assignments in s j_ <p map variables in q> to d e D which do not
respect their predications in (p. As in the first-order AGM case, select some of the mini¬
mal superstates, and join, to form a downdate.
Since DPL can only gain information about indefinites, RDPL can only lose and re¬
vise information about indefinites. There are no clauses here for retraction of formulae
involving names (eg: "John isn't ill."), since DPL interprets assertions of such formulae
as tests on the current state. Itwould be a simplematter to interpret retraction of definite
information in RDPL as a test that the current state does not support the retracted infor¬
mation. In order to deal with retraction of existential claims, some ideas from free logic
can be employed. Distinguished elements 0 e Cons and * e D stand for the "null" in¬
dividual (the individual with no properties) and its name. Thus, Vn e N, n(0) = *, and
also VP E Pred, * ^ P(P). Using a "null" name and individual for the interpretation of
non-existence claims is (at least) better than van Eijck's FOTEm, where interpretation
of the denial of an existential leads to absurdity. Here, such utterances do not trigger
implosion of the state; they are processible.
Thus, modelling repair of anaphoric information in RDPL, add the following clauses to
DPL.
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s [-Px] = s] Px [
s] Px |= U (3(s -L Px)
«] (x = U) [= U -L (i(x) = i(y)))
SJ -1(f) [= sU | [</>]
4 4> A [= si <t> [Us] i/j [
s] 3a; [= s]x[
s]a;[= {n = i(x | *) | i G s}
(the state just like s except that it assigns x to *.)
s [T Px} = s][ Px |
s][ Px ][= s] Px [ [Px]
(One could also give a clause for disjunction, s] <t> V ip [= s] (f) [ns] V [= s] <t> [] r/> b
but since DPL lacks one, so does RDPL.)
The basic downdate clause has the effect of expanding the set of assignments to one
which does not support Px. Conversely to the DPL update clause for negations, down-
dating by, or "forgetting", just adds to s all those assignmentswhich are non-absurd
under update by (f>.
The example given above can now be dealt with as a case of revision.
"A man and a boy came in. He was tall. No, not the man, the boy."
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«Mb] lTxi l~Tx] \Ty\ = {i <E s | i(x) € F(T)}j Tx [ [TyJ = s' JTxJ for some
s' D s such that s' Tx = s" such that Vi € s", i (= Ty
The downdate clause for the existential needs some elaboration. It is intended to
interpret utterances in dialogue such as,
Example 22 "Someone at home will feed the cat."
"
No, there isn't anyone at home."
[3xCxj 1 3x |
Such a statement is interpreted as retracting a prior claim in the dialogue that some
x exists, not just that it has a particular property. Importantly, the second sentence in the
above example cannot be interpreted as Cx" (retraction of information about an in¬
definite). Rather, it seems to be a retraction of the indefinite expression from the current
dialogue. It's not that there is someone who has the property of not being at home, but
that the previously introduced indefinite cannot be employed any further. This has the
effect of "killing" the variable x. For example, one cannot continue the above dialogue
with "They can cook the dinner." The indefinite is no longer available for anaphoric ref¬
erence after being the subject of the retraction of an existential claim. However, such a
statement does not reduce the dialogue to absurdity (as prescribed in FOTEjj). For¬
mally, this is achieved by mapping x to a "null" element * g D, whose name is 0. Once
a variable is associated with this name, it is no longer available for further use. I shall
return to these issues at the close of the chapter.
Retraction of identity information moves to a superstate of s in which the identity
statement is not supported - that is, where one of the variables in question is possibly
assigned to some new individual or individuals, and thus found to lack some property
which the other retains. The clause ismeant to account for the following type of example
(where "the boy" and "the suspect" are both indefinites).
Example 23 "The boy had dark hair, the suspect had dark hair"
"No, the suspect is not the boy."
s]x = y[
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Due to distinguishability (12), it is not the case that both the boy and the suspect retain
their properties, but one is forced to lose some property which the other retains. Re¬
tracted identity statements can be re-imposed if it is learnt (via update) that the "lesser"
of the two individuals has the additional property after all, or if the other individual
is discovered (via downdate or revision) not to have the additional property after all.
These issues are more properly the subject of chapter 6.
It turns out that RDPL is completewith respect to FOTE supplemented with the fol¬
lowing theory contraction clauses (dub this system FOTCj). The result deals with the¬
ory change through growing and shrinking sets of naming functions n : Vars —> Cons,
whose semantical counterparts are DPL states.
Definition 47 (FOTCj contraction clauses)
T,n—Pt = f)a(T ± Pnt),n
T, n—->0 = f){T' | T' C T and Bic € N : T', n + 0 7^ C,w}
T, n—3x = T,u such that u = n(x \ 0)
T, n—(0 A 0) = (T, n—0) U (T, n—0)
T, n—(t = t') = fl a(T -L nt = nt'),n
5.4.4 Completeness of FOTCi wrt RDPL
Theorem 14 The update and extension clauses are the same as the preceding theorem (for DPL
and FOTE). Here m denotes the single static model, and I and give the result in terms ofupdates
and downdates on sets of namings/ variable assignments s and u in that theory/ model.
(1) Th(m), s + 0 = Th(m), s [0|
(2) T, s + 0 = T, u iff u = s [0]
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(3) Th(m), 8-<f> = Th(m), sj <j> [
(4) T, s-0 = T,u iff u = s] <p [
Proof:
Update/extension clauses (1 and 2) follow from van Eijck's proof connecting DPL and
FOTE (see [96] page 10, in [23] page 258). The other parts are very similar, but that they
connect contraction and downdate clauses.
For example;
Th(m), s—3x = Th(m), s(x | 0) = Th(m), s]x[= Th(m), s] 3x |
The other clauses are similar, if less interesting.
Part (4)
T,s-0 = T,w iff Th(Mod(T)), s—(j) = Th(Mod(T)),u
iff by part (3)Th{Mod(T)), s-<f> = Th(Mod(T)), sj <j> |
iff u = sj (j> [
5.5 Dynamic Modal PL, FUL, and FOTEm,
Overall I attempt to give a reformulation of Modal DPL adapted to the logic ofRevision
Semantics. The project has much in common with EDPL (Dekker [21]) and DMPL [97],
where DPL is given an underlying Update Logic. In preparation for the full change sys¬
tems, systems of extension and update are investigated first.
In FOTEm (van Eijck's second system) theories can be extended with negative infor¬
mation (denoted T — f>) as well as positively. In general, this amounts to extending by
the negation of the sentence in question, so that; T,n — <f — T,n + -x/>
Definition 48 (FOTEni)
T,n + Rt\... tm = Cl(T\J{Rnti. ..ntm}),n
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T,n+ -></> = f]{T' \T' DT,3w € N-T',n + (j) = C, w}
T,n '(p = T',n iff 3w : T,n + (p = T", w
T,n + (<i = t2) = Cl{T[}{nt\ = nt2}),n
T,n — (ti = t2) = Cl(T\J{-i(nti = nt2)}),n
T, n + 3x = T, n(x | c), c € Cons
T,n — 3x — C,u
T,n + cp A ip — B,u such that T,n + cp — C,w and C,w + ip — B,u
= (T,n + <p) +ip
7> - <M V = (T - 0) n (U{T' \T',w = (T,n + <f>)-ip}),n
T,n + Ocp = T,n iff T,n + </> C
= C,n iff Vw, T,n + (p = C,w
T,n — Ocp — T,n iff T,n + cp ^ C
= C,n iff Vw, T,n + <p = £,w
Van Eijck proves that if the shared domain of the models under consideration is fixed,
FOTEm is complete with respect to DMPL (Dynamic Modal Predicate Logic). When
First-Order Theory Change Systems with Semantics 160
the domain is canonical (ie: changes with respect to identity statements), then the sys¬
tem is linked to First-OrderUpdate Logic. Note some peculiarities of the above (as trans¬
lated from the original): clauses for positive and negative extension bymodals are iden¬
tical23, and denial of the existential leads to absurdity24.
The semantics of DMPL (see van Eijk and Cepparello [97])defines an interpretation
function over sets of models sharing a fixed domain D, an input set of assignments n,
and an output set of assignments u, to sets of first-order models over D. The relation \=n
is the standard "satisfaction in state n" relation for FOL. Identity is a test on the current
state, negation is state subtraction, conjunction passes along variable assignments, and
existential quantification randomly assigns individuals to variables. Updates actually
eliminate possible models which do not support the new information.
Definition 49 (Semantics ofDMPL)
s [J?ti ... fm] ™ = {i€s|n = rt and i [=n Rt\ ... tm}
s [fi = Uj " = {i € s | n — u and i \=n (t\ = t2)}
sM u = {( F s \ n = u and there is no r such that i e s [</>] "}
s If A ip} ™ = {i e s | 3w such that ids [<^>] 2, [^1 „ }
s [3x] % = s iff u = n(x | d), 3d € D
s [[o^l u — s iff n = u and 3r : s [0J " ^ 0
23But surely, denial of a possibility is not equivalent to its assertion. Rather, the clause should be: T,n —
0(f> = T,n iff T,n + <f> = C
= C,n iff Vt', wT, n + <j> ^ C, w
24As noted earlier, this is surely too drastic a measure.
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Completeness of DMPL with respect to FOTEni
Theorem 15 (van Eijck 1993)
(1) Th(s),n + (f> = Th(s [0] ™),u
(2) Th(s),n — (f) = Th(s [—>^>] ™),u
and ifT is closed, and full and exhaustive over Cons, then also:
(3) T,n + f = T', u iff Cmod{T) [$>J ™ = Cmod(T')
Where Cmod(T) is the set of all models for T over the canonical domain Cons=, con¬
structed with respect to the identity statements holding in T (construct the domain by
setting a = b iff (a = b) e T). Since T is full over Cons, this operation defines an
equivalence relation on Cons. As van Eijck shows, states can be defined for Cons=, but
there is no need to distinguish them from states for Cons. (The main point here is that
T = Th(Cmod(T)) for closed T which is exhaustive and full over Cons, so that (3) fol¬
lows.)
If the restriction to full theories, or a single domain for the models is dropped, the sys¬
tem FOTEm is then complete with respect to a system of First-Order Update Logic or
FUL.
5.5.1 First-order Update Logic (FUL)
The system FUL (see van Eijck's [96]) allows for growth of knowledge about identities25.
Its semantics is given in terms of sets of canonical models (as described above), an input
state, and an output state. Identity statements provide constraints on the equivalence
components of the canonical models.
The system allows for an analysis of growth of knowledge about identity relations. The
set of equivalence classes on Cons (the domain of "proto-individuals") is updated through
interpretation of identity statements. If 9 is an equivalence class on Cons, then Conse
is a domain of individuals. Now restrict attention to canonical models, with domains
Conse.
25DMPL does not since there true identities are "epistemically necessary"; s \x = y] ™ = {i e s \ nx =
ny} = s or 0. Thus, as van Eijck mentions, in DMPL, s |x = j/] ^ = s [0(x = y)] ™ = s |D(a; = y)] £
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Canonical models26 are ordered pairs i = (im,ie)• Where im is a "proto-model" over
Cons, called the proto-model component of i, and ie is the equivalence component of i. The
members of each ie class have the same properties (they respect the signature of the
model).
Definition 50 (FUL)
• s {P(ti... fn)] 1 = {i € s | n = u and im \=n P(h ■ ■ ■ tn)}
• S [fi = <2] u ~ ^ S I 71 = U (ntl = ^ ^
• s h<t>l u = {i e S | n = u and there is no w such that i € s [<£J ™ }
• s If Aip}™ = {i e s \ 3w such that i€s[CHa}
• s [3x] u = s iff 3c € Cons such that u = n(x \ c)
• s [0</>] u = s iff n = u and 3w such that s [(/»] ™ ^ 0
Here, update by identity information is no longer a test on the current state, but imposes
constraints on the equivalence components of the canonical models. Note also that the
clause for the existential no longer deals with individuals in the domain of the models,
but in names. This reflects the move away from reference to "real individuals", to ref¬
erence to "proto-individuals" instead.
FUL and FOTEm are connected in the following way, where s is a set of canonical mod¬
els;
Theorem 16 (van Eijck 1993)
Th(s),n + f = Th(s
26See [96] for full details.
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and ifT is closed, and exhaustive over Cons, then also (as for DMPL):
T,n + 4> = T',u iff Cmod(T) [0] £ = Cmod(T')
5.5.2 Adding Downdates and Revision
Here, I indicate how van Eijck's FOTEjjj can bemade into a genuine FOTC system, and
might be given a semantics along the lines of a Revisable DMPL. The result would be a
semantics of theory change which handles revision of anaphoric information as well as
dialogue-external (truth-conditional) information.
Later, I show how LUL can be given the same treatment.
5.5.3 Revisable DMPL
Revisable DMPL is simply DMPL with a mixture of downdate clauses from RDPL and
RMPL, and a revision clause. Unsurprisingly, it can be connected to a theory change sys¬
tem based on FOTEnr ■ Updates and downdates by atomic formulae (reflecting dialogue-
external inputs) now no longer (as in DPL and RDPL) just test the current state, but ac¬
tually change it.
Definition 51 (RDMPL)
Add the following clauses to DMPL:
sj Pti . . . tm lu= U P(s -U Pti... tm),n = u
S1 E=sU 1 14>] nu
S1 x = y lu= {i € s \ n = u and s x = y}
sj (p Aip [2= sj <j> EUs] ip [;n.u
sj 3x E= s iff u = n(x | *), * 6 D
S1 0<t> \u= s iff s 1 </> E# s
Revisions:
S1 ^ Iw Vt>\ wu
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Note the clause for downdates of identity statements in the above, defined as a test
that the current state does not support the identity information. Analogouslywith inter¬
pretation of "discourse-external" information in DPL and RDPL, update and downdate
by identity information in DMPL and RDMPL is simply a test on the current state.
That is, in (R)DMPL, either s \x = y\ „ = s or 0 and in RDMPL s] x = y [£= s or 0
FRL, on the other hand, incorporates genuine update and downdate of identity infor¬
mation. This dynamic treatment of identity information can be applied to the semantics
of various dialogues.
RDMPL is complete with respect to the following theory change system.
Definition 52 (FOTCn)
Add the following clauses to FOTEjn
T, n-Pt\ ... tm = fl a(T _L Pt\... tm),n
T, n-^f = fl{T' | T' C T and 3w 6 IV, T', n + </> f C, w}
T, n—3x = T,u = n(x \ 0)
T, n—((p A ip) = (T, n—f) U (T, n—ip)
T, n—(x = y) = T,n iff (nx = ny) f T
T, n—Of = T,n iff T, n—f f 0
Revision:
T, n+f = (T, n—-«t>) + <j>
Theorem 17 (RDMPL and FOTCn)
In addition to the usual connection between state update and theory expansion (due to van Eijck,
presented above),
(1)Th(s),n-<t> = Th(s}(t>lZ),u
(2)Th(s), n+f = Th(s][ (f> ]["), u
and ifT is closed, and full and exhaustive over Cons, then also:
(3)T, n-<f> = T', u iff Cmod(T)\ f \l= Cmod{T')
(4)T, n+f = T', u iff Cmod(T)\ <f> ]["= Cmod(T')
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Proof:
items 2 and 4 are trivial consequences of items 1 and 3, together with van Eijck's results.
The other proofs are available by combination of the results for RMPL and RDPL, for ex¬
ample:
Item(l):
as for RMPL and FOTC, but for the following clauses (involving negation and anaphoric
information):
Th(s), n—-iPx = H{T' I T' C Th{s) and 3w e N,T',n + (p ^ C,w) = Th(sU j
[Par] ), n
— Th(s] -iPx [),n
Th(s),n—3x = Th(s),u — n{x | 0)
Th({i G s | i(x) = *} = Th(s]x[) = T/i(s! 3Px [), u
Item(3) as for DMPL, but with contraction and downdate:
if T is closed, full and exhaustive over Cons, then
T = Th(Cmod(T)), and
T, n-<f> = T1, u iff Th(Cmod(T)),n—<p = Th(Cmod(T')),n iff by part (1)
Th(Cmod(T)), s-cfi = Th{Cmod(T)j 0 £), u iff
Cmod(T)J (f> K= Cmod(T')
5.5.4 Adding some modals
It is a simple enoughmatter to extend the account of the epistemic modals ("possible, in-
dispensible, disposable, prohibited") offered in chapter 4 to the first-order case. Again,
the notation here is somewhat misleading, because appearance of a formula between
"dynamic" interpretation brackets usually signals a change in information state. How¬
ever, as usual, these modals are static tests which only change the state if they fail.
1. s [Op] ™ = {i£s\n = u and 3r, s [p] ™ 7^ 0}
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2. s [Dp] u = {iGs|n = ?i and 3r, s] p ["= 5}
3. s] Op [2= {i £ s | n = u and 3r, s] p 5}
4. sj Up |JJ= {i€s|n = u and 3r, s [p] J? = 0}
Of course, one could also give a first-order constructive "dynamic modal" along the
lines of CRS (from chapter 4).
Results
In RDMPL, consider the "theory" that "Ann, Bill and Cathy were on holiday." Then
Cons = {a, b, c}, s = l G s \ i |= Ha A Hb A He}, and Vm G Cons, n{m) = m. When
only names are involved here, suppress the assignments/ namings.
"Maybe someone was ill" is consistent, so long as the variable x for 'someone' can
consistently be associated with the name of a (possibly) ill person.
s [OPx] u — s iff 3m € Cons, u = n(x | m), and s [Pra] 2 ^ 0
"Everyone might have been ill. Ann wasn't ill" is consistent:
s [VxOAx] [-Ma] = s [CMa A OAb A OAc] [-Ma] = s [-Ma] ^ 0
Quantifying in: "Maybe someone was ill. Ann wasn't ill" is consistent:
s [OSaMcc] [-Ma] = s [-Ma] ^ 0
"Ann was ill. There must have been someone who was ill" is consistent:
s [Aa] [SxDAx] = s [Aa] ] 3xAx [= s [Aa] ] Aa, Ab, Ac [v= s [Aa] ^ 0
"Ann was ill. Someone must have been ill" is consistent:
s [AaJ [3a:DAa:] = s [Aa] [DAa V OAb V DAc] = s [Aa] ^ 0
"Somebody wasn't ill. Maybe everybodywas ill" is inconsistent:
s [3x-Mx] [OVaMx] = S [-Ma V ->Ab V -Mc] [VxA.r] = 0
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Now try a revision:
"Everyone might have been ill. Ann wasn't ill. No, Ann was ill." is consistent:
s [V:rOA:r] [-Aa] ][ Aa ][= s [OAa A OAb A OAc] [-Aa] ][ Aa ][= s [-Aa] ][Aa ][=
s [-Aa] ] -.Aa | [Aa] = s [Aa] # 0
5.5.5 First-Order Revision Logic
"First-order Revision Logic" (FRL) is an extension of van Eijck's FUL with first-order
downdates and revisions. FRL allows for genuine growth, loss, and revision of knowl¬
edge about identities (as well as the usual dialogue-internal and external information
change).
The basic idea is that contractions of identity statements downdate the equivalence classes
ie on Cons. Downdating by identity statements relaxes conditions on the equivalence
components of the canonical models. All other downdates and revisions work in the
same way as in RDMPL.
Definition 53 (FRL clauses)
Add the RDMPL downdate and revision clauses to FUL, but for the following exceptions:
«] x = V lu= U ±n (x = y)), n — u
s] 3x ["= s iff u = n(x | 0), 0 G Cons
So, as in FUL, existential quantification is about "proto-individuals" or names. Down-
date by an identity statement x = y now increases the set of canonical models under
consideration, to include some models whose equivalence components do not support
the identity statement nx = ny.
Theorem 18 (FRL and FOTCn)
Where s is a set of canonical models for Cons, and - and -j- are the theory contraction and
revision operations of FOTCn respectively,
(1) Th(s),n—(j) = T7i(s] <f> ["), u
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(2) Th(s),n+<t> = Th(s}[ 0E),u
and ifT is closed, and exhaustive over Cons, then also:
(3) T, n—(f> = T\ u iff Cmod(T)\ </> [£= Cmod(T')
(4) T, n+cj) = T1, u iff Cmod(T)][ <f> ][£= Cmod(T')
Proof: by composition of the RDMPL and FUL results, but for the above two clauses.
The reasoning is analogous to the preceding results.
This concludes the exposition of the hierarchy of revisable systems of dynamic se¬
mantics based on van Eijck [96]. The result is a variety of systems for the processing of
different types of information change. FRL, the last of the systems, can process changing
information about theworld, about (provisional) identity statements, and about anaphoric
relations. However, there is a price to be payed for the "dynamic" identity statements
of FUL and FRL; models no longer contain individuals, but some less "ontologically
pure" objects instead. Chapter 6 investigates a variety of possible approaches to such
"dialogue referents".
5.6 Prospects and Conclusions
To conclude the chapter, I sketch some possible further developments, which depart
from some of the assumptions of the preceding systems.
5.6.1 FOTC with growing domains
Agents commonly introduce new names and variables in dialogue, in the hope (or knowl¬
edge) that they refer.
Formally, modelling this is fairly trivial. Simply drop the assumption that the set of
names (Cons) is constant, and assume instead that it grows only under theory expan¬
sion, or state update, in the following way:
(D+) Cons(T, n + <p) = Cons(T) U Cons(4>)
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where Cons(<f>) is just the set of constants appearing in 0. The resulting TheoryChange
system would be complete with respect to RMPL where individuals in the domain are
employed as denotations of newly introduced names.
5.6.2 Free Logic for Existential contractions
More interestingly, consider the issue of losing names and variables from a theory (as in
the downdate clause for the existential in RDPL). To ask for an example of a name that
is now no longer in use generates a paradox. Nevertheless, there are names that are
no longer in common usage, for example, "braddle", "bubblecar", or "chivalry". More
dramatically, there are names which people use in full knowledge that they fail to refer
("Batman"), and even names which are non-fictional and non-referring ("phlogiston").
On yet other names the jury is still out (consider, "superstrings," or "the antichrist.")
Formally, the question becomes: Under what conditions does the domain of a theory
shrink? The classic answer is that terms which are found to be non-denoting should be
removed from a theory (eg: phlogiston, ether, witches). Whilst in the case of scientific
theories such cases are quite rare, in the case of dialogue-based theories such terms can
be quite common, for example "the person who stole my hat" ceases to be an operative
discourse referent whenever I find that I've just misplaced it, and this constitutes gen¬
uine growth of knowledge. In the systems above, a "null" individual with no properties
was used to accommodate such cases.
There are various candidates for conditions under which domains ought (rationally) to
be contracted. Non self-identical objects are presumably to be excluded from theories,
for example.
The case of objects with contradictory properties is less clear. Certain cases in the his¬
tory of sciencemight be mentioned here, but a focus on dialogue brings up similar cases;
agents do not stop referring toMarywhen they are told that she both is and is not com¬
ing to their party, they want to know which it is.
Agents can discover that a name is non-referring, or at least somehow dubious in some
way, when it accumulates contradictory properties. In such a situation there are at least
three options. The first is to just remove the offending term from the domain of dis¬
course (but this is too brutal); another is to adopt an outer domain semantics in a free-
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logic, to which the offending terms are exiled (a Meinongian approach.) I consider the
latter option anon. Finally paraconsistent predicate logics may be explored, the intu¬
ition being that inconsistent objects are exiled to an outer domain of "paraconsistent"
or impossible objects. For the moment, though, let us stay classical.
Consider a new rationality postulate: it says that under removal of a name from a
theory ,T—3c, all equivalent constants should also be removed.
ci = C2 G T => C2 $ T—3ci
But this is far too strong for our purposes, for example: "Smith is the murderer"
"But there is no murderer - Jackie is alive and well!"
S \m = s] ] 3m [ [.Aj A Wjj
One ought not to conclude from this that Smith no longer exists, unless, perhaps, the
onlyway inwhich Smithwere involved in the theory is by virtue of the "murderer prop¬
erty". Rather, it seems, removal of a name should result in the removal of all statements
involving that name (including identities of course) from the theory.
So now take the new postulate to be:
(N3) T—3c \f a, \/a G T such that c G Cons(a)
Formally then, let existential claims be part of a theory, so that intuitively, if 3c G T
then T contains the claim that the object named by constant c exists. Modify the syn¬
tax and semantics accordingly. Any formula in which c appears implicitly contains the
claim that d, where n(c) = d, exists. There are now expressions such as 3c V -dci to deal
with.
Thus, T h 3c o c £ Cons{T) and semantically,
s 3c Vi G s, i(c) G D
This has the following ramifications in a theory revision system;
T,n + 3c = Cl(TU{3c}),n
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(D-) T, n—3c = H a(T -L 3c), n(c \ c')3c' / c6 Cons(T)27
(D+) Cons(T + 3c) = Cons(T) U {c}
Note that when a name is lost it can no longer be used in the naming part of configura¬
tions. In the semantics then, simply;
s [3cJ = {i € s | i(c) e Dom(s)}
(where Dom(s) denotes the shared domain of the set of models s), and,
(D-) s] 3c |= U P(s -L 3c)
Conjecture: (Completeness of FOTRdom- wrt RMPLdom-)
Th{s [3c] ) = T + 3c and Th(s] 3c [) = T-3c
Mod{T + 3c) = s [3c] and Mod{T-3c) = s] 3c [
It seems to be the case (see chapter 6) that people do not cease to be able to use dis¬
course referents which they neverthelessbelieve are non-referring. To this end, one could
partition the domain of discourse referents as in a free logic; Dom(i) is the domain of
"operational" referents, while D'(i) is the domain of "dubious" or generally sketchy,
referents. Thus RMPLfree models are of the form
i = (Dom(i), D'(i), F)
The intuition here is that certain names are found to denote in D'{i), and that this is
genuine growth of knowledge which nevertheless does not result in the eradication of
the referring expression (from the theory) or the referent (from the model). In fact, for
communication purposes, is seems vital that the discourse "referent" is still operative,
albeit non-referring, so that such information can be shared with other agents.
"No, there is no murderer. Jack isn't dead after all!"
Thus, retraction of existential claims now no longer involves a diminishing domain but
instead the assignment of objects in D'(i) to variables and names.
First ensure that:
D'(i) n Dom(i) = 0 (Disjoint sets)
Then replace (D-) with (Dfree):
27n(c | c) is the naming just like n but that c is replaced by c'
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3i G st such that i(c) 6 D' => 3c T
Of course, quantification now ranges only over Dom(i).
5.6.3 Summary and Conclusions
I hope to have made the following contributions in this chapter.
1. The exploration of intuitionistic approaches to modelling first-order theory growth
and change.
2. The development of several first-order systems of theory change.
3. The demonstration that FOTC systems are associated with interesting systems of dy¬
namic semantics.
After investigating the possibility of a non-truth-persistentQuantified Intuitionistic Logic,
and analysing of the capacity of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic to accommodate cases
where information not only grows, but changes (is defeasible), I argued that the best
way to accommodate information loss in semantics is through genuine AGM-style ra¬
tional contraction.
Some basic rationality constraints on first-order theory change systems were then de¬
veloped.
Next, after reviewing connections between dynamic semantics and systems of first-order
theory extension, a variety of systems of first-order theory change were connected to
revisable systems of dynamic semantics. Different strategies were called for in order to
model changing information about the world, about anaphoric relationships, and about
identities.
The approach taken in this chapter has the following virtues:
• The systems avoid stacks of information stateswhen computing information revision.
• The proposals are technically, as well as philosophically, interesting. Extending AGM
theory change and Revisable Dynamic Semantics to the predicate logical case raises
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important issues to do with the (semantical and syntactical) behaviour of quantifiers,
names, identities, and anaphoric relations under change.
• The approach commends a family of new systems for further study.
This concludes the purely formal development of the thesis. The remainder of the
work consists of applying the systems developed herein in an analysis of corrections
and a formal model of communication (chapter 7), and a discussion of possible variants
of those systems (paraconsistency and autonomy, in chapter 8). The idea of changing in¬
formation about names, variables, and "proto-individuals" emerging from the systems
of this chapter, motivates the discussion of the next.





Linguistic Data: analysing theory
changes in communication
"A prerequisite to a theory of the way agents understand speech acts is a theory of how
their beliefs and intentions are revised as a consequence of events."
(Appelt and Konolige, [4], p. 1)
6.1 Overview
The basic picture from preceding chapters should by now be evident. Dialogues are
taken to modify the epistemic states of agents; the contents of their theories. Commu¬
nication is to be described as theory change, or iterated belief revision, such that agents
converge upon a mutually agreeable theory about the world; how it is, was, may be, or
may become.
This chapter is not intended to provide a full formal account of constituent negation,
but to show how the systems of previous chapters may be applied in such an analysis.
A full account is beyond the scope of this work, but I claim that it would have to employ
a framework much like the one offered in this thesis - where information states and in¬
terpretations are revisable. Here I provide distinctions and classfications in an analysis
of correction data, and point out the route that a more detailed accountwould take. The
axioms for speech acts at the close of the chapter indicate quite formally how the sys¬
tems may be applied in a theory of communication.
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In this chapter, an analysis of various linguistic phenomena (corrections, repairs, nega¬
tions, editing terms, intonation) is provided,which is further evidence for the thesis that
theory change is an integral part of communicative behaviour. The examples given also
serve as data that a dynamic semantics of communication ought to be able to cover.
Many of the claims made, although explicitly about dialogues, also hold for a full se¬
mantics of discourse - due to phenomena of self-repair.
The linguistic evidence to be presented in this chapter illustrates the necessity (if the
goal of empirical adequacy is to be met) of the first-order theory change systems and Re¬
vision Semantics developed in the preceding chapters. Thus the transition of the pre¬
ceding chapters, from propositional to first-order theory change, is seen to be required
by the linguistic evidence.
This chapter also raises some more pragmatic issues concerning rational agenthood
in general, and speech acts by which theory-revision can be supported. In general, I
explore the structure of information states manipulated in dialogue by rational agents.
This is an empirical enterprise to the extent that we have intuitions as to the likely (and
warranted) theory-transitions of an agent within a particular dialogue context. Indeed,
that we have such intuitions is the very fact that makes strategic dialogue, and commu¬
nication, possible at all. An important source of empirical supportwill bemini-dialogues
involving corrections in both discourse and dialogue, employing constituent negation clauses
in particular. These examples result in an analysis of (some instances of) negation (and
words like 'but' and 'except') as triggers, cues, or instructions for theory contraction and
revision. Intonation is also examined as an important cue as to the correction intended
by a speaker.
In addition, some more general dialogue strategies and contributions are analysed
as contractions or revisions of information states:
1. Suspension of Disbelief - contraction 'for the sake of argument'
2. Negative Definitions of concepts.
For example; "Red ants are exactly the same as black ants - except that they're red."
3. Qualified Universals - defaults.
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For example; "Everybody likes the Beatles - exceptpeople who have never heard them."
4. Counterfactual Conditionals
5. Future Conditionals
6.2 Theory manipulation in dialogue
I have argued for a view of communication as construction and revision of agent-relative
theories, or their contents: epistemic states. A next step is to explore the internal struc¬
ture of these information states as exhibited by their manipulation in dialogue. Suffice
it to say that the burden of preceding chapters has been to provide algorithms which,
given utterances analysed into logical form, construct and revise theories and informa¬
tion states. I assume that such theories and states are partial, revisable, andmay be para-
consistent on occasion. Howmight the systems developed in the preceding chapters be
employed in a model of communication?
6.2.1 General features of the model
Each agent is assumed to employ two interdependent information 'spaces'. The most
important one for the analysis presented here is their current interpretation of the di¬
alogue as it stands; this has been the province of formal semantics to date. The other
vital domain of interpretation enters the picture when one begins to consider theory
change processes instigated by belief integration. Communication has to take into ac¬
count the fact that interpretations of utterances may not "fit" informationally with the
hearer's own epistemic state; the actualities or possibilities towards which the hearer
has epistemic attitudes. The fact that some kind of integration (unification or revision)
happens between information constructed from discourse and dialogue interpretation
and an agent's own information (memory, knowledge, beliefs) leads to two conclusions.
The first being that the information structures derived from utterances and those char¬
acterising "beliefs" (or background information) must be (at some level) comparable1.
Also see Kamp's (1985) Unity of Thought and Information [62] and compatible. The
'see Asher in [49]
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second conclusion is that an adequate semantics of communication must take account
of background information and revisions relative to it, because they have a direct effect
on dialogue interpretation, communicative strategy, and linguistic behaviour in general
(see the arguments in chapter 1).
It was noted that the two "information spaces" are interdependent; in that inferences
available in the "background" space influence dialogue interpretation, and that revi¬
sions instigated by dialogue interpretation may change the content of the background
space. As an idealization, agents are taken to (attempt to) incorporate dialogue informa¬
tion into the background space at the close of each sentence. This process of "suspen¬
sion of disbelief" whilst processing each sentence can, in reality, obviously go on much
longer (for example, while considering an argument presented by a speaker). The issue
of the incrementality of revisions and interpretations is an interesting one, but it is as¬
sumed in this simple model that a sentence close triggers the revision process. A differ¬
entmodel might take each conversational turn as the revision trigger, or a finer-grained
incremental approach might try to revise after every sentential sub-clause.
Two important processes now clearly present themselves. The construction (but not the
revision) of dialogue interpretations in the "dialogue space" has, to a large extent, been
dealt with by dynamic semantics (though theory change will have important lessons for
the information structures developed therein.)
An important point to note is that each dialogue space is an agent-relative interpreta¬
tion of the utterance information. Each agent has their own stock of "dialogue referents"
and inferences which enable them to construct an interpretation. Thus there is no objec¬
tive agent external "dialogue content space" intowhich information is placed in order to
be "grasped". This allows agents to talk at cross purposes, mix up referents, and make
other common mistakes, as well as repair them. Indeed, part of the force of chapter 1
was the argument that agent-relative theories allow, and even necessitate, an account of
communication.
Linguistic Data: analysing theory changes in communication 179
6.2.2 Game-theoretical Dialogue Semantics
Dialogue has been analysed via the tools of game-theory (eg: Carlson [16], Houghton
and Isard [57]). In a game-theoretical analysis communicative interactions are classified
in terms of a limited repertoire of conversational moves open to each conversant. Each
utterance or "move" made in a dialogue "game" commits the participant making it to a
number of options or obligations; the public content of the dialogue. Thus, assertions are
taken to commit conversants to certain claims about the world. The underlying idea is
something like that employed in eliminative dynamic semantics; each utterance com¬
mits the speaker to "inhabit" or endorse a certain set of possibilities.
The treatment of dialogue offered by game-theoretical analysis is not, then, fundamen¬
tally at odds with the project of this thesis. The research here modifies and extends the
approach offered by game-theory, rather than challenging it directly. In addition to an
analysis of assertions, a Dynamic Semantics of dialogues employing information state
revisions offers an analysis of retraction and correction in dialogue.
In particular, however, the notion of public content of a dialogue in a game-theoretical
analysis is troublesome. That such a common-ground or shared information state is not
actually directly available to participants (ie: does not actually exist for them) was the
upshot of the deliberation over the "problem of communication" in chapter 1. Instead,
I employ each participant's version of the dialogue-theory (their minimally derivable
theories produced by the dialogue), to do something like the same work. This was part
of the "solution" to the problem. In practice I also assume that each participant can ac¬
tually remember all the utterances made in the dialogue (the idealization is that nobody
mis-hears, mis-remembers, or fails to infer.) To complicate matters a little, agents also
have "dormant" private doxastic states,which constitute their background information
about the world. When there is a mismatch between the background state and the state
derived from the dialogue theory, repair, revision, and querying occurs.
6.3 Repairs and Corrections in Dialogue
Carletta, Caley, and Isard [15] make the following claim;
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"Repairs can be used to investigate the cognitive processes underlying language
production because they are a visible trace of where those processes break down,
showing us the limits of those processes and something of how they interact with
each other."
Furthermore, as van Leusen recognises in her analysis [99] of corrections,
"an implementation that rises above the level of a toy example will put heavy re¬
quirements on a formal theory of discourse interpretation ... since corrections in¬
duce a revision of the contextual information, it should be possible to represent a
change of commitment of a participant towards a piece of contextual information."
This is, of course, precisely the formal job that the various systems of Revision Se¬
mantics developed earlier are supposed to do. I now turn to an analysis of corrections
(as well as other communicative phenomena) in terms of revision semantics.
Here I present and analyse some important data; corrections or repairs in discourse
and dialogue. A correction occurs when an utterance (the "correction" or "repair") is
contrastivewith a previous statement (the "correctum"2), such that the new information
supersedes or overrides information given in the previous statement. Prior utterances
set up the context in which the correction makes sense; a correction cannot just be made
a propos of nothing. There is also often an important structural parallelism between the
correction and the sentence which it repairs.
Four kinds of correction data will be distinguished; self-correction, hearer-correction,
content-correction, and non-content correction. I am most interested in content correc¬
tions of the hearer (where the information conveyed by a preceding speaker's statement
is under dispute). For example (throughout I use upper case letters to denote stress, and
letters A,B ... to denote distinct agents):
Example 24 (van Leusen 1994)
A: They gave Tim a blue kite.
B: No, they gave Tim a YELLOW kite.
Here the correction rejects certain information in the correctum and replaces it. The
predicate in focus ("yellow") is a contrastive parallel element to the predicate "blue",
so that the kite is now understood to be yellow, rather than blue and yellow. Note that
2In [15] this is termed the "OU", for "original utterance."
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the correction relies implicitly on shared background ("conceptual") beliefs about kites
and colours; the assumption that agents have background 'theories' about aspects of the
world which they may access freely during dialogue.
There is a delicate issue in deciding whether it is the predicate "yellow", or the identity
of the object (the kite), which is the focus of the correction here. Van Leusen assumes
that both the predicate and the referent are corrected (ie: that a different object of a dif¬
ferent colour is being referred to in the correction). However, it seems clear that there
is a genuine ambiguity here, which ought to be treated either one way or the other. My
intuitions are that where the referent is an indefinite object it is the predicate that is cor¬
rected, and where the referent is definite it is the identity of the object itself which is at
stake (again see chapter 8 for more discussion of these issues).
Again, the above example also indicates that one must distinguish between dialogue
referents and what is predicated of them.
Of related interest are "non-content corrections", which repair syntactic form, stylis¬
tic features, and general lexical confusion, but do not affect the content of the corrected
utterance.
Example 25 (van Leusen 1994)
A: Alan trapped the mongeese.
B: He trapped the monGOOSES, you mean.
There is no disagreement about the content of the correctum here.
Both content and non-content corrections obviously have a crucial part to play in
any theory of language acquisition. I shall not pursue such a theory here, but note that it
might employ techniques much like those made available by a Revision Semantics.
There are two kinds of content-correction data ofmajor interest; self-correction or self-
repair (in discourse) and hearer-correction (in dialogue). Self-correction occurs when an
agent wishes to repair one of its own (previous) utterances, or even part of a sentence
which is currently being produced. Hearer-correction is the repair of another speaker's
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preceding utterance by the current speaker.
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6.3.1 Self-correction
Levelt [73], Blackmer and Mitton [14], and Hieke [56], have collected self-repair data in
Dutch, English, and German. Carletta Caley and Isard [15] discuss the following exam¬
ple of Levelt's;
Example 26 "Go from left again to /uh .../from pink again to blue"
In the above example of self-repair the speaker realises that the word "left" is incorrect
and backtracks to make a correction.
Temporary memory failure can require a speaker to repair one of his or her own ut¬
terances;
Example 27 "I've read a few pages ofyour book. Ah, no, actually I read the whole first chapter
late last night."
Whatever the psychological processes (memory failure, confusion) giving rise to such
episodes, one thing is clear; speakers are at liberty to retract and revise previously con¬
veyed information. Such speakers do not mean actually to contradict themselves at all
(self-repair does not invoke self-contradiction). Rather, we interpret them as correct¬
ing themselves, retracting a previously made commitment, and replacing it with a new
one. The mechanisms of self-correction appear to be exactly the same as for multi-agent
(speaker) corrections; primarily constituent negation clauses. Thus the speaker appears
to treat his or her own prior utterances in the same way as utterances made by another
dialogue participant. Once made, all utterances are treated as "public property", as
commonly available (shared) information3.
3Speakers assume that participants understand our utterances unless it ismade obvious that they don't.
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6.3.2 Hearer Correction
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Hearer corrections are perhaps slightly less common than self-repairs. They arise from
the wish of a dialogue participant to revise information presented by another speaker.
Presumably a collection of hearer-corrections could also be culled from the Map Task
corpus. Noor van Leusen ([99], pp. 523-532) discusses the following dialogue correc¬
tion;
Example 28 A - The journalists are interviewing Arafat.
B - No, they're interviewing RABIN.
Obviously B's utterance is not to be interpreted as saying that the interviewers are also
interviewing Rabin. Nor is it the case that the dialogue degenerates into absurdity (p A
-ip; the interviewers are and are not interviewing Rabin.) Rather, the point is that in¬
formation in B's utterance is supposed to replace that provided by A. Note also that the
repair here is specifically directed to one part of the predicate-argument structure of A's
utterance, so that the correction makes use of the form of the previous sentence. Thus a
structural parallelism exists between the correction and the correctum. However, as van
Leusen shows, the parallelism is not between the surface syntactic forms of the correc¬
tum and correction:
Example 29 (van Leusen 1994)
A: Peter hit Michael.
B: No, HENRY was hit by him.
Here the corrected element (Michael) is direct object, while its correction is given as sub¬
ject (Henry). Thus, it seems that it is the thematic structure, rather than the syntactic struc¬
ture, that is shared by correction and correctum; 'Henry' and 'Michael' both take the
'theme' role in the sentences in which they occur.
This analysis leads to the following conjectures (see van Leusen [99]):
(1) Corrections utilize the thematic structure of the correctum.
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(2) Where correction and correctum share the same predicates,we compare and contrast
the arguments of those predicates which share thematic roles.
(3) Where correction and correctum share the same "objects" or predicate arguments,
we compare and contrast those predicates which share objects.
Note that in the Blue/Yellow Kite example it is the predicate itself which is the con-
trastive parallel element since the predicate is in focus, rather than the object. This exam¬
ple thus falls under case (3) above. Van Leusen loosely terms this a "conceptual paral¬
lelism", presumably because the correction relates to the properties of some 'conceptual
object'. A first-order revision semantics treats this as a case of change in the properties
of a "theoretical entity." Again, this was the subject of chapter 6.
Another kind of parallelism is illustrated by the following infelicitous example;
Example 30 (van Leusen 1994)
A: Mary taught Peter Latin during last year's holiday.
# B: No, she taught him Latin at the beach.
The correctum specifies a period in time, while the attempted correction specifies a
location. This example shows that the required parallelism is not structural, but seman¬
tical.
6.4 Analysis
Self-repairs and Hearer-repairs are to be analysed as information state revisions, in the
style of the systems of Revision Semantics given in preceding chapters.
In contrast to an approach in terms of "sequence semantics" [104], which assumes that
agents keep track of "stacks" of all their previous information states, an account in terms
of revision semantics does not require agents to manipulate anything other than their
current information states. The constituent negation clauses analysed here only make
use of information conveyed in utterances preceding the repair.
In terms of theory change, first-order logic is required to describe most of the above
examples. Consider the Arafat/Rabin example given above.
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Example 31 Let Cons = {a, r, I, m, n}, the names for Arafat, Rabin, and 3 journalists. As¬
sume also that background knowledge dictates that Arafat is not Rabin, and that no-one can in¬
terview themself.
Analyse A's assertion as an update ("The journalists are interviewing Arafat");
T = { Vi-i/ra, -i(a = r),-iJa,-<Jr, Jf Jm, Jn} +\/x(Jx —> Ixa) = {Vx-i/xx, ~<(a =
r), -iJa, —>Jr, Jl, Jm, Jn, Ila, Ima, Ina]
B's instruction is to revise T in the following way: contract the information that any journalist
is interviewing Arafat, and add the statement that they are all interviewing Rabin.
T—3x(Jx A Ixa) +VxJx —> Ixr = T\/{17a, Ima, Ina} + VxJx —► Ixr = {Vx->Ixx, ->(a =
r), -iJa, -'Jr, Jl, Jm, Jn, Ilr, Imr, Inr}
An analysis of this dialogue in dynamic semanticswould make use of the systemRDMPL
(tracking revisable dialogue-external information, without dynamic identity.) In terms
of theory change, the first system of FOTC could be used.
Change of Identity under correction
In some cases new information is accommodated by an existing dialogue referent; this
certainly is the case for simple updates, where new information is given as a predication
of the existing dialogue referent. During some repairs the referent survives correction
even though its properties have changed, and it inherits modifiers and arguments from
the correctum. However, as illustrated by the blue/yellow kite example, where predi¬
cates are the focus of correction, the issue can arise as to whether or not a new dialogue
referent comes into play. Sometimes it is more appropriate to assume that a new object
has been introduced to carry the correction information. 4 In these cases, an indefinite
introduced in a prior utterance is either found to change its properties (eg: from blue to
4Considering the analogy with scientific theories as long multi-agent dialogues the same issue crops
up; was Fresnel actually referring to the electromagnetic field in his theory of optics based on the "elastic
ether"? In other words, once Fresnel's theory underwent repair (via Maxwell's correction of his mistakes
about the nature of the ether), do we (liberally) accept that Fresnel was talking about the electromagnetic
field all along (even though he was wrong about its properties), or do we insist on a replacement of the
theoretical entity?
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yellow: Bx+Yx ), or to refer to a different individual.
These questions are dealt with by way of rationality constraints on objects under
change. Again, these issues are more the subject of chapter 6.
6.5 Mechanisms of Correction: Linguistic Cues for Theory Re¬
vision
One major task of this chapter is to reveal the kinds of theory revision strategies that lin¬
guistic agents actually use, by dint of some linguistic analysis. This analysis will sup¬
port the argument for the necessity of interpreting certain NL expressions as instruc¬
tions (or requests) to perform particular types of theory revision. These revision oper¬
ations will be found to be considerably more fine-grained than the account offered by
AGM theory5.
I investigate the following contraction and revision triggers:
• Constituent Negation
• Suspension of Disbelief - contraction 'for the sake of argument'
• Negative Definitions
• Qualified Universals - defaults
• Counterfactual Conditionals
• Future Conditionals
• Contractions of Sub-theories
6.5.1 Constituent Negation as Revision Cue
The capacity to interpret and employ constituent negation clauses for repairing linguis¬
tic information, in either discourse or dialogue, is not a particularly sophisticated one.
5This ought not to be a surprise. AGM theory change was never intended to deal with the phenomena
considered here.
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In fact we aquire these skills relatively early on in our linguistic development, if indeed
we acquire them at all. It may even be a prerequisite for language acquisition that cor¬
rections are interpreted properly by an agent. (It is certainly a prerequisite for language
teaching that corrections be produced properly by the teacher6.) For example, the fol¬
lowing behaviour, an example of constituent negation for self-correction, was exhibited
by a child of 46 months (pointing at a coloured block);
Example 32 "That one is yellow. No, that one is orange."
Nick Asher [5] mentions the use of constituent negation following an assertion by a
dialogue partner7. For example,
Example 33 A:"Zebedee and Ermintrude are going to visit Dougal."
B: "No, it's not Ermintrude who's going with Zebedee, but Dylan."
Notice that a truth-conditional view of the meaning of B's utterance (that Dylan and
Zebedee are going to see Dougal) does not capture its real character; that it is an attempt
to correct A's assertion. Current dynamic accounts do not fare much better however (in
fact many fare much worse, since they classify B's utterance as rendering absurdity). A
dynamic account of linguistic interpretation can only account for the above dialogue if
it offers an account of revision.
The above example allowsmore specific inferences to be drawn. That the negation in B's
utterance only has scope over the proper name "Ermintrude" tells us something about
the information structure that is being manipulated here. B's instruction to A is to re¬
place just one part of his previous assertion, indeed to change one of the arguments
of one predicate. This analysis supports the claim that, in order to describe B's utter¬
ance adequately,wemust take the informationmanipulation involved to exploit at least
predicate-argument structure. In addition, this information content must be linked to
the surface syntactic form of B's utterance, from which underlying process of theory
6See [9]
7Apparently Hans Kamp brought this phenomenon to Asher's attention.
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revision is derived. Revision by constituent negation then exploits the grain of theory
structure underlying NL information states.
Constituent negations can be interpreted in two ways (depending on their force) -
as constituent retractions of information (via "downdate") or as revision instructions.
For example, in "No, it's not Ermintrude who's going with Zebedee, but Dylan",
the negation clause is a constituent retraction instruction, and "Dylan" fills the result¬
ing 'gap'. However, in "No, DYLAN went with Zebedee" the force of the constituent
negation is that of a revision instruction. Notice that B's revision instruction need not
be in response to an explicit assertion from A, for agent B may have inferred that A has
some information that needs revision. In addition, of course, A's autonomy means that
he is not forced to accept B's instruction. A understands what B intends as an appro¬
priate revision, and then judges whether or not to carry out his instruction. Autonomy
implies that acceptance of the revision instruction is not automatic. This is a complexity
that is ignored in most work on revision (AGM revision just gives priority to the most
recent information), but I shall have more to say on the matter in the next chapter8 .
The investigation proceeds by finding expressions that can occur in the scope of con¬
stituent negation. I claim that each of these expression types can be interpreted as the
argument of a theory change or state revision function.
As expected, propositions can appear in the scope of constituent negation,
Example 34 "No, arithmetic is incomplete."
This example licenses the AGM unit of revision and contraction (the proposition) as ap¬
plicable to NL revision. However, more fine-grained units of revision are common.
Predicates (adjectival expressions) can also appear in the scope of constituent negation,
Example 35 A:"Whoever smashed that window was an idiot"
B:"No, he wasn't an idiot, he was just unlucky."
8see Chapter 8: Paraconsistency, Autonomy, and Change
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Determiners (and quantifiers) can also be the arguments of a revision function,
Example 36 A:"Everyone hates that idiot who smashed the window"
B:"No, not everyone, just a few people."
Example 37 A:"Only a few people here eat meat."
B:"No, actually everyone here eats it."
Modifiers appear in corrections too,
Example 38 (van Leusen 1994)
A: "Mary taught Peter Latin during last year's holiday."
B: "No, she taught him Latin 3 YEARS AGO."
The following example also illustrates inheritance of the modifier from the correctum:-
Example 39 (van Leusen 1994)
A: "Soon after twelve o'clock, everybody left."
B: "Well, MOST people left." (soon after twelve o'clock.)
Agents can dispute universals and conditionals, which have a more radical effect on
the content of a dialogue,
Example 40 A:"IfJohn's got grandchildren, then his kids must be adults."
B:"No, his kids might be dead."
Example 41 A: "Every animal has a heart."
B: "No, not every animal. Slugs don't."
To summarize, then, I have observed that corrections using constituent negation have
scope over the following grammatical units:
1. propositions
2. determiners




Finally, the analysis presented above begs the question of limits on the types of ex¬
pression that can participate in revisions. In other words, which elements cannot fall
inside the scope of constituent negation?
Asher9 claims that grammar rules out sentences and ordinary conjunctions from the
scope of constituent negation. However, some of the examples given above use propo¬
sitions in the scope of constituent negation, and are perfectly well-formed.
All in all, the above examples suggest an analysis in terms of contraction and revision of
partial theories, and their underlying information structures. The process relies on con¬
traction of a certain expression from the hearer's current theory, and its replacement by
a different expression of the same semantical type. Constituent negation is analysed as
theory contraction specified by the focus of the correction, ascertained by way of struc¬
tural parallelism with the correctum, leaving a "gap" which may or may not require
filling. The combination of contraction ond subsequent update of that expression type
results in revision or correction
Note that constituentnegation is really a request or instruction to contract, and that it need
not be obeyed;
Example 42 A: "Jackie went to the cinema with John last night."
B: "No, he didn't go with Jackie."
If A accepts B's instruction, or carries out his request to contract, the result will be a
"gap" in A's information. Agent A will be more likely to carry out B's request if this
gap can be consistently filled with information offered by B; agents do not like to lose
information if they can avoid it (by conservation of information). Thus, there seems to
be room for a process of "suspension of disbelief" by the hearer, before he or she decides
either to accept or reject the requested contraction or correction.
9See [7] page 312.
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A's autonomymeans that he might need to be convinced that the retraction that B wants
him to accept is coherent, or consistent with his current theory. Suppose B detects A's
hesitancy in accepting the retraction; he might add,
B: "He went went with Kate."
So long as this correction is consistent with A's current theory, A (rationally) ought to
accept B's repair. Thus we can make the conjecture that an agent accepts a contraction
instruction on the proviso that the resulting revision is consistent with other informa¬
tion.
Another point to note is that revision instructions can be shared in amulti-agent con¬
text:
Example 43 A:"Everyone hates that idiot who smashed the window"
B:"No, not everyone does. Just a few people."
C: "And he's not an idiot, just unfortunate."
Finally, the recent phenomenon of post-sentential negation, often employed for comic
effect, might be analysed as a (playful) revision instruction.
Example 44 "You are so intelligent. ... not!"
This is another example of the proposition as a unit of revision. A sentence is asserted,
followed swiftly by its negation. So, corrections can also be used to comic effect.
6.5.2 Intonation and "Editing Terms" as revision cues
Intonation and stress patterns are often signals about what sort of revision the speaker
considers appropriate, while so called "editing terms" ( such as "uh", "sorry", "erm",
"no", "but", "I mean", "you mean") can be used both by speakers in self-correction or
by hearers who wish to interrupt and correct the current speaker.
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Example 45 "HE didn't write "Hamlet" (it was Marlowe.)"
The revision here has the effect of focussing on the subject as the candidate for repair
(rather than the name of the play itself.) People also use intonation to focus on an object
as repair candidate:
Example 46 "Jane didn't kiss SAM, it was Jack."
The next example shows how stress can be used to focus on predicates;
Example 47 "You may not believe it, but I didn't KISS her."
- this kind of denial disputes not the individuals involved, but the predication used to
relate them.
6.6 Other Theory Contractions
Andre Fuhrmann mentions some interesting examples of theory contractions dictated
by certain kinds of natural language constructions. Here I elaborate upon Fuhrmann's
considerations (in [35] p. 71 - 73), and discuss how they might be accommodated in a
fully fledged first-order Revision Semantics. I also add some classes of examples ofmy
own.
6.6.1 Contraction "for the sake of argument"
A strong motivation for considering theory change is the analysis of suspension of dis¬
belief, or contraction'for the sake of argument.'
Example 48 " Just suppose for the moment that Sartre is wrong about the contingency of ex¬
istence. Then what follows?"
Here, the hearer is instructed to imagine the result of contraction from a theory, even
though that contraction might not ultimately be warranted.
A full analysis of such constructions will have much in common with that offered
for counter factual conditionals in Revision Semantics (chapter 4).
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6.6.2 Negative Definitions of Concepts, and definition by revision
Broadly speaking, assume a 'concept' of something to be similar to a theory about its
properties and relations to other theoretical entities. People commonly use figures of
speech in order to define new 'concepts' in terms of others;
Example 49 "Modern classical music is just ambient music, but without all the electronic in¬
struments."
The new concept (or theory) to be defined is given by contracting a property or set of
properties from another 'concept'. Concepts can also be defined byway of revision (again,
such examples could be handled by a system like RDMPL):
Example 50 "Red ants are black ants, except they're red."
Such definitions are used when the speaker believes that an audience understands one
particular concept, some of the properties of which can be 'removed' in order to de¬
fine a more general concept, or revised in order to specify a slightly different concept.
One might imagine that such a definition can be captured byway of conjunction, but as
Fuhrmann points out (in [35]), such a construal would lead to contradictory definiens
for all negative definitions a = (5 A 7, since 7 is intended to deny part of whatever (3
affirms. Thus I intend such definitions to be captured by way of theory contraction and
revision.
6.6.3 Universal Claims with Exceptions
As in the literature on default reasoning, there are the following kinds of everyday ex¬
amples of qualified universal claims,
Example 51 All that food is Naoko's, except maybe that melon.
In RMPL, this sentence could be analysed as:
[VxA'xJ ] Nm |
Example 52 No mammals lay eggs, except the platypus.
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Example 53 Everyone is going to vote, but Sam might not.
Again, these claims cannot properly be captured conjunctively, for contradictions im¬
mediately ensue. Rather, I take qualifications of universal claims to be interpreted as
(first-order) theory contractions and revisions.
6.6.4 Counterfactual and Future Conditionals
Recall the treatment of counterfactual conditionals sketched in RevisionSemantics (chap¬
ter 4). In addition, it seems that some future conditional statements are tests about the¬
ory revision.
Example 54 "IfMajor had lost his seat, Tony Blair would be prime minister now." (Counter-
factual Conditional)
Example 55 "Ifyou tell her the truth about last night, she will leave you." (Future Conditional)
In the first case the consequent of the conditional needs to be contained in the hearer's
theory (about politics) revised by the proposition in the antecedent.
Counterfactual Conditionals: <j> ip iff T+<p 1= f
Future conditionals can, it seems, be treated in the same way, but (strictly speaking) us¬
ing updates rather than revision, because the antecedent adds to, rather than contradicts,
the current "state of affairs".
6.6.5 Removal of sub-theories
Sometimes, in particularly drastic situations, an agent is instructed to remove whole
sub-theories from a larger theory.
Example 56 Everything you believe about last night is wrong.
Example 57 Everything I told you about quantum mechanics is a lie.
These cases require the theory of general contractions developed by Fuhrmann; in par¬
ticular, the above examples can be analysed as instances of package contraction (see
chapter 5).
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This completes the investigation of the scope of repair and contraction expressions
in dialogues. I claim that the semantics of such expressions can be formally analysed
using First-Order systems of Revision Semantics.
6.7 Revision Semantics in a formal theory of communication
Towards the close of [21], Paul Dekker provides the beginnings of a theory of informa¬
tion exchange in dynamic semantics. He argues that the standard epistemic modals are
better understood in a system of information exchange, where they serve to establish
agreement between agents. However, Dekker's system only accounts for information
growth between communicants (he is quite explicit about this limitation.) Recall, the
problem (from chapter 1),
"If the speaker attempts to exchange the information that 0, and the hearer has in¬
formation to the contrary, then the exchange is simply taken to come to a halt. For
the exchange to proceed in such a situation, a higher order discussion may be re¬
quired ... as well as some method of belief revision. Since ... belief revision fall[s]
beyond the scope of the present undertaking, we just have to settle for expelling
the occurrence of inconsistency of information."
(Paul Dekker, [21], pages 211-2.)
The problem is that, using EDPL, agents can only communicate about information
that they agree upon, or can consistently add to their information states. The prize of¬
fered by the RDMPL account of information states is an account of communicationwhere
agents can disagree and resolve conflicts.
Let sa and be the information states of two agents a and b. Following Dekker,
pages 209-218 of [21], take the ordered pair (sa, Sb) as the information state of a two-
agent system10. Assertion of 0 by either agent, results in the new state (sa, Sb) [0] =
(sa [01 , Sb lb]) By the Gricean maxim [45] of sincerity, whoever made that assertion al¬
ready has that information, so either sa [0] = sa or Sb [01 = (or both if both agents
already believe 0). InDekker's system one also has tomake the consistency assumption
that, if agent b is the hearer, s& ^ ->0, otherwise Sb implodes and the conversation is over.
The virtue of systems of Revision Semantics is that no such consistency assumption
10This can easily be extended to a multi-agent model.
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need be made. If a makes an utterance that conflicts with b's information, b can use a
constituent negation, or other downdate trigger, to remove that information from a's
state. Of course, this means that whoever is speaking has the power to change the be¬
liefs of a hearer almost atwill. Such a system models a gullible hearer and a charismatic
or authoritative speaker. Not too much is wrongwith this as long as the speaker is well-
informed and sincere. However, ultimately, agents ought to be autonomous in their re¬
sponse to utterances.
Consider the following account, where sa is a sincere speaker:
<So, sb) [</>] = (sa M , sb I0J) = (sa, sb [</>! }
(Sa,Sfc)] 0 [= (Sa,Sbj (f> |)
(Sa,S&)][0][= («o,SiI </»][)
(Sa, Sb) l<>4>} = (Sa, Sb) iff sa {<g ^ 0 and sb [</>]] / 0
(sa, Sb) [□</>! = (Sa, Sb) iff saJ [# S and s6J 4> 5
The above clauses establish the basics of a system of information exchange (one could
also add a variety ofmodals and conditionals, from both RS and US). The following ax¬
ioms provide a more detailed treatment.
U+ (cf>) and Ub (</>) stand for assertions of formula 4> by the agents. Similarly, U~{4>)
formalises refraction of 0 by agent a ("No, I didn't say that X"). The sentence stands
for a's belief that cj>. s'b is b's information state immediately after change from sb.
Agent a "believes that" <p if and only if their current information state supports 0.
In other words
Baifi) ^ Sa )= 4>
6.7.1 Axioms for assertion (update)
The minimal systemmodels sincere and gullible/credulous communicants, who cannot
contradict each other without collapse of the dialogue.
• U1 U+((fr) => sa 1= 4> (Assertion theory of belief/ Sincerity)
• U2 U+(<f>) => s'b = sb l<j> A Ba{4>)\ (Integrity Assumption) (Gullibility)
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• U3 U+ (4>) and Sb f= </> =4> s'b = Sb (Vacuity)
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U1 states that speakers only assert what they believe to be the case.
U2 states that the hearer models the speaker's beliefs/information, and that the hearer
unquestioningly accepts new information at the expense of old.
U3 ensures that telling hearer something he already believes has no effect (a simple con¬
sequence of the definition of update).
6.7.2 Axioms for retraction (downdate)
Agents can also remove a hearer's commitment to information.
• D1 U~(4>) => sa 4> (Sincerity)
• D2 U~(cf>) ^ s'b = St] <j> V Ba((f>) [ (Integrity Assumption) (Gullibility)
• D3 Ur~(<t>) and Sfc d => s'b = Sb (Vacuity)
6.7.3 Axioms for modals
Agents can use epistemic modals to test each other's states, and establish shared infor¬
mation.
• Ml U+(0(j>) => sa ^ cf) (Sincerity)
• M2 (Oc(>) and Sb \= (p => Ub((f>) (Co-operation/Sharing)
• M3 U£(0<j)) and s& |= -></> =>■ (Co-operation/Sharing)
• M4 U^(0(j)) and Sb 4> and Sb —>0 => V6+(Oq) (Vacuity)
M2 and M3 have the effect of ensuring that dialogue participants respond helpfully
to modal utterances. The modals are almost like questions here; they operate so as to
elicit any relevant information the hearer has.
M4 simply says that a hearer echoes the modal expression if they are unable to respond
more helpfully.
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6.7.4 Axioms for (teacher/pupil) repair
Dropping the gullibility assumption, and installing some level of autonomy, agents can
disagree and correct each other. Here, update is taken to revision in all cases for the
pupil a, who can learn from the teacher 6, who does not believe anything that the pupil
states. In other words, a is gullible, while b is sceptical and authoritative.
• R1 u+(<t>) => sa \=(j) (Sincerity)
• R2 U+((f>) s'b = sfc][ Ba(4>) ][ (Integrity Assumption)
• R3 Uf(4>) => s'a = sa][ 0 A Bb(cf>) ][ (Integrity Assumption)
• R4 Ua((/)) and Sf, (= —>0 =^> Gfe+(| -><p) (Correction/Repair instruction)
• R5 C6+ (T <t>) => s'a = s«][ (f> A Bh(4>) ][ (Correction/Repair acceptance)
• R6 Ua((t>) and sb ^ <t> and sb => C6~(0) (Downdate instruction)
• R7 Ub(4>) => s'a = saJ 4> I (Downdate acceptance)
R1 states that the pupil never lies. R2 states that the teacher believes that the pupil
believes whatever he utters. R3 states that the pupil believes whatever the teacher ut¬
ters.
R4 states that the teacher corrects utterances made by the pupil which she considers to
be incorrect.
R6 states that the teacher admits (and encourages!) ignorance, and R7 states that the
pupil becomes ignorant of whatever the teacher is too (perhaps this models a teacher
who disabuses the pupil of their, presumably unwarranted, beliefs).
Installing genuine autonomy
The above pupil/teacher system highlights a limitation of the theory change approach.
New information is always believed, according to the AGM tradition. Applying AGM
techniques results in a theory of communication inwhichwhoever is speaking can brain¬
wash their unfortunate audience. Genuine autonomy would result in a system where
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rational agents judge whether or not to take new information on board. This issue is the
subject of the next chapter.
6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I hope to have given some empirical motivation for the formal systems
of preceding chapters, brought to light some interesting linguistic phenomena, and ad¬
vanced the beginnings of a formal theory of communication. The theory allows agents
to interpret sentenceswhich conflictwith their current information (both about the world
and about the dialogue), and to dispute and repair information provided by other agents
in a dialogue. The following chapter explores how considerations about autonomous




This chapter is intended to further projects initiated in chapters 4 and 6; the investiga¬
tion of the potential for a fruitful combination of paraconsistent logics with systems of
theory change and of dynamic semantics. The marriage is explored with respect to the
application of the resulting systems inmodelling the changing information states of au¬
tonomous agents in dialogue (see eg: [38]). As defined in the first chapter, an agent is au¬
tonomous if it does not automatically accept new information, but judges whether or not
to do so on the basis of information available to it. AGM theory assumes that new infor¬
mation automatically overrides current information, partly because its concern is with
changing knowledge rather than belief. In some contexts this assumption makes sense (in
scientific experimentation perhaps), but it is not applicable in a semantics of dialogue
(as argued in the preceding chapters).
The basic idea here is to modify the base logic (the "internal logic") of theories and
information states, so that inconsistencies can be localized. The theory change compo¬
nent then acts so as tominimize the number of inconsistencies in a theory or information
state. Agents are taken to accept revision information in dialogue if the proposed infor¬
mation state is "better" than their current state. This begs the question of how one is to
judge between competing theories, a (very tough!) general question which is beyond
the scope of this work. I offer a modestway of grading competing information states in
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terms of their "information quality." A measure of the "Information Quality" (IQ) of a
state is developed and employed in a system of autonomous first-order theory change.
The result is also applied in an embryonic formal system of communication between
autonomous rational agents, in the style of the preceding chapter.
7.1 Motivation: the case for equal rights
Combinations of partial logics (those where the law of excluded middle is dropped) and
DPL have been investigated by Krahmer[64] '. Such a union is motivated by consider¬
ation of semantic presupposition (Strawson [93]). The possible combination of partial
logics with systems of dynamic semantics was discussed in chapters 3 and 5.
Related to this issue, it ought to be investigated how paraconsistent logics (those non-
trivial logics which lack the law of non-contradiction and are non-explosive under ad¬
dition of information) might be combined with Dynamic Semantics (DS). It was argued
(in chapter 4) that DS might have much to gain from such a marriage. A Paraconsistent
DS is (unsurprisingly enough) able to deal with phenomena which require a paracon¬
sistent semantics. The phenomena in question are self-contradictions in discourse and
resolution of disagreements in dialogue. In general, natural language interpretation is
taken to build up a partial (and possibly paraconsistent) theory about the world. The
argument for a paraconsistent basis for semantics turns upon particular notions of ac¬
ceptance, rejection, assertion, denial, and the interpretation ofnegation. Taking the epis-
temic, or informational, perspective on semantics (which was argued for in chapter 1)
it seems quite natural to accord the denial of a proposition the same primitive status
as an assertion (see eg: Pearce and Rautenberg [78], Wansing [106]). Rather than inter¬
preting negation classically, or intuitionistically in terms of assertion, implication, and
falsum (-ip = p —;>T), it is more natural, in the epistemic setting, to view ->p as the rejec¬
tion of p. Epistemic logic has concentrated on positive information to the the exclusion
of negative information, but rejection ought not to have such a secondary status. There
is more to negative information than that which is excluded by the positive informa-
^here the possible combination of paraconsistent and dynamic logics is acknowledged, but otherwise
ignored.
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tion. The classical approach suffices in certain contexts (where information is consistent
and exhaustive), but in the context of a dynamic semantics (dynamic in the "discourse-
external" sense) of dialogue, where there are very often conflicting statements under
discussion, a robust explicit account of negative information processing is called for.
Standardly, as discussed throughout the thesis, systems of dynamic semantics take
inconsistencies to render information states absurd (the "implosion problem"). How¬
ever, as far as dialogue modelling is concerned, there is an important distinction to be
made between the consistency of a dialogue and its coherence. In a paraconsistent seman¬
tics, an inconsistent dialogue can still be coherent, or interpretable. If contradictions do
not lead to state implosion, then inconsistencies are interpretable and repairable, and
an inconsistent dialogue remains coherent. Recall that, as Rescher and Brandom [83]2
argue,
"We must envisage the realm of the coherently discussable as broader than that of
the logically self-consistent."
[83], page 33.
As has been demonstrated in preceding chapters, conflict, disagreement, contradic¬
tion and inconsistency all play a positive and pivotal role in evolving dialogues.
If any example of the importance of paraconsistency in non-trivial theories is re¬
quired, recall that even in the history ofmathematics and logic (paragons of consistency)
there have been non-trivial inconsistent theories. Frege's second order logic was found
to be inconsistent, as were set theory (Russell's paradox) and Quine's version of it. Of
course, these same examples point out that consistency is still of primary value in de¬
termining a "good" theory. However, localized inconsistencies offer the promise of in¬
telligible and useful inconsistent theories, to which theory change systems can make
improvements.
2There are, of course, logical systems which fulfill Wittgenstein's prophecy, "Indeed, even, at this stage,
I predict a time when there will be mathematical investigations of calculi containing contradictions, and
people will actually be proud of having emancipated themselves from consistency." [110] p. 332.
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7.2 Rationality and Paraconsistency
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The concern of this thesis is not to describe what agents actually do in their revision pro¬
cedures (even though such data certainly supports the argument for paraconsistency),
but to explore what an ideal rational agent could and should (logically and rationally)
do during theory change, particularly change triggered by dialogue interpretation. Para¬
consistency is rational, because it takes conservation of information seriously. However,
there is a sense in which paraconsistent systems take conservation of information a little
too seriously.
As a methodological point, stipulations of what are to count as rational revisions
should be kept to aminimum, so as to avoid unnecessary prescriptiveness. Consistency
preservation under change has always been just such a prescription. This constraint,
embodied in the AGM literature, can be relaxed. Not only is it possible to escape the
constraints of consistency, but it is productive to do so.
Rationality postulates play the role of the regulating body of information manage¬
ment, and crucially, it is logic that provides the notion of consistency as a minimal mea¬
sure of the quality of information structures. How, then, could paraconsistency possi¬
bly qualify as a feature of rationally managed information states? Itmight seem at first
that paraconsistency and rationality are fundamentally at odds. This conclusion is, in¬
deed, inescapable if the rational options are identifiedwith logical options (but I argued
against such an identification in the first chapter). However, once rationality is tied to
good information management, the argument for paraconsistency as a useful strategy
becomes clear. Paraconsistent states and theories are robust under inconsistent input,
or inconsistencies derived from input. Thus, in any environment where input is not of
guaranteed consistency and where conservation of information is a primary consider¬
ation, paraconsistency is a decidedly rational virtue of a system. Communicative con¬
texts, of course, constitute just such an environment.
7.2.1 Paraconsistency and Dynamic Semantics
Paraconsistent logics have been discussed in the field of philosophical logic for a num¬
ber of years (see eg; Priest [78].) Those systems sought to tackle the classical "paradox"
Paraconsistency, Autonomy and Change 204
of implication Vg, pA ~>p \= q) the problem being that classical theories "explode" to ab¬
surdity under contradiction. That paraconsistency has not yet found its way into dy¬
namic semantics can perhaps be explained by the general avoidance of the issues of
correction, repair, and recovery from, absurdity in a formal semantics of dialogue. An
empirically adequate formal semantics must meet these challenges. While dynamic se¬
mantics based on partial logics (close cousins of paraconsistent systems3) have been ex¬
plored in relation to presupposition (Krahmer [64], Muskens [76]), a fusion of paracon¬
sistency and dynamics is unexplored territory, perhaps because the problem raised here
with regard to the implosive nature of DS has not before been focussed upon, and partly
because DS has not attempted to treat the repair and correction data which is analysed
in chapter 6.
To "go paraconsistent" in dynamic semantics is fairly simple. US, DPL, and their ex¬
tensions, can be based on a partial logic which allows the denotations of formulae to
be overdefined (simultaneously true and false) in the semantics. The resulting systems
each have a "double-barrelled" semantics (separate clauses for positive and negative
evaluation of each formula). Recent work in the logic of theory change (Pearce and
Rautenberg [78]) suggests that the notions of assertion and rejection should be taken as
independent epistemic primitives. An extension of this stance into dynamic semantics
proves to be productive.
It is a relatively simple matter to construct a Paraconsistent Update Semantics (PUS)
with the following properties:
Robustness under contradiction in PUS
s [0 A -i<£J 7^ 0, and
for 0 ^ 0, and s V^pus 0, s 10 A ->0J ^PUS 0
I develop this system shortly.
7.2.2 Paraconsistency and Theory Change
At first blush itmight seem that themotivations behind paraconsistent logics and theory
change systems are severely at odds. For the whole point of theory revision is to main-
'Paraconsistent logics are partial logics without a constraint ruling out overdefinedness on preposi¬
tional interpretations.
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tain consistency under inputs which contradict the initial theory (or which lead to con¬
tradictions in the theory via inference). In contrast, paraconsistent logics simply allow
any contradictions to persist, without trivializing the theory. However, an attempt to
combine the two perspectives is not destined to failure, but at once points out problems
and limitations in standard approaches to paraconsistency and theory change, and sug¬
gests a new approach to themodelling of interpretation in dialogue in terms of paracon¬
sistent and partial information states, where agents can repair each other's utterances
and robustly "agree to disagree".
The classical logician's disquiet over paraconsistency might be traced to the following
point. Even though paraconsistent logics have succeeded in the robust accommodation
of inconsistencies, inconsistencies in a theory remain undesirable. There is very little
point in allowing contradictions into theories if it is then the case that "anything goes"
in terms of theory change. If paraconsistent theories can be non-trivially updated with
any proposition (even those which lead to inconsistency) then, as far as modelling the¬
ories goes, this is in itself a kind of triviality. While theories ought to be non-explosive
and contradictions processible, constraints of some kind are required to ensure that their
number is kept to a minimum. These constraints are to be provided by a suitable (para¬
consistent) theory change system, which seeks to minimize the number of contradic¬
tions in a paraconsistent theory.
In general, any system which is to deal with phenomena of change has lessons to
learn from paraconsistent logic, and conversely, any paraconsistent logic ought to be
equipped with a change component. However, since the whole motivation for AGM
theory change systems was to preserve consistency under change at all costs, it might
still seem that the motivations behind paraconsistent logic and theory change systems
are fundamentally at odds.
One of the lessons of chapter 4 was that if a dynamic semantics is to incorporate the
insights of theory change systems then paraconsistency is a reasonable interface require¬
ment on their combination. There are (at least) two possible arguments for this conclu¬
sion.
(1) Contradictions must be recognised as such (without inducing triviality) before they
can enter a revision process. This recognition processwould require that, at some point,
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contradictions are represented in the logical formalism before they are removed. This
much is true; if the system is to reason about inconsistencies, then they must be repre¬
sented. However, if the system is to reason under inconsistent input, the requirement
need not be met. One can easily imagine an algorithmwhich checks for the consistency
of new information relative to a current theorywithoutmaking the requirement that any
contradictions are explicitly represented in the theory. For example, the US test s [Op]
could be carried out prior to updating by p, the update occurring conditional on success
of the test.
Nevertheless, a second line of argument is more compelling in the context of dia¬
logue modelling.
(2) Contradictionsmust be allowed to persist, and must be processed (in the case of the¬
ories built up during NL interpretation) without "infecting" unrelated propositions. It
is clear that dialogues continue non-trivially even when there have been mutually in¬
consistent utterances. Part of the point of dialogue is to resolve such inconsistencies, or
disagreements between participants.
To suppose that there is simply some "paraconsistent antechamber" where interpre¬
tations arrive to be integrated by the consistency preserving revision procedure (the as¬
sumption behind (1)), is unwieldy and unnecessary. Rather, the revision procedure it¬
self should incorporate paraconsistency (option (2)), minimizing the number of incon¬
sistencies whilst preserving information under contradiction.
Thus there is a trade-off between consistency of a theory and the amount of infor¬
mation that it contains. The following definition states that rational agents seek to gain
information which maximizes the consistency and informativeness of their current the¬
ory.
Definition 54 (Rational Revision with local inconsistencies)
Rational revision of a theory T by sentence p is modification so as to minimize inconsistencies
in T+p while maximizing the information in T+p.
This rather sketchy definition will be given some content by the formal work in the
remainder of the chapter. The difficult point comes, of course, in deciding whether a
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less consistent, more informative theory is better than a trivial but consistent one.
7.2.3 Autonomy and Paraconsistency
Paraconsistency is also desirable for autonomous theory change systems (see the pre¬
ceding chapter), where agents judge the quality of a new theory before accepting or re¬
jecting the revision instruction which would lead to it. Paraconsistency is used in order
to make a comparison between competing theories,without just ruling out inconsistent
ones. If theories do not contain inconsistencies, then any revised theory is as "good" as
the theory preceding it (some even contain less information).
T = {a,b,c} contains just as much information as T+->a = {->a, b, c} (Of course, ex¬
tended or consistently updated theories are always more informative than their prede¬
cessors.) An autonomous agent ought not, by conservation of information, to accept a
pure downdate, for without further evidence (ie: in the form of a revision) the agent is
simply being instructed to discard previouslybelieved information. For sceptical agents,
this is not a rational option.
7.3 TC and DS with inconsistencies
A deductively closed (or just "closed") theory T is a set of sentences of some language
C closed under the consequence relation of that language. T is paraconsistent if 3<j> €
C such that <f> A -i0 € T and T C.
Alternatively, T is paraconsistent when if T h p then T + -np # C
Note that a paraconsistent closed theory (where both p and ~^p are in the theory) can still
be complete.
Extension
For paraconsistent and partial theories, the basic propositional extension clause remains
the same, but closure under logical consequence does not lead to the absurd state in the
presence of contradictions. Thus, paraconsistent theory extension meets the following
conditions,
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T + (p A -ip) ^ C (Non-explosive)
which in terms of the dynamic semantics is;
s \p A -ipj ^ 0 (Non-implosive)
The semantical condition is met by way of defining a new paraconsistent consequence
relation, in the semantics developed below. Syntactically the condition ismet by using a
paraconsistent deducibility relation4 in the base logic for theories. Crucially, this change
can be made without loss of standard AGM results (see Restall and Slaney [84] for full
details).
Contraction and Revision
In a classical non-partial and consistent logic the contraction of a theory with respect
to a proposition p is tantamount to expansion with ->p. (Denial that p is assertion that
not p.) Van Eijck's second system for the extension of propositional theories (chapter
5's "FOTEm", from [96]) works in just this way; he is able to provide a translation of
that system into Veltman's Update Logic.
However, these are obviously not constraints that ought to be imposed upon theories
manipulated during natural dialogue. Since paraconsistent theories simply allow in¬
consistencies to accumulate, they benefit from contractionmethods which allow contra¬
dictions to be resolved. Removal of a sentence from a paraconsistent theory is achieved
in the same way as for standard, consistent, theories. As demonstrated in [84], para¬
consistent theories have the same well-defined notion of "maximal subtheories failing
to supportp" as classical theories do. Localized inconsistencies can be removed through
theory contraction, by the removal of one of the contradictory conjuncts.
The idea of revision as a consistency preserving update need not be discarded either.
Inconsistent updates are permitted, but revision is (still) consistency preserving. Asser¬
tions which contradict current information (unbeknownst to the speaker, presumably5)
can be interpreted as (paraconsistent) updates, while constituent negation clauses are
interpreted as revision instructions from a speaker who is aware of the hearer's "mis-
4see Priest[78]
3Otherwise they ought to utter a revision instruction, such as a constituent negation clause.
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7.3.1 Paraconsistent Update Semantics (PUS)
[.] + is the assertion function, for updating a state with positive information. [.] ~~ is
the denial function, which updates a state with negative information. The notation |.J
is used where the polarity of update is irrelevant.
M = (5, V+, V~) where U+(p), V~(p) are (not necessarily disjoint) subsets of S.
Assertion Denial
s [p]+ = £ s ! i € U+(p)}
s [-.p] + = s [p] ~
S lp A qj + = s [p] + [tf] +
s [p V qj + = s [p] + U s [g] +
s [Op] + = {i £ s | V0, s lp\+ \/= (p A -10}
s [p] " = {f G s | f € U"(p)}
»hpl ~ =s bl+
S Ip a qj ~ = s [p] - LJ s {qj ~
s [p V g] - = s [p] ~ [g] _
s [op] ~ — G s | 3(p such that s [p] ~ <fi A -«(>}
The system construes negation as denial, where denial has an independent status
in the semantics. Moreover, non-modal paraconsistent systems never reach the absurd
state. While this result may be a pleasing one in terms of philosophical logic, it pro¬
duces obvious problems for the standard definitions of the epistemic modals in US and
its extensions. For in dynamic semantics an update by Op is standardly a test against
absurdity under update of p. There can be no such test without an accessible absurd
state. The only change necessary, though, is to refine the usual US definition of [Op] to
take account of the new localized inconsistencies which paraconsistent logic provides.
s [Op] + = s iff \/(f>, s [p] + ]£ <p A -i</> (= 0 otherwise.)
Alternatively (as above):
s [Op] + = {i <E s | V0, s [p] + ^ <p A -Kp}
So, contradictions are still undesirable, but they can be accommodated.
Denial of possibility is treated similarly:
6Of course, quite whose information is the mis-information depends on your point of view.
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The upshot is that non-modal contradictions no longer implode the information state;
only modal statements (as tests) can do that. For example,
in PUS; s [->p] + [Op] + = 0,
which is another way of saying, s [p] ~ [Op] + = 0
7.3.2 Paraconsistent Revision Semantics (PRS)
Paraconsistency and revisability (as explored in chapter 4) complement each other; they
are solutions to the same general kind of problem. Here the two approaches are com¬
bined in a natural way.
There are 3 basic operations available in PRS (1) [p] +, (assert p), (2) [p] ~, (deny p),
and (3)] p [, (retract p). Revision by p is again defined as retraction of ->p followed by
assertion of p.
Assertion clauses Denial Clauses
s [pJ+ — e s M ^ ^+(p)}
s [-,p] + = S [p] -
8 1-p] + = 4 p [
« lb A ?1 + = 8 [p] + lq] +
S [Op] + = {« € s 1 V</>, s [p] + ft <p A -.0}
s [Dp] + = {f e s | s]p [= 5}
S [p] ~ = {* e s I i € V-(p)}
S bp] ~ = s [p] +
■s [—p] ~ = sj -.p [
s [p A q] - = s [p] - U a {qj ~
s [Op] ~ = {i G s | 30 such that s [p] - \/= 4> A -xf>}
s [Dp] ~ = {i <E s | s] -.p b S}
Downdate clauses
s]p[= U/J(s Up)
s] ->p [= UP(s U -■p)
- P 1= s W +
«]pA?[= s]p [Us] q [
4 Op[= {i G a | s]p[^ S}
4 DP [= {i € s | s [p] + 1= q A -<q, 3q}
Revision clause
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s][ p ][= s] -.p | [p] +
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Conjecture: PRS is complete with respect to a Theory Change system based upon
Restall and Slaney's [84] 7.
Repairing local inconsistencies
Revision Semantics allows repair of the absurd state (of course, in paraconsistent se¬
mantics there are many stable inconsistent states). This is because, in RS, 0 |f p] =
s such that s \= p. Downdating the absurd state removes all contradictions from that
state, since their retentionwould support p (it being the case that even one contradiction
in an RS state entails all propositions). However, simply using RS to effect such a repair
does not do justice to the idea of conservation of information. Information ought to be
conserved even in the face of absurdity, so that if a proposition q is supported by a state
which later becomes absurd via addition of some proposition p, then q ought to be sup¬
ported by the state after repair. Put formally, this results in the following desideratum:
01 P [1= Vg such that p ^ q, and s (= q, and s |p] =0
RS fails to meet this requirement since if s [p] =0 then 0] p [= s' and it is not ex¬
cluded that s C s'. (ie: it may be the case that s' ^ p)
PRS, with its localized inconsistencies, can repair absurdities in a way which pre¬
serves information present prior to the absurdity.
For example, in PRS take s \p A q A—= s' 0. Then s'J p [|= ->p A q
All in all then, in order to be able to rationally recover dialogues from absurdity,
while preserving prior information, PRS is required.
One could produce a version of RS that carries a consistency checkwith [OpJ before
7And see also Pearce and Rautenberg [78].
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allowing p to be asserted. Alternatively all updates could be treated as revisions, so that
consistency is always preserved. However, as illustrated in chapter 6, agents interpret¬
ing natural language do not always, or even often, seem to do this.
Paraconsistent Information States
A semantics for a paraconsistent logic must at least allow that some propositions can be
considered as both true and false simultaneously. Semantically (first-order) paracon¬
sistent models M = (D, d+, d~) are classical models furnished with a denotation and
anti-denotation for each n place predicate P, d+P and d~P £ D". Denotation and anti-
denotation may overlap, producing overdefinedness for some individuals. In order to
avoid partiality, impose the following constraint on the models:
(No underdefinedness) for all Pn : d+P{jd~P — Dn.
Partial theories are modelled by sets of total models considered disjunctively. As dis¬
cussed in chapter 3, further complicating the semantics byway ofpartial models is largely
superfluous. One could give a paraconsistent semantics by way of considering sets of
total models conjunctively (ie: where one model makes p true and the other false then
p is both true and false). However, partiality would then have to be modelled in some
other way.
7.3.3 Paraconsistent Predicate Logic (PPL)
The semantics of PPL is defined in terms of assignments in a model. 5 is a set of total
assignments such that i : VAR —► D for every i £ S. S is the set of all assignments.
Let [</>J + = [i £ S | i f= <t>} and
[01 - = {i £ S | i ft (/>}
so that [</>]+ and fpj ~~ are the sets of assignmentswhich respectively support and reject
4> (with respect to a suppressed model M.)
Definition 55 PPL8
8Based on what is called the "relevantist" approach to paraconsistency in [79]
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1. \P(ti ... tn)j + = {i | (i(ti)... i(tn)) G d+P}
[P(<i... in)J _ = {i | ... i(tn)) G d~P}
2. [-,0j + = -[0j-
b0J ~ = [01 +
3. [0 A 0J + = {i | i G [0J + and i£ [-0] +}
[0 A ip\ ~ = {i | i G [</>]- or i G [0] "}
4. [0V0j + = {f|iG [0J +or iG M+}
[0 v ip\ ~ = {i \i G 14>\- andie [0j '}
5. [3x0J + = {i | 3j and i =x j and j G [01 +}
[3x0j - = {i I Vj, i=xj=>je [0J -}
6. [Vx01 + = {« | Vj, i=xj=>je [0| +}
[Vx01 - = {? I 3j and i =x j and j G [01 "}
Here i =x j means f/zaf assignment j is exactly like i, but (possibly) for the value it assigns to x.
This allows a definition of the evaluation function Val : FORM x Dv —+ 7r.
Definition 56 Assertibility, Rejectibility, Overdefinedness
• 0 is assertible inM under assignment i, or Val(<j>, i) = {l},iffi G [0J +
• 0 is rejectible in M under assignment i, or Val(<fi, i) — {0}, iffi G [0J "
• 0 is overdefined in M under assignment i, or Val (0, i) = {0,1},?^ G [01" and i G [01+
alternatively; 0 is overdefined by i in M iff3i such that i G [0J + fl [01 ~~
Note that for all PPLmodels which obey the no-underdefinedness constraint [0J+ U
[01 - = 5
Entailment: £ |—a iff it is the case in all models M, under all assignments i, that if
for all f3 G £, 1 G Val(/3, i), then 1 G Val(a, i).
This is equivalent to: if V0 G S,i G [01 + then i G [a] +
s supports a if Vi G s, i G [aj +
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For the purpose of modelling robust information states, note that;
Fact 13 a A -icc ^ 0
a, -ia V 0 0.
Paraconsistent DPL, MDPL, RMDPL, and FRL
Given a paraconsistent predicate logic, as shown above, it is a simple matter to base a
dynamic predicate logic upon it, as well as the other first-order systems of chapter 5.
Indeed, once the base logic is fixed, its paraconsistency percolates up to all the systems
which stem from it. A range of systems akin to those of chapter 5, with completeness re¬
sults, could fairly easily be generated using a base logic which localizes inconsistencies.
In the remainder of the chapter I assume such a series of systems to have been devel¬
oped. These systems would differ form the systems of chapter 5 only in that they have
"double-barrelled" semantics for assertion and denial.
7.4 Information Quality Measures
Information Quality (IQ) measures are defined so as to provide a way of adjudicating
between competing theories. They are to allow agents to exhibit rational autonomy in
theory change, or information revision, in the sense that agents choose whether or not
to accept new information, on the basis of the "information quality" which its accep¬
tance would result in. AGM research simply models gullible agents; those assuming
new information to be true. Here, sceptical or autonomous agents judge the quality of
the incoming information; the merits it would bring to their current theory.
The basic idea is that more information is better information, but that inconsistencies
are undesirable (although not completely ruled out.) Thus, as long as an update or re¬
vision is consistentwith a rational agent's current theory, theywill accept it. If a down-
date would remove an inconsistency, but no other information, the rational agent will
carry out the downdate. The interesting cases arise inweighing up whether to accept an
informative new statement which induces inconsistency, and whether to accept down-
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dates which remove contradictions at the expense of other information.
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Coherence and Informativeness
I now define two simple informational (as opposed to logical) measures, which can be
used to guide theory change processes.
Definition 57 (PRS coherence)
Where #(T) is the number ofpropositional variables overdefined in T.
coh(T) = 777—-V ^
1 + #(T)
Definition 58 (PRS Informativeness)
I(T) =| {p | p £ T or ->p e T)
The informativeness of a theory is simply the number of propositional variables which
it contains information about.
Definition 59 (PRS Information Quality)
IQ(T) = ncoh(T) x mI(T)
Where n and m are parameters controlling the relative weightings of coherence and
informativity. A gullible agent, (perhaps a database for example), will value informa-
tivity over coherence, and vice versa for a skeptical agent (say, a pure mathematician)9.
Then define theory change to be conditional on the IQ measure of the proposed theory.
9One could easily imagine agents changing these parameterswith respect to the status of their dialogue
partner.
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Definition 60 (Autonomous Rational Theory Change)
T + p = Cl(T U {p}) iff IQ(T + p)> IQ(T)
T-p = n <*(T±. p) iff IQ(T-p) > IQ(T)
T+p = (T—->p) + p iff IQ(T+p) > IQ(T)
Example 58 Take T = {p,q,r}
Then should a rational agent accept the assertion +(q —> ->p A-ir At Au) ?
Put n = m — 1, then coh(T) = 1/1 + 0 = 1
coh(T') — coh({p, -<p, q, r, —>r, t, u}) = 1/(1 + 2) = 1/3
I(T) = 3,1(T') = 5
IQ(T) = 3,IQ(T') = 5/3
A rational agent, who values coherence and informativity equally (n = m = 1), would not
accept the proposed assertion, since IQ(T') < IQ(T).
Neither would they accept "-p" (the instruction to forget p), without any compensating in¬
formation.
7.4.1 Axioms for resolving disagreement
Dropping the gullibility assumption of the preceding chapter, and installing autonomy,
agents can disagree and correct each other, depending on how their "parameters" are
set for coherence vs. informativity.
• A1 Uf (f) => sa \= 4> (Sincerity)
• A2 Uf(4>) +- s'b = sj Ba((f)) ][ (Integrity Assumption10)
• A3 Uf(4>) and Sb \= ->4> =>• Ub(T -i</>) iff IQ(sb}[ f ][) < IQ(sb)) (Autonomous
Correction/Repair)
• A4 Uf( f f) and /C?(si][ <f> ][) > IQ(sb) => s'b = S(,][ <f> ][ (Rational Autonomous Accep¬
tance)
• A5 Uf(T <f) and IQ(sb}[ 4> ][) < IQ(sb) =+ Ub(-<f) (Rational Autonomous Downdate)
10Hearer models speaker's beliefs.
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• A6E/+(-</>) and IQ(sb}(f>l) > IQ{sb) =>• s'b = s^J ^>[ (Rational Downdate Acceptance)
Agents disagree only if incorporating the new information leads to a state of less
information quality.
One could even imagine a system where A2 is altered so that a hearer can detect
"lies". That is, if A2 were changed to
A2' U+(<f>) =>s'b = S6][ Ba(cf>) ][ iff IQ(s'b) > IQ(sb)
then the hearer could even refuse to accept that the speaker believeswhat they have just
uttered.
7.4.2 Information Quality in DS states
The IQ measures presented above work in the syntax of propositional paraconsistent
theories. Here I show how the definition can be extended to cover the information states
of Dynamic Semantics: first-order IQ measures over sets ofmodels and assignments.
The coherence of a predicate P can bemeasured inversely to the number of variables
that are assigned to fall in d+(P) f| d~(P). This set of the individuals overdefined for P
(the glut of P) is written #(P) C D. Then #{P)i Q V is the set of variables and names
overdefined for a predicate P relative to an assignment i (and a model m);
Definition 61 (Glut ofP)
#(P)i = {x € Vars U Cons \ i(x) G #(-P)}
Definition 62 (Coherence ofa Predicate)
If information about a predicate P has no overdefined variables or names, then that predicate is
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The coherence of a model is just the sum of the coherence measures of the predicates
which its interpretation function ranges over, in proportion to the number of those pred¬
icates. Coherence is intended to give a measure of the quality of information in a para-
consistent model ( classical models always have coh(M) = 1.)
Definition 63 (Coherence of a Model)
T,PePRED l+|#(P)i|coh(M) = PRED
We say a predicate is coherentwhen | (d+(P)f\d (P)) |= 0, and thenwrite coh(P) = 1.
A model is coherent (coh(M) = 1) iff all the predicates that it models are.
Informativeness
The informativeness I(P)i of a predicate P (in model I) is the number of variables as¬
signed to d+(P) 1J d~(P), the number of terms that the predicate applies to (either pos¬
itively or negatively).
Definition 64 (Informativeness of a Predicate)
I(P)i = | x £ V such that i(x) € d+(P) | + | x € V such that i(x)d~(P)} |
The informativeness of a model is just the sum of the informativeness of its predi¬
cates. Thus themore predicates a model interprets, and themore terms are classified by
a predicate, the more informative a model is.
Definition 65 (Informativeness ofa Model)
I(M) = £ I(P)i
PePRED
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Note that informativeness can increasewhile coherence decreases (the casewhere pred¬
icates become increasingly overdefined). We aim to give a combined measure which
will deal with the informational considerations in a given belief revision. Such a mea¬
sure could be thought of as a first-order analogue of the Epistemic Entrenchment (EE)
hierarchy for propositional theory change. The approach here has a number of advan¬
tages over the Gardenfors EE ordering. Rather than just being an ad hoc hierarchy of
beliefs, this finer grained set of measures provides a more principled and explanatory
framework for handling the informational considerations that arise in adjudicating be¬
tween alternative logically possible revisions11 The point is that paraconsistent first-
order theories might be fine-grained enough to be able to generate a suitable hierarchy
of subtheories for contractions, using IQ measures to grade competing subtheories.
The information quality of a model M, written IQ(M) is simply the weighted product
of its coherence and informativity measures. Where n and m are parameters reflecting
gullibility, scepticism, and (in combination) rigor of the agent.
Definition 66 (Information Quality)
For real numbers n and m;
IQ(M) = mcoh(M) x nl(M)
7.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed prospects for an integration of paraconsistent semanticswith
systems of theory change, arguing that the two approaches complement each other, par¬
ticularly in the application ofmodelling communication. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns
out that neither theory change systems nor systems of dynamic semantics suffer too
much under the adoption of a paraconsistent base logic. Dynamic systems gain "dou¬
ble - barelled" interpretation functions, and TC systems adopt a notion of "change on
the basis of increased Information Quality". The benefits of these changes are varied.
11
Again, see the multiple extensions problem.
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Systems of Paraconsistent Revisable dynamic semantics can model robust dialogue in¬
terpretation for (a variety of) rational autonomous agents. This allows an analysis of
dialogues in which contradictions may persist, but can also be resolved.
These considerations bring the thesis to a close. Various suggestions for further re¬
search have been made in the development of these chapters:
• An investigation of the use of structured theories and states for iterated revision.
• Further exploration of a range of epistemicmodalities employingmodel construction.
• A full account of the counterfactual conditional of Revision Semantics.
• A further investigation of the range of revisable dynamic systems suggested by chap¬
ter 5, and the properties of their "dialogue referents".
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